The verdictOn demand the evidence leans bullish: Three rival engine makers confirm the shortage lasts until 2028. ERock holds about $610M of customer cash. A new 1,543 MW permit application shows a pipeline well beyond the $1.7B backlog. On delivery and Texas the evidence leans bearish: The orders scheduled at 31 March cover only about $296M of the $363β393M of H2 revenue that guidance needs. Three control weaknesses are stillβ¦
Written by Claude (Anthropicβs AI) from public sources Β· Willem owns EROC Β· AI can make mistakes β numbers in brackets point to the sources Β· Not financial advice
Bull arguments show how well they survive the devilβs advocate (strong / medium / weak); bear arguments show the damage they could do after the counter-argument (high / medium / low).
Dropped since report #2: "Texas rules require backup generation." The final SB 6 rule (16 TAC Β§25.194, adopted 2026-09-18) explicitly left behind-the-meter generation "outside the scope" [18]. The tailwind did not materialise in the rule.
The point: a handful of buyers decide each quarter.
Evidence:
| Period | Top customer share of revenue | Other large customers |
|---|---|---|
| Q1 2026 | 37% | 13%, 12% |
| Q2 2026 | 28% | 13%, 13%, 11% |
| FY2025 | 18% | 16%, 14% |
Why it matters: a single delay, dispute or cancellation moves the quarter and the cash position.
π‘οΈ Counter-argument:
Severity: MediumβHigh.
The point: ERock wins on speed and capex, but loses on running cost. That limits the plant's life once the grid arrives.
Evidence: from the PFD [11]:
| Measure | McCloud (ERock) | El Paso Electric generic turbine |
|---|---|---|
| Heat rate | 12,000 Btu/kWh | 10,564 Btu/kWh |
| Fixed O&M | $59/kW-yr | $24/kW-yr |
| Fuel cost | $41.75/MWh | $26.75/MWh (existing units) |
| Service life | 20 years | 30 years |
Why it matters:
π‘οΈ Counter-argument: turbines aren't available until 2028β30 [21,26], and for a hyperscaler, compute revenue dwarfs the fuel cost.
Severity: Medium. It matters more in 2028β30 than today.
Per-share numbers use ~273M fully exchanged shares (219.4M Class A + B plus ~52.4M Class M equivalents) and a 25% tax rate (estimate). The share basis behind consensus EPS is not disclosed.
Caprock Ranch (1,543 MW) turns into a firm order β 30% chance by 2027-12-31
Margin surprise before 2028 β 17% chance within FY2027
Anthropic adds installation and O&M to its 470 MW order β 35% chance by 2027-06-30
A long ERCOT audit and missed Batch Zero deadline push more projects to self-power β chance not quantifiable
The Texas freeze or the 2027 legislature delays new Texas sites in the 2027β28 order book β 30% chance of a visible delay by 2027-06-30
ERock absorbs a 15% tariff on HD long blocks β 35% chance in FY2027
The H2 2026 ramp misses guidance β 38% chance by the FY2026 results (~March 2027)
Anthropic or another large customer cuts or delays an order β 12% chance within 36 months
The PUCT denies McCloud, or El Paso Electric rejects the conditions β 14% chance by 2027-03-31
Heavy selling around the 12-07 lock-up, amplified by the short base β 45% chance of a noticeable price drop in December
| # | Factor | Weight | Measured value | Score | Why |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Liquidity & funding runway | 15% | $626.6M cash, no debt, undrawn $250M ABL; but only ~$98M excluding $528M deposits; H1 burn ex-deposits ~$16M/month | 42 | FCF is positive only because of deposits. Excluding them, runway is roughly 6 months on cash, or ~20+ months with the ABL. No going-concern language. |
| 2 | Leverage | 10% | Net cash, $0 debt, $29.8M leases; TRA early-termination estimate $658M (contingent) | 18 | Net cash. The TRA is a contingent claim, not debt. |
| 3 | Dilution (last 12 months + overhang) | 10% | 219.4M A+B shares flat since IPO; IPO added 27.9M new shares (+12.7%); Class M ~52.4M (+23.9%) + ~18.7M plan reserve | 60 | 12-month change β +13%, with an overhang of ~33% that converts only above thresholds. |
| 4 | Profitability | 10% | H1 adj. EBITDA β$26.4M (β37%); FY25 β12.4%; FY26 guide +$3β9M | 66 | Clearly loss-making, guided to improve in H2. |
| 5 | Revenue quality & concentration | 10% | Top customer 28β37% of quarterly revenue, 62% of receivables; services 25% (FY25) to 34% (Q2) of revenue | 72 | Top customer above 35% in Q1, and mostly one-off equipment revenue. |
| 6 | Execution & track record | 10% | 3 unremediated material weaknesses; no guidance track record; first guide needs a 5x H2 ramp; late Form 4 | 82 | The anchor puts a material weakness in the 81β100 band. |
| 7 | Competitive position & disruption | 10% | 12β18-month delivery vs 40β80+ weeks for rivals; but higher heat rate and O&M than turbines; Cat, Generac, WΓ€rtsilΓ€ and Cummins scaling | 52 | A strong niche today that becomes contested in 2028. |
| 8 | Cyclicality & commodity/macro sensitivity | 10% | Tied to the AI capex cycle; peers fell 14β24% in 2020 [28,29,30]; Q2 revenue β42% y/y on lumpiness | 62 | Highly cyclical demand driver, with lumpy deliveries. |
| 9 | Regulatory, legal & geopolitical | 5% | TCEQ freeze (no end date), McCloud PFD, 2027 legislature, Korea tariff, Hagens Berman investigation | 72 | Large pending rulings in its home state. |
| 10 | Valuation & expectations | 10% | EV ~1.4β1.9x FY27 sales; all-Buy coverage; short interest ~43% of tradeable float; 12-07 unlock | 70 | Not expensive on forecasts, but heavy short interest with a fragile near-term story. |
Overall: weighted average = 6.3 + 1.8 + 6.0 + 6.6 + 7.2 + 8.2 + 5.2 + 6.2 + 3.6 + 7.0 = 58.1 β 58.
Change vs last: β4 versus 62 under the old six-area method. This is mostly a method effect. The v3 factors give separate weight to the net-cash, no-debt balance sheet (Leverage 18), which the old "Financial health & dilution" area blended with dilution and the TRA. Underlying risk is unchanged to slightly higher:
Ranking check: EROC (58) sits between ALM (55) and DUOT (66). It is riskier than ALM because its revenue still rests on an unproven 5x ramp and a single Texas customer under regulatory review, against ALM's producing mine. It is safer than DUOT because it holds net cash and contracts with investment-grade hyperscalers rather than one cash-short counterparty.