Stock Analysis · Bulls vs Bears

Almonty Industries ALM

🐂 Bulls vs Bears 🐻Report #311 Oct 2026
★ Willem owns this stock · 3.9% of the portfolio
55
elevated risk▼ −4 vs last
🐂 9vs10 🐻
Bears lead
25%
▲ Chance of the biggest tailwind the forecasts miss
40%
▼ Chance of the biggest headwind the forecasts miss
The verdict

The balance sheet has stopped being a risk. Cash is C$1.23B, the convert runs at 2.25% to 2031, and the "minimum of 15 months" line turns out to be stale boilerplate. What is left to decide is whether Sangdong delivers and what tungsten is worth. Consensus 2027 revenue of ~C$991M already assumes Phase I near full capacity at about today's price. Against that, the mill ran 13–16 hours a day in late September and…

🎙️ Bulls vs Bears podcast — Almonty Industries
Alex and Sam debate every bull and bear argument · 14:19
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Written by Claude (Anthropic’s AI) from public sources · Willem owns ALM · AI can make mistakes — numbers in brackets point to the sources · Not financial advice

🐂 Bull arguments 9

  1. 1China's controls keep Western tungsten scarce into the DFARS 2027 switchStrong
  2. 2C$1.23B cash and a cheap 2031 convert remove funding riskStrong
  3. 3Sangdong is built, certified and bagging concentrateMedium
  4. 4A 21-year GTP offtake solves the buyer problem rivals still haveMedium
  5. 5Panasqueira alone now earns ~60% gross marginsMedium
  6. 6Phase II could double Sangdong outside the GTP contractMedium
  7. 7New side-contracts widen the base: Los Santos, molybdenum, RwandaWeak
  8. 8Fidelity built an 11% stake while early holders soldWeak
  9. 9Most brokers rate it Buy with targets about double the priceWeak

🐻 Bear arguments 10

  1. 12027 forecasts assume a full Sangdong ramp that hasn't startedHigh
  2. 2Western APT is drifting lower in a market with no spot tradesHigh
  3. 3GTP's implied price is ~76% of APT, not ~89%Medium
  4. 4Controls failed two periods running; auditor swapped before Sangdong's first yearMedium
  5. 5Every Sangdong date since 2022 has slipped, including Q3-26 ramp completionMedium
  6. 6One mine, one metal, and three buyers take nearly everythingMedium
  7. 7US$48M of buybacks bought at ~US$16.5, with no capex budgets publishedMedium
  8. 8Founders and cornerstone holders sold heavily at US$15–24Low
  9. 9An unexplained royalty takes ~16–17% of Panasqueira revenueLow
  10. 10Panasqueira volumes shrink and both sales contracts expire within four monthsLow

Bull arguments show how well they survive the devil’s advocate (strong / medium / weak); bear arguments show the damage they could do after the counter-argument (high / medium / low).

Bull case

🐂 Bull #1China's controls keep Western tungsten scarce into the DFARS 2027 switch

  • The point: China's export licensing has split tungsten into two prices. Almonty sells into the high one. From 2027-01-01, US defence buyers must also exclude Chinese ore, which locks in demand for non-Chinese concentrate.
  • Evidence:
    • On 2026-10-09, APT CIF Rotterdam was US$2,700–3,100/mtu (average US$2,900). Chinese 65% concentrate was ~US$738/mtu CIF China, a gap of ~US$1,580/mtu. SMM says "China cannot export APT", and says exports of tungsten products to the US and Japan are banned "this year" [32].
    • China exported zero APT in Jan–Feb 2026 and 20 t in May [34]. Only 15 firms are licensed to export tungsten for 2026–27 (secondary) [39].
    • The rule: DFARS 225.7018-2, from 2027-01-01, bars tungsten metal powder and heavy alloy whose ore or feedstock was mined or produced in China, Russia, North Korea or Iran [35].
    • The supply gap: an S&P study (summary only) has ex-China mines meeting only about half of ex-China demand in 2026, with a ~16 kt gap still open in 2030 [51].
    • Platts: proposed CIF-US APT and concentrate prices from 2026-11-30, and lists South Korea and Europe as eligible origins [38].
  • Why it matters: Each US$100/mtu on the realised price is worth ~US$21M a year on GTP's 210,000 mtu minimum (our arithmetic). Policy, not mining cost, sets the price Almonty earns.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • DFARS keeps Chinese ore out but does not oblige anyone to buy Korean ore. A head-of-agency waiver applies when compliant material "cannot be procured … at a reasonable price" [35].
    • Beijing's suspensions of other export-control measures run to 2026-11-10 and 2026-11-27, and the truce to 2027-01-10 [39,40]. China can reopen the tap whenever Western mines start up.
    • SMM expects new non-China APT smelting from 2027 to "pressure APT-led pricing" [32].
  • Verdict: Strong The two-price market still holds and has a legal anchor from 2027. But the price is set by policy, and Almonty controls none of it.

🐂 Bull #2C$1.23B cash and a cheap 2031 convert remove funding risk

  • The point: Almonty can build Phase II and the oxide plant without new equity.
  • Evidence:
    • At 2026-06-30: cash C$1,227.2M and working capital C$1,127.0M [2].
    • Face value of all debt is C$1,311.8M, of which C$1,195.4M is due in the year to June 2031 [2].
    • Convert: US$800M at 2.25%, ~US$18M coupon a year, conversion at US$27.40, plus a capped call to US$41.36 [2,14].
    • Near-term repayments: C$78.4M due in the next 24 months, of which C$18.2M (the Panasqueira Euro loan) was already repaid on 2026-07-15 [1,2].
    • All covenants were met at 2026-06-30 [1]. Interest income (C$3.8M) nearly covered interest expense (C$5.7M) in Q2 [1].
    • Open question answered: the MD&A line "continue operations for a minimum of 15 months" is word-for-word the same as in the FY25 MD&A (cash C$268M) and the Q1 MD&A [1,4,6]. It is stale boilerplate, not a new warning.
  • Why it matters: A slow ramp or a price dip costs time but does not force a dilutive raise. Most critical-mineral peers have no such cushion.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • The cash is borrowed. Net of face-value debt, it is roughly zero (about −C$67M after the July repayment, our arithmetic).
    • The KfW Sangdong loan (C$136.4M) begins amortising six months after "ramp-up commencement". That date is not defined [1,2].
    • US$543M of convert proceeds is earmarked partly for "possible acquisitions" [14].
  • Verdict: Strong The risk has moved from whether the money exists to how it is spent (Bear #7).

🐂 Bull #3Sangdong is built, certified and bagging concentrate

  • The point: The asset everyone was waiting for now physically exists and works.
  • Evidence:
    • The plant took feed from June 2026 [8]. The mining facility inspection certificates were issued on 2026-09-17, which the company called "the final administrative requirement" [11].
    • First concentrate bags came around 2026-09-23 [9].
    • Mill hours: 13 h/day, 7 days a week on 09-29 [9]; about 16 h/day on 10-07, adding 2 hours "every few days" [10].
    • The CEO says the first vessel is booked for 2026-10-24 [10,49]. This is not in any filing.
    • The CEO also says recoveries are "right where we would expect them" (no figure) [10].
    • A further 19,700 t of development ore at 0.35% WO3 was mined in Q2 [8].
  • Why it matters: It turns a decade of construction into an operating plant, the step Goldman, GBC and Jefferies all named as the key test [25,27,31].
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Still no throughput, tonnes, mtu, head grade, recovery or unit cost has been published.
    • Three slurry pipes failed and replacements were flown in from Europe [10].
    • "Commissioned and producing" was already claimed in the 2026-03-16 release (report #2), three months before ore went through the plant [8].
  • Verdict: Medium The plant is real, but the operating data isn't public yet.

🐂 Bull #4A 21-year GTP offtake solves the buyer problem rivals still have

  • The point: Western APT smelting is the bottleneck. GTP (Plansee) guarantees Sangdong a seat at one of the few non-Chinese refiners.
  • Evidence:
    • Amended 2026-07-14: term 15→21 years, volume 3.15M→4.41M mtu, minimum 210,000 mtu a year after ramp-up, more than 90% of Phase I, price +6.3% [7].
    • SMM says long-term smelter books outside China are "essentially full", leaving many ex-China miners unable to find buyers [32].
    • Plansee still holds 27.66M shares (9.78%) [21] and guaranteed Sangdong's KfW overrun lines (report #2).
  • Why it matters: Volume risk is gone for 21 years, and the price stays indexed to spot with no cap (per the 2025 F-10, report #2).
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • The July release is internally inconsistent. Its "US$490M annual revenue at current APT" works out to ~US$2,333/mtu, only ~76% of the ~US$3,050 APT of early July (Bear #3) [7].
    • GTP's right of first refusal means Almonty cannot sell even its spare Phase I tonnes above GTP's terms [5].
    • The CEO calls it "a standard market agreement that's based on spot price" [10], so it passes any price fall straight through.
  • Verdict: Medium Its value is that the volume is placed. On price, it is less generous than we assumed in report #2.

🐂 Bull #5Panasqueira alone now earns ~60% gross margins

  • The point: Even the old, shrinking mine is very profitable at today's prices, and Sangdong's planned costs are lower.
  • Evidence:
    • Q2-26: revenue C$43.0M, mining income C$26.1M (60.7%), adjusted EBITDA C$17.6M (40.9%) [3].
    • Q1-26: 51.2% margin. Q3-25: ~15% [3,4,48].
    • Free cash flow by quarter: Q1-26 −C$12.1M, Q2-26 +C$6.8M. The Q2 figure was helped by payables up C$26.5M in H1 [1,2,4].
    • The Sangdong technical report puts AISC at US$136/mtu at plan grade (report #2).
  • Why it matters: At ~US$2,300–2,900/mtu, even a cost several times the plan leaves a large margin per mtu.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • The margin is entirely price. Panasqueira MTUs sold fell 21% q/q [1].
    • A "Royalties" charge (Bear #9) and G&A of C$8.9M a quarter absorb a large share [3].
    • H1 free cash flow was still about −C$5M (our arithmetic).
    • Sangdong at 0.25% grade could cost ~US$223/mtu (report #2 arithmetic). That is still small, but unproven.
  • Verdict: Medium The margin is real at today's price, but it says nothing about Sangdong.

🐂 Bull #6Phase II could double Sangdong outside the GTP contract

  • The point: Phase II (1.2 Mt a year, "potentially over 460,000 mtu annually") is not covered by GTP, so it could be sold to US or Japanese buyers at any Western premium.
  • Evidence:
    • Shareholder letter: "Phase II is officially a go", with underground development progressing and orders "placing with Metso … including new mills". It calls Phase II "fully funded" and targets completion in 2027 [9].
    • Phase II is permitted under the Phase I approvals [1].
    • Mill orders were expected "within four to six weeks" of 10-07 (secondary) [47].
    • Stifel argues Almonty could lead Western tungsten output by end-2028 on Phase II [26].
  • Why it matters: At GTP-equivalent pricing, an extra ~230,000 mtu would add roughly C$740M of revenue a year (our arithmetic; see Tailwinds).
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • No Phase II or oxide capex has been published anywhere. Asked this run, still not found [1,9].
    • The MD&A makes Phase II "subject to positive operating results from Phase I" [1], and Phase I has no published results.
    • Phase I took about four years longer than first guided [46].
  • Verdict: Medium for 2028+, Weak for 2027.

🐂 Bull #7New side-contracts widen the base: Los Santos, molybdenum, Rwanda

  • The point: Almonty is adding floor-priced or take-or-pay revenue outside Sangdong.
  • Evidence:
    • Los Santos tailings (Spain): take-or-pay with Sandvik's WBH for ≥~1,720 t contained WO3 (≈172,000 mtu, our arithmetic), index-linked with a floor, plus a US$3.0M conditional upfront payment. The plant has been in care and maintenance since 2020 [15].
    • Molybdenum: SeAH takes 100% at a US$19/lb floor (report #2). Drilling was 37% done by June [1].
    • Rwanda: a 75/25 joint venture with the government (2026-09-14), with no tonnages disclosed [9].
  • Why it matters: WBH is described as the only integrated tungsten smelter outside Asia and Russia [15]. A second Western refiner as customer reduces dependence on GTP.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • The Los Santos floor level, the duration and the restart date are undisclosed.
    • Molybdenum is Inferred resource only.
    • Rwanda has no numbers.
  • Verdict: Weak to Medium. Los Santos is the only one that could matter before 2028.

🐂 Bull #8Fidelity built an 11% stake while early holders sold

  • The point: A large long-only holder has been absorbing the supply from founders and cornerstone holders.
  • Evidence:
    • FMR's stake went from 18.29M shares (6.5%) at 03-31, to 27.93M (9.6%) at 06-30, to 31.76M (11.1%) at 07-31. Of that, 16.19M (5.7%) sits in Fidelity Tactical High Income Fund [22].
    • CEO Lewis Black bought 100,000 shares at US$14.95 on 2026-03-24 (aggregator) [24].
  • Why it matters: It shows informed institutional demand at US$14–20.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Holding much of it in a high-income fund suggests part of the position may be convert-related.
    • Black's 100k purchase came the day after a 5M-share block sale by his own vehicle (Bear #8).
  • Verdict: Weak

🐂 Bull #9Most brokers rate it Buy with targets about double the price

  • The point: Sell-side coverage expanded quickly in Q3 and is mostly positive.

  • Evidence (all paywalled; public summaries only):

    Broker Rating Target Date
    Jefferies Buy US$26.25 09-02
    Stifel Buy US$25 09-24/25
    D.A. Davidson Buy US$33 09-15
    BofA Buy US$23 08-31
    GBC Buy US$30 ~08-20
    Oppenheimer Outperform US$25 07-10

    Sources: [26,27,28,31].

    • Price: US$11.87 on 10-09 [29].

  • Why it matters: If Sangdong produces, the coverage is already in place to re-rate the stock.

  • 😈 Devil's advocate:

    • Most targets predate the ~50% fall. Goldman (Neutral, US$13) is the most recent major initiation and sits closest to the price [25].
    • FY26 consensus (C$346.6M) implies ~C$278M of revenue in H2, against C$68M in H1 [28]. The models look stale.

  • Verdict: Weak. Targets lag, and none reflect published Sangdong data, because none exists.

Bear case

🐻 Bear #12027 forecasts assume a full Sangdong ramp that hasn't started

  • The point: Consensus has Sangdong at or near Phase I nameplate in 2027. Almonty has not published a single operating number.
  • Evidence:
    • Consensus (StockAnalysis, 12 analysts, 2026-10-09): FY26 revenue C$346.6M (range 233–506M), EPS 0.40; FY27 C$990.7M, EPS 1.69 [28].
    • Our arithmetic: Panasqueira runs at ~C$160M a year at current prices (estimate, from Q2's C$43M). That leaves ~C$830M ≈ US$600M for Sangdong in FY27, or roughly 230,000–260,000 mtu at US$2,333–2,600/mtu. That is all of Phase I's ~230,000 mtu capacity.
    • Mill hours: 13 h/day on 09-29 [9] and ~16 h/day on 10-07 [10]. The Q2 MD&A expected ramp-up "completed during Q3-2026" [1], which looks missed.
    • Grade: the stockpile is ~139,700 t at ~0.25% WO3 [8]. Nameplate output needs ~0.42% at 85% recovery (report #2 arithmetic). At 0.25%, the plant makes ~136,000 mtu a year at full hours.
    • Goldman expects a "more gradual" ramp than the market [25].
  • Why it matters: A year at ~60% of capacity removes ~C$258M of revenue and ~C$0.54 of EPS (about a third) from FY27 (see Headwinds).
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Starting on low-grade stockpile is a deliberate de-risking choice.
    • Development ore at 0.35% is coming.
    • Hours are rising every few days.
    • GTP's 210,000 mtu minimum applies only after a 12-month ramp, so the contract allows for a slow start.
  • Severity: High This is the biggest gap between what the market expects and what has been shown.

🐻 Bear #2Western APT is drifting lower in a market with no spot trades

  • The point: The price that drives 100% of revenue is easing, and it is set in a market too thin to defend it.
  • Evidence:

    • Price path:

      Period European APT (US$/mtu)
      Q2-26 average 3,075
      2026-08-07 3,087
      2026-09-18 ~3,000
      2026-10-09 ~2,900 average, unexecuted offers near 2,700–2,750

      Sources: [1,32,33].

    • European and US spot trading has been "virtually zero" for a quarter [32].

    • China: domestic APT fell to RMB 590,000/t, the September peak season failed, and utilisation is below 70% [33]. Chinese concentrate fell more than 60% from its March peak to late May [34].

    • Substitution: scrap is about one-third of 2026 supply (+~50% y/y) [34]. Steelmakers are switching from ferro-tungsten to molybdenum [34]. Rotterdam ferro-tungsten fell US$35 to US$175/kg W in September [33].

    • Goldman expects prices to "normalize" as new mine supply, recycling and refining respond [25].

  • Why it matters: Each 10% fall in APT takes roughly C$99M of revenue and ~C$0.23 of EPS off FY27 consensus (our arithmetic, 65% after-tax drop-through).
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • The Western price has drifted, not collapsed: ~−6% from Q2.
    • The China weakness is a domestic margin squeeze. China still cannot export APT [32].
    • DFARS demand starts in 11 weeks.
  • Severity: High

🐻 Bear #3GTP's implied price is ~76% of APT, not ~89%

  • The point: Report #2 assumed Almonty is paid ~89% of APT. The July GTP release implies far less on Sangdong's main contract.
  • Evidence:
    • The release headline says "US$490 Million in Contracted Annual Revenue at Current APT Pricing", against a minimum of 210,000 mtu a year [7]. That is US$2,333/mtu. European APT averaged ~US$3,050 in early July [1,32], so about 76.5%.
    • The uplift is "at least US$30 million per annum" [7]. That is ~US$143/mtu, so the pre-amendment price was ~US$2,190, about 72% of APT (our arithmetic).
    • The release body says "US$490 million over the 21 year contract", so the release contradicts itself [7]. Only the annual reading fits the US$30M a year and US$630M lifetime uplift.
    • The 89% figure in report #2 applied to Panasqueira concentrate, not to GTP.
  • Why it matters: If analysts model Sangdong at ~89% of APT, FY27 Sangdong revenue could be ~C$120M too high (−12% of FY27 revenue, our estimate).
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • The figure may be conservative: "current APT" could mean a lagged monthly average. Treatment and freight to Europe also cost money, which a CIF-Rotterdam APT quote includes.
    • Almonty has not disclosed the formula, so 76% is our derivation, not a fact.
  • Severity: Medium It is a level shift in value, not a threat to the business.

🐻 Bear #4Controls failed two periods running; auditor swapped before Sangdong's first year

  • The point: The first Sangdong numbers will come through a weak control environment and a brand-new auditor.
  • Evidence:
    • Disclosure controls were "not effective" at 2025-12-31 and at 2026-06-30. The cause is a material weakness in segregation of duties and IT general controls. Assessment is to be "substantially completed in Q3-2026" [1,6].
    • Zeifmans resigned "at the Corporation's request" on 2026-09-29. PwC was appointed the same day. There were no reportable events [12].
    • Small sloppiness:
      • Q1's "Selling costs" of C$4.4M was relabelled "Royalties" in Q2 without comment [1,4].
      • The MD&A gives the KfW Euro loan as both EUR14,661k and EUR14,662k [1].
      • The GTP release contradicts itself (Bear #3) [7].
  • Why it matters: PwC's first year-end audit (FY26, due ~March 2027) covers complex derivative accounting. The convert's conversion feature produced a C$204M gain in Q2 [2].
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • PwC is an upgrade suited to a Russell 1000 company.
    • Both auditors confirmed there were no disagreements.
    • The CFO's review of non-routine adjustments found "no material inaccuracies" [1].
  • Severity: Medium

🐻 Bear #5Every Sangdong date since 2022 has slipped, including Q3-26 ramp completion

  • The point: The company's dates have not been reliable.
  • Evidence:

    • Timeline:

      When said What was said
      2020 Production "in 2022 if all goes according to plan" [46]
      Nov 2025 (Q3-25) Commissioning "in near-term" [48]
      FY25 MD&A Commissioning "in due course" [6]
      Q2 MD&A Ramp-up "completed during Q3-2026" [1]
      09-29 Mill at 13 h/day [9]
      10-07 Mill at 16 h/day [10]

    • The shareholder letter says "we have kept our focus and kept our promises" [9].

  • Why it matters: Investors cannot yet rely on the 2027 Phase II date, which is the basis of the bull growth case.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Certification and plant feed did arrive within the 2026 guidance.
    • Mining start-ups commonly slip.
  • Severity: Medium

🐻 Bear #6One mine, one metal, and three buyers take nearly everything

  • The point: Revenue today is one Portuguese mine selling to two refiners. Tomorrow it is one Korean mine selling >90% to one refiner.
  • Evidence:
    • FY25 statements: "the majority of the output … is sold to two customers … one of which is a shareholder" [6].
    • Percentages are not disclosed [1,6].
    • GTP takes >90% of Phase I for 21 years [7].
    • Only 3–4 non-Chinese APT smelters exist (report #2).
  • Why it matters: A dispute with, or trouble at, Plansee/GTP would leave Sangdong with almost no alternative buyer.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument: Plansee is a large, century-old private group. It is a 9.78% shareholder and guaranteed Sangdong's KfW lines, so its incentives are aligned [21].
  • Severity: Medium

🐻 Bear #7US$48M of buybacks bought at ~US$16.5, with no capex budgets published

  • The point: Capital is being deployed before the operating plan has numbers.
  • Evidence:
    • 2,914,739 shares were bought for US$48M (US$16.5 each) by 09-29, about 39% above today's US$11.87 [9,29].
    • The CEO says: "We intend to keep buying, leveraging our fortress balance sheet" [9].
    • US$543M of convert proceeds is for general purposes "including possible acquisitions" [14].
    • No Phase II, oxide plant or Los Santos capex has been disclosed. The oxide plant has had "no significant capital expenditure" [1].
  • Why it matters: The cash cushion in Bull #2 is borrowed. Spending it on buybacks at peak-cycle prices, or on an acquisition, would leave less for Phase II.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument: US$48M is ~4% of cash. The 2024 MOU figures point to Phase II costing tens of millions, not hundreds (report #2).
  • Severity: Medium

🐻 Bear #8Founders and cornerstone holders sold heavily at US$15–24

  • The point: The people and partners closest to the asset reduced exposure in 2026.
  • Evidence:
    • Open question answered: the Black/D'Amato Form 144 was executed. Almonty Partners LLC sold 5,000,000 shares at ~US$15.25 on 2026-03-23 [19,24]. Black's 13G then showed 19.46M shares (6.9%) [20].
    • Plansee sold 2.5M shares on 02-27 [21].
    • Deutsche Rohstoff sold ~5M at ~US$16 by 07-22 (secondary) [23].
    • Director Trachuk sold ~400,000 shares on 07-01 to 07-08 at C$21–24 (aggregator) [24].
    • Executive director Kwon sold on 08-21 (aggregator prices garbled) [24].
    • No insider purchase was found other than Black's 100k on 03-24 [24].
  • Why it matters: It adds supply and shows that insiders thought US$15–24 was a fair price to sell at.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Black still controls ~19.5M shares [20].
    • The sales were at prices 30–100% above today's.
    • Fidelity absorbed far more than was sold (Bull #8).
  • Severity: Low

🐻 Bear #9An unexplained royalty takes ~16–17% of Panasqueira revenue

  • The point: A large, price-linked cost line appeared with no explanation.

  • Evidence:

    Quarter Royalties Share of revenue
    Q2-26 C$6.97M 16.2%
    Q1-26 ~C$4.36M (derived) 17.2%
    Q2-25 C$0.09M 1.2%

    Sources: [1,4].

    • In Q1 it was labelled "Selling costs" [4].
    • The AIF lists no stream. Sangdong has no royalty [5].

  • Why it matters: Interpretation: a charge that rises ~78x while revenue rises ~6x looks like a sliding-scale or price-participation royalty. If something similar applies to Los Santos or other Portuguese and Spanish assets, margins at high prices are lower than they look.

  • 🛡️ Counter-argument: It does not touch Sangdong, which will be ~80% of revenue. At Panasqueira it has already been absorbed in the 60.7% gross margin.

  • Severity: Low.

🐻 Bear #10Panasqueira volumes shrink and both sales contracts expire within four months

  • The point: The only cash engine is declining, and its terms reset soon.
  • Evidence:
    • Q2 production −20.8% y/y; shipments −17.9% y/y; MTUs sold −21% vs Q1 [1,3].
    • The Sumitomo Electric offtake expires 2026-12-31. The WBH (Sandvik) contract expires 2027-01-31 [5].
    • No renewal has been announced.
  • Why it matters: If APT falls before Sangdong ramps, falling Panasqueira volume makes the hit worse.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • These contracts are "typically renewed on an annual basis" [5], and Western buyers are short of supply.
    • Renewal could even reprice upward (see Tailwinds).
  • Severity: Low

Tailwinds NOT in the forecasts

Basis for all sizing (estimates):

  • Baseline: FY2027 consensus revenue C$990.7M and EPS C$1.69 (StockAnalysis, 12 analysts; we read both as C$, the reporting currency) [28].

  • Other inputs:

    • ~285.6M shares (288.5M less the buyback).
    • US$1 = C$1.38 (estimate).
    • After-tax incremental margin of 55% on new volume.
    • 65% after-tax drop-through on price changes (23% tax, ~16% variable royalty and selling costs).

  • No FY2028 consensus was found.

  • Phase II producing at scale through 2028 — 25% chance by end-2027 (full-year effect in FY2028)

    • Impact on revenue: +~C$740M vs FY2027 consensus (+75%). Shown against FY27 because no FY28 consensus exists. Some FY28 models may already include part of this.

    • Impact on EPS: +~C$1.43 per share (+85% vs FY2027 consensus).

    • How we got the number (estimate): 230,000 mtu × US$2,333 × 1.38 = C$740M × 55% ÷ 285.6M ≈ +C$1.43.

    • Expected value: 0.25 × C$1.43 ≈ +C$0.36 per share.

    • What it is: Phase II lifts Sangdong to 1.2 Mt a year, "over 460,000 mtu", completed in 2027 [9].

    • Why it's not priced in:

      • FY27 consensus already looks like full Phase I alone.
      • Goldman sees a gradual ramp [25].
      • There is no capex budget to model.

    • Trigger to watch: Metso mill order with a value; Phase I at 24/7; a Phase II capex number in the Q3 MD&A.

    • Why this probability: a one-year build when Phase I took ~4 years longer than first guided, and the MD&A makes Phase II conditional on Phase I results. Permits and funding are in place.

  • Los Santos tailings restart with full-year deliveries in 2027 — 35% chance by end-2027

    • Impact on revenue: +~C$138M vs FY2027 consensus (+14%).

    • Impact on EPS: +~C$0.19 per share (+11%).

    • How we got the number (estimate): 172,000 mtu contracted ÷ assumed 4-year life = 43,000 mtu × ~US$2,320 (80% of US$2,900) × 1.38 = C$138M × 40% after-tax ÷ 285.6M ≈ +C$0.19. The duration and payable rate are not disclosed.

    • Expected value: 0.35 × C$0.19 ≈ +C$0.07.

    • What it is: a take-or-pay with Sandvik's WBH, index-linked with a floor [15]. The AIF had targeted a "late 2026" restart, and the plant modification costs only ~€1M (per MD&A).

    • Why it's not priced in: it was announced 2026-09-17, after most models were set. Volumes and timing are undisclosed.

    • Trigger to watch: a restart announcement; the US$3.0M upfront payment received.

    • Why this probability: it is cheap and simple, but the plant has been idle since 2020 and the company's attention is on Sangdong.

  • Western-origin premium on Panasqueira renewals and non-GTP tonnes — 25% chance within 2027

    • Impact on revenue: +~C$23M vs FY2027 consensus (+2.3%).

    • Impact on EPS: +~C$0.05 per share (+3%).

    • How we got the number (estimate): 10% premium × (C$160M Panasqueira + C$72M for ~20,000 non-GTP Sangdong mtu) = C$23M × 65% ÷ 285.6M ≈ +C$0.05.

    • Expected value: 0.25 × C$0.05 ≈ +C$0.01.

    • What it is:

      • Platts CIF-US prints (proposed for 2026-11-30, with Korea and Europe eligible) [38].
      • DFARS ore-tracing from 2027-01-01 [35].
      • The Sumitomo (12-31) and WBH (01-31) contracts renew against that backdrop [5].

    • Why it's not priced in: consensus is built on the European APT quote, and the Platts launch is not yet confirmed.

    • Trigger to watch: the first Platts CIF-US print versus Rotterdam; Panasqueira renewal terms.

    • Why this probability: the legal driver is fixed, but waivers, a market with no spot trades and GTP's ROFR limit how much premium Almonty can actually capture.

  • US government offtake, stockpile sale or financing with Almonty — 18% chance within 36 months

    • Impact on revenue / EPS: not quantifiable. It would mostly re-label Phase II or oxide volume already counted above, and the terms are unknown.

    • What it is: DLA's US$2B-ceiling, US$150M-minimum tungsten IDIQ went to Elmet on 2026-09-11 [37]. Almonty could supply into it, or get EXIM/DoW funding for the oxide plant.

    • Why it's not priced in: no talks have been disclosed.

    • Trigger to watch: a DLA sub-supply deal, or oxide offtake upsized with a US agency.

    • Why this probability: Almonty is the obvious allied supplier. But Phase I is committed to GTP, and Washington has so far backed US-domiciled firms (Elmet).

Headwinds NOT in the forecasts

  • Sangdong Phase I averages ≤60% of capacity in 2027 — 40% chance by end-2027

    • Impact on revenue: −~C$258M vs FY2027 consensus (−26%).

    • Impact on EPS: −~C$0.54 per share (−32%).

    • How we got the number (estimate): a shortfall of ~80,000 mtu (≤138k vs ~220k implied) × US$2,333 × 1.38 = C$258M × 60% after-tax decremental (fixed costs stay) ÷ 285.6M ≈ −C$0.54.

    • Expected value: 0.40 × −C$0.54 ≈ −C$0.22.

    • What it is: 0.25% stockpile feed, sub-24/7 hours and teething (slurry pipes) keep output near 0.25%-grade arithmetic (~136k mtu at full hours).

    • Why it's not priced in: FY27 consensus implies ~full Phase I [28].

    • Trigger to watch:

      • Q3 MD&A (~mid-Nov) with the first tonnes and recovery.
      • Q4-26 mtu sold.
      • 24/7 operation by January.

    • Why this probability: grade alone caps early output near 60% of nameplate, and new tungsten plants often need more than a year to stabilise. Development ore at 0.35% and rising hours keep it below even odds.

  • European APT averages below US$2,000/mtu in 2027 — 30% chance for FY2027

    • Impact on revenue: −~C$307M vs FY2027 consensus (−31%).

    • Impact on EPS: −~C$0.70 per share (−41%).

    • How we got the number (estimate): −31% price (US$2,900→2,000) × C$990.7M = C$307M × 65% ÷ 285.6M ≈ −C$0.70.

    • Expected value: 0.30 × −C$0.70 ≈ −C$0.21.

    • What it is:

      • China extends or widens licensing when its suspensions lapse (11-10, 11-27) or the truce ends (2027-01-10).
      • New ex-China APT capacity arrives in 2027.
      • Scrap and molybdenum substitution keep growing [32,33,34,39,40].

    • Why it's not priced in: consensus looks built on roughly current prices (our inference from the FY27 arithmetic). Only Goldman explicitly models normalisation [25].

    • Trigger to watch:

      • Rotterdam APT below US$2,500.
      • The China–West concentrate spread below US$1,000.
      • MOFCOM licence approvals to the US or EU.

    • Why this probability: the price is still ~9x the 2024 average (US$333) [1]. Spot trade has dried up, and China gains by undercutting new Western mines. DFARS and the stockpiles cushion demand.

  • GTP realised price ~76% of APT versus models at ~89% — 35% chance that consensus uses the higher figure

    • Impact on revenue: −~C$120M vs FY2027 consensus (−12%).

    • Impact on EPS: −~C$0.28 per share (−16%).

    • How we got the number (estimate): C$830M Sangdong × (1 − 76/89) = C$121M × 65% ÷ 285.6M ≈ −C$0.28.

    • Expected value: 0.35 × −C$0.28 ≈ −C$0.10.

    • What it is: see Bear #3 [7].

    • Why it's not priced in: the formula is unpublished, and the release's annual reading has not been widely noticed.

    • Trigger to watch: the first Sangdong revenue per mtu in Q4-26 results.

    • Why this probability: we cannot see broker models. Some analysts may already use the US$490M figure, which would make this partly priced in.

  • Panasqueira contract renewals slip or reprice lower — 15% chance by Q1-2027

    • Impact on revenue: −~C$16M vs FY2027 consensus (−1.6%).

    • Impact on EPS: −~C$0.04 per share (−2%).

    • How we got the number (estimate): 20% of C$160M lost for half a year = C$16M × 65% ÷ 285.6M ≈ −C$0.04.

    • Expected value: 0.15 × −C$0.04 ≈ −C$0.005.

    • What it is: Sumitomo (expires 12-31) or WBH (expires 01-31) is not renewed on time, or is renewed with worse payables [5].

    • Why it's not priced in: renewals are assumed.

    • Trigger to watch: renewal releases in December and January.

    • Why this probability: Western buyers are short of material, so a lapse is unlikely. Worse terms are possible if APT falls.

  • Restatement or late FY26 filing under the new auditor — 12% chance by 2027-04

    • Impact on revenue / EPS: not quantifiable. The impact would come through trust and the multiple rather than revenue.

    • What it is: PwC's first audit finds errors, for example in derivative accounting or the royalty classification [1,12].

    • Why it's not priced in: none of the coverage we found discusses it.

    • Trigger to watch: the Q3 controls conclusion; any NT filing.

    • Why this probability: the material weakness has lasted years, but no misstatement has been identified.

Investment Risk Score: 55/100 (elevated)

# Factor Weight Measured value Score Why
1 Liquidity & funding runway 15% Cash C$1,227M (06-30). FCF Q1 −C$12.1M, Q2 +C$6.8M (WC-boosted). No undrawn lines. "15 months" = stale boilerplate 30 About break-even FCF with net cash roughly equal to face debt. Runway is effectively unlimited at current burn. Not scored 0–20 because FCF isn't reliably positive and cash is borrowed.
2 Leverage 10% Face debt C$1,312M vs cash C$1,227M → net debt C$67–85M. Q2 adj. EBITDA C$17.6M (C$70M annualised) → ~1.0–1.2x. 2031 maturity 35 Under 1.5x, but on a thin, price-driven EBITDA base. Almost all debt is a 2.25% bullet due in 2031.
3 Dilution 10% Shares 262.8M (Dec-25) → 288.1M (Jun-26), +9.6% in 6 months. Buyback −2.9M. Overhang: convert 29.2M (~10%, capped call to US$41.36) + options/RSUs ~5.4M 55 The 12-month figure (not found) is likely around or above +10%. The overhang only bites above US$27.40.
4 Profitability 10% Gross margin 60.7%, adj. EBITDA margin 40.9% (Q2). H1 FCF ≈ −C$5M (−8% margin) 45 Operationally profitable, but FCF is around break-even because of Sangdong capex.
5 Revenue quality & concentration 10% ~100% of revenue from one mine (Panasqueira); majority to two customers; GTP >90% of Phase I for 21 years 72 One asset today, one buyer tomorrow. Contracts reduce volume risk but not concentration.
6 Execution & track record 10% Material weakness at YE-25 and 06-30-26; auditor swapped 09-29; Sangdong ~4 years late; Q3-26 ramp target likely missed (13–16 h/day) 82 The anchor wording "material weakness or serial misses" applies on both counts.
7 Competitive position & disruption 10% Largest new ex-China contracted supply; Barruecopardo (EQR) doubling output, Hemerdon restart, Nui Phao expanding; price-taker 42 A strong, scarce, permitted asset, but no price power, and new Western supply is arriving.
8 Cyclicality & commodity/macro 10% One commodity. APT US$2,900 vs US$333 avg 2024 (9x); 2015–16 trough ~US$185 78 A textbook one-commodity exposure near a cyclical high. Not 81+ because the cash means survival doesn't depend on the price.
9 Regulatory, legal & geopolitical 5% Price set by China's MOFCOM licensing (suspensions 11-10/11-27, truce 2027-01-10) and DFARS. Korean revocation power. No material litigation 65 Large exposure to China policy decisions in the next 90 days.
10 Valuation & expectations 10% ~US$3.4B market cap; EV/trailing sales ~52x; ~5x FY27 consensus revenue. FY27 consensus assumes ~full Phase I. Short interest 21.1M (7.3% float, 3.5 days, 09-30) 60 After a −51% fall it is not priced for perfection. But consensus still embeds a fast ramp at today's price.

Overall: weighted average = 4.5 + 3.5 + 5.5 + 4.5 + 7.2 + 8.2 + 4.2 + 7.8 + 3.25 + 6.0 = 54.65 → 55.

Change vs last: −4 versus report #2's 59, which used the old six-area method, so this is not like-for-like.

  • Balance-sheet factors (1–4) score lower than the old "Financial health" area (40). The "15 months" scare is gone and net debt is near zero.
  • Execution is higher than before (82 vs 72). The Q3 ramp target now looks missed, and the GTP release inconsistency adds to the disclosure concerns.

Ranking check: At 55, ALM sits between REAX (50) and DUOT (66).

  • It is riskier than REAX because it depends on one mine and one commodity price and carries a live material weakness.
  • It is safer than DUOT and IPX because it has revenue, ~60% gross margins and C$1.2B of cash with no dilution pressure.

Conclusion

  • What you are really betting on:

    • that Sangdong reaches near-nameplate output in 2027 on better ore than today's 0.25% stockpile;
    • that Beijing keeps the West short of tungsten long enough for the price to stay well above US$2,000/mtu.

  • The 2–3 things that will decide the outcome:

    1. The first Sangdong operating data in the Q3 MD&A (~mid-November) and Q4: mtu, recovery, hours, revenue per mtu.
    2. China's decisions at the 11-10/11-27 suspension deadlines and the 2027-01-10 truce expiry, and the European APT price that results.
    3. Whether Phase II gets a budget and mill orders, or slips.

  • Signposts:

    • Confirm the bull case:
      • Q4-26 or Q1-27 Sangdong sales annualise ≥150,000 mtu.
      • The mill runs 24/7 by January 2027.
      • Disclosed recovery is ≥80%.
      • Platts CIF-US prints above Rotterdam, and Panasqueira renews at equal or better terms.
    • Break the bull case:
      • Sangdong is still below 100,000 mtu annualised by mid-2027.
      • Rotterdam APT stays below US$2,000 for a quarter.
      • Sangdong revenue per mtu comes in well under US$2,300.
      • A late filing or restatement, or Phase II pushed to 2028 or later.

  • New since the last report:

    • GTP price: the July release implies ~76% of APT (US$2,333/mtu), not the ~89% we assumed. That is a level cut to Sangdong value of roughly 12%.
    • Funding and insiders:
      • The "minimum 15 months" wording is unchanged boilerplate from when cash was C$268M.
      • The Black/D'Amato 5M-share sale was executed at ~US$15.25 in March.
      • Fidelity rose to 11.1%.
    • Expectations and royalties:
      • FY27 consensus (C$990.7M) already implies a full Phase I year.
      • The royalty line is a Q1 "selling costs" relabel that runs at 16–17% of revenue.
      • The June resident stoppage could not be confirmed in Korean media, so it has been dropped as a bear argument.

Open questions & data gaps

  • Sangdong operating data: no tonnes, mtu, recovery or cost has been published. The first numbers should come with Q3 (~2026-11-10 to 11-12, date unconfirmed). This matters most of all.
  • GTP price formula: the amended agreement is on SEDAR+ only and could not be accessed. Our ~76% is derived from a self-contradictory release. It matters a lot for valuation.
  • Phase II and oxide capex: still not disclosed. The Metso mill order value was not found.
  • Royalty basis: the counterparty, the rate, and why it was relabelled. Low impact on Sangdong, medium on credibility.
  • Customer shares: the % of revenue from the top customer and top 3 is not disclosed.
  • KfW Sangdong loan: the first amortisation date is undefined ("six months after ramp-up commencement").
  • Consensus quality: aggregators disagree by 2–3x on FY26. FY28 consensus was not found.
  • China after November: whether the MOFCOM suspensions are extended, and whether tungsten sits in the suspended or the active layer, is unclear.
  • Insiders: SEDI primary pages were not accessible. The Kwon trades are unverified.
  • Listings: the TSX listing ended 2026-07-31 and the ASX listing ~09-01 [17,18]. The AII ticker note in portfolio.md is out of date.
Sources
  1. Q2 2026 MD&A (6-K Ex. 99.3) — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-08-11 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001670061/000149315226037264/ex99-3.htm
  2. Q2 2026 interim financial statements (6-K Ex. 99.2) — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-08-11 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001670061/000149315226037264/ex99-2.htm
  3. Q2 2026 results release (6-K Ex. 99.1) — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-08-11 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001670061/000149315226037264/ex99-1.htm
  4. Q1 2026 MD&A (6-K Ex. 99.3) — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-05-11 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226022338/ex99-3.htm
  5. Annual Information Form FY2025 (40-F Ex. 99.1) — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-03-18 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226011503/ex99-1.htm
  6. FY2025 MD&A and audited statements (40-F Ex. 99.2/99.3) — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-03-18 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226011503/ex99-3.htm
  7. Almonty expands Sangdong offtake agreement with GTP — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-07-14 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001670061/000149315226033123/ex99-1.htm
  8. Almonty commences processing operations at Sangdong — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-07-01 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226031435/ex99-1.htm
  9. Shareholder letter and corporate update — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-09-29 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226044777/ex99-1.htm
  10. Almonty Industries at 20th International Investment Forum (transcript summary) — Investing.com — 2026-10-07 — https://www.investing.com/news/transcripts/almonty-industries-at-20th-international-investment-forum-sangdong-turns-to-output-93CH-4937657
  11. Sangdong processing plant receives final operational certification — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-09-21 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226043476/ex99-1.htm
  12. Notice of change of auditor (with Zeifmans and PwC letters) — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-09-29 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226044963/ex99-1.htm
  13. New share repurchase programme — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-08-17 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226038655/ex99-1.htm
  14. Convertible senior notes pricing — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-06-04 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226027390/ex99-1.htm
  15. Tungsten offtake agreement with Sandvik Group subsidiary (Los Santos tailings) — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-09-17 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226043044/ex99-1.htm
  16. Almonty secures corrective disclosure from Pure Tungsten — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-10-02 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226045665/ex99-1.htm
  17. Voluntary TSX delisting — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-07-17 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226033811/ex99-1.htm
  18. Voluntary ASX delisting — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2026-07-23 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226034449/ex99-1.htm
  19. Form 144 (Lewis Black / Almonty Partners LLC) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-03-23 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226012214/primary_doc.xml
  20. Schedule 13G (Lewis Black) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-03-31 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315226014401/primary_doc.xml
  21. Schedule 13G (Plansee / GTP Europe) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-06-17 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000121390026069610/primary_doc.xml
  22. Schedule 13G/A (FMR LLC) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-08-07 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/315066/000031506626002244/primary_doc.xml
  23. Deutsche Rohstoff verkauft 5 Millionen Aktien — Börse Express — 2026-07-22 — https://www.boerse-express.com/news/articles/almonty-deutsche-rohstoff-verkauft-5-millionen-aktien-931237
  24. ALM/AII insider tables (SEDI-derived; aggregator) — Wealth Awesome / InsiderScreener — accessed 2026-10-11 — https://www.wealthawesome.com/insiders/aii-to ; https://www.insiderscreener.com/en/company/almonty-industries-inc
  25. Goldman Sachs initiates Almonty Industries at Neutral — Investing.com — 2026-09-24 — https://ph.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/goldman-sachs-initiates-almonty-industries-stock-at-neutral-93CH-2599596
  26. Stifel startet mit Buy, Goldman sieht Bewertung ambitioniert — Goldesel — 2026-09-24 — https://goldesel.de/aktien/news/almonty-stifel-startet-mit-buy-goldman-sieht-bewertung-bereits-ambitioniert
  27. Almonty vor der Nagelprobe (Jefferies US$26.25) — Börse Global — 2026-09-05 — https://www.boerse-global.de/almonty-vor-der-nagelprobe-rechtfertigt-sangdong-ein-kursziel-von-26-dollar/825213
  28. ALM analyst forecast (consensus, 12 analysts) — StockAnalysis — 2026-10-09 — https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/alm/forecast/
  29. ALM price and short interest — MarketBeat — 2026-10-09 — https://www.marketbeat.com/stocks/NASDAQ/ALM/short-interest/
  30. Bank of America erwartet 670 Millionen CAD Umsatz 2026 — Börse Express — 2026-05-14 — https://www.boerse-express.com/news/articles/almonty-aktie-670-millionen-cad-umsatz-2026-erwartet-906445
  31. GBC AG setzt Kursziel auf 30 Dollar — Trading-Treff — 2026-08-23 — https://trading-treff.de/trading/almonty-aktie-gbc-ag-setzt-kursziel-auf-30-dollar
  32. One Market, Two Prices: the structural deadlock in the tungsten market — SMM — 2026-10-09 — https://news.metal.com/newscontent/104148615-smm-tungsten-analysis-one-market-two-prices-how-to-break-the-structural-deadlock-in-the-tungsten-market
  33. Chinese tungsten market sees broad-based decline — SMM — 2026-09-18 — https://news.metal.com/newscontent/104123384-smm-analysis-chinese-tungsten-market-sees-broad-based-decline-amid-weak-supply-and-demand-with-no-upside-in-sight
  34. SMM Deep Research: Tungsten (data to 2026-07-03) and May import/export analysis — SMM — 2026-07 / 2026-06-25 — https://events.metal.com/ai-stack/reports/tungsten_en.html
  35. DFARS 225.7018-2 Restriction and 225.7018-3 Exceptions — acquisition.gov — change 2026-05-07, accessed 2026-10-11 — https://www.acquisition.gov/dfars/225.7018-2-restriction.
  36. DPAS allocation order for black mass and tungsten scrap (FR Doc 2026-16078) — BIS / Federal Register — 2026-08-06 — https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-16078.pdf
  37. DoW invests in Elmet; DLA US$2B tungsten IDIQ — Manufacturing Dive — 2026-09-15 — https://www.manufacturingdive.com/news/dod-war-elmet-group-tungsten-supply-chain-dla-economic-defense-unit/830331/
  38. Platts proposes alternative-supply-chain tungsten assessments (summary only; page 403) — S&P Global — 2026-08-28 — https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/pricing-benchmarks/our-methodology/subscriber-notes/082826-platts-proposes-new-alternative-supply-chain-tungsten-price-assessments
  39. China suspends export controls on certain critical minerals — Pillsbury — 2025-11-13 — https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/china-suspends-export-controls-certain-critical-minerals-related-items.html
  40. Trump–Xi summit extends the trade truce — investinglive — 2026-09-25 — https://investinglive.com/news/trump-xi-summit-extends-the-trade-truce-but-leaves-the-biggest-market-questions-unresolved/
  41. Surging tungsten prices propel MSR to record-high profit — Masan High-Tech Materials — 2026-07-29 — https://masanhightechmaterials.com/surging-tungsten-prices-propel-msr-to-record-high-profit/
  42. Q1 2026 project update — Tungsten West (RNS) — 2026-04-08 — https://www.investegate.co.uk/announcement/rns/tungsten-west--tun/q1-2026-project-update-/9509167
  43. EQ Resources delivers meaningful Q1 tungsten output (summary only; page 403) — Mining Weekly — 2026-10-06 — https://www.miningweekly.com/article/australias-eq-resources-delivers-meaningful-q1-tungsten-output-revenue-increase-2026-10-06
  44. Almonty set to export refined tungsten from Sangdong mine — Korea Times — 2026-09-28 — https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/companies/20260928/almonty-set-to-export-refined-tungsten-from-sangdong-mine
  45. Mineral Industry Surveys: Tungsten, December 2015 — USGS — 2016-03 — https://apps.usgs.gov/minerals-information-archives/tungsten/mis-201512-tungs.pdf
  46. European tungsten producer Almonty advances Korean Sangdong project — Northern Miner — 2020 — https://www.northernminer.com/news/european-tungsten-producer-almonty-advances-korean-sangdong-project/1003827695/
  47. Almonty's Sangdong ramp-up: a booked cargo, a 21,000-tonne gap and the work still ahead (secondary) — ad-hoc-news — 2026-10-10 — https://www.ad-hoc-news.de/boerse/news/unternehmensnachrichten/almonty-s-sangdong-ramp-up-a-booked-cargo-a-21-000-tonne-gap-and-the-work-still-ahead/70289963
  48. Q3 2025 results release — Almonty / SEC EDGAR — 2025-11-03 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670061/000149315225020536/ex99-1.htm
  49. Almonty's Sangdong cargo is booked for October 24 (secondary) — ad-hoc-news — 2026-10-08 — https://www.ad-hoc-news.de/boerse/news/unternehmensnachrichten/almonty-s-sangdong-cargo-is-booked-for-october-24-analysts-can-t-agree-what-the-stock-is-worth/70265417
  50. Two giant tungsten deposits could test Kazakhstan's push beyond raw exports — Astana Times — 2026-08-13 — https://astanatimes.com/2026/08/two-giant-tungsten-deposits-could-test-kazakhstans-push-beyond-raw-material-exports/
  51. Tungsten market report (summary only; PDF 403) — S&P Global — 2026-05-08 — https://www.spglobal.com/content/dam/spglobal/global-assets/en/special-reports/critical-mineral-market-reports/Market%20Report%20-%20Tungsten%20-%2008052026.pdf
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Disclaimer. AI-generated research and podcast (Claude by Anthropic, voices by Google Gemini) for educational purposes — not financial advice and not a recommendation to buy or sell. Willem (MR.INVEST) owns this stock. Check the company’s own filings before making any decision.
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