Stock Analysis · Bulls vs Bears

Genius Sports Limited GENI

🐂 Bulls vs Bears 🐻Report #312 Oct 2026
★ Willem owns this stock · 2.7% of the portfolio
48
elevated risk▼ −7 vs last
🐂 9vs10 🐻
Bears lead
35%
▲ Chance of the biggest tailwind the forecasts miss
40%
▼ Chance of the biggest headwind the forecasts miss
The verdict

The operating evidence leans bull: Genius has met or beaten its revenue guidance in every period we checked. It raised its 2026 guidance twice and held it after the Brazil ban. Remaining performance obligations (RPO, contracted revenue not yet booked) rose $99.6M in Q2 alone. The stock trades at about 8.8x 2026 EBITDA, below its pre-Legend multiple. The shareholder case still leans on things that have not happened…

The Bulls vs Bears podcast is being made
Two AI hosts debate this report, NotebookLM-style. It appears here automatically within a few hours.

Written by Claude (Anthropic’s AI) from public sources · Willem owns GENI · AI can make mistakes — numbers in brackets point to the sources · Not financial advice

🐂 Bull arguments 9

  1. 1Exclusive NFL and UK-football data until 2029 that sportsbooks must buyStrong
  2. 2Beat-and-raise record: every guide since FY24 met or exceededStrong
  3. 3Contracted minimums and a backlog that jumped $99.6M in one quarterMedium
  4. 4Incremental revenue drops through at near-100% to EBITDAMedium
  5. 5Valuation now below the pre-Legend multiple on a bigger EBITDA baseMedium
  6. 6Legend's first earn-out tranche is booked at 89% of maximumMedium
  7. 7Paid on every route a bet takes, including prediction marketsMedium
  8. 8Litigation overhang shrank: Sportscastr patent case settled before trialMedium
  9. 9League technology embeds Genius in the long tail of rightsWeak

🐻 Bear arguments 10

  1. 1Rights costs rise to $397M in 2028, then both big contracts expireHigh
  2. 2Free cash flow is still negative, and the cash yardstick keeps changingHigh
  3. 3Share count +12% a year, with an earn-out payable in sharesMedium
  4. 4Leverage is 4.2x on trailing EBITDA, not the "2x" headlineMedium
  5. 5Legend is an expensive affiliate whose sellers can sell from late OctoberMedium
  6. 6The US sportsbook market has stalled while taxes riseMedium
  7. 7Prediction markets are shared with Sportradar and the NFL is hostileMedium
  8. 8Adjusted EBITDA flatters: SBC exceeded it in FY25, and litigation add-backs recurMedium
  9. 9Insiders sell, nobody buys, and short interest has risen 2.6x since MarchLow
  10. 10Addiction litigation names Genius's NFL data as the enablerLow

Bull arguments show how well they survive the devil’s advocate (strong / medium / weak); bear arguments show the damage they could do after the counter-argument (high / medium / low).

Bull case

🐂 Bull #1Exclusive NFL and UK-football data until 2029 that sportsbooks must buy

  • The point: No US sportsbook can offer official in-game NFL data without buying it through Genius. The same goes for Premier League, EFL and SPFL data for books anywhere. These are the two contracts US and UK in-play betting can't do without.
  • Evidence:
    • The NFL licence was extended in June 2025 through the end of the 2029 season, with 9.5M extra $0.01 warrants (5.0M vest 2028-04-01) [1,5].
    • The Football DataCo (FDC) deal runs through 2028-29 [1,24].
    • Together the NFL and FDC are "a majority of third-party data rights fees" [1].
    • NCAA post-season is exclusive to 2032 [25].
    • Locke on the Q1 call: NFL "locked in until Super Bowl 2030" [13].
  • Why it matters: Exclusivity is what lets Genius set minimum guarantees and raise prices at each sportsbook renewal ("each renewal is a pricing event"). It also makes Genius the natural settlement source if NFL or UK-football prediction contracts are ever licensed.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • The asset is rented, and both leases end within a season of each other (Bear #1).
    • The NFL already holds 14.5M vested warrants, so it is a shareholder. At the next renewal it can ask for more cash, more equity, or a split.
    • No Sportradar bid for the next cycle has been reported, but its balance sheet has net cash. It has just raised $170M by selling Atrium [20].
  • Verdict: Strong through 2029. It says nothing about the price after that.

🐂 Bull #2Beat-and-raise record: every guide since FY24 met or exceeded

  • The point: Management guides conservatively and delivers, which makes the 2026 back-half guide more believable than its shape suggests.
  • Evidence:
    • FY24 was guided at $511M revenue and $86M EBITDA; Genius delivered $510.9M and $85.7M [8].
    • FY25 guidance was raised from $620M/$125M to $655M/$136M; Genius delivered $669.5M and $136.2M [7].
    • In Q2-26, revenue was $195.5M against a $185M guide, adjusted EBITDA $52.6M against $45M, and cash $155.1M against $140–150M [3].
    • FY26 guidance went from a standalone $810–820M / $180–190M, to $990M–1.01bn / $270–280M including Legend (May), to $1.005–1.025bn / $285–295M (August). It was reaffirmed on 2026-09-28 after the Brazil ban [3,4,16].
    • The Q1 promise of a "low point in Q2, probably around $140 million to $150 million" of cash was kept [13].
    • Auditor Withum gave an unqualified opinion on internal controls for FY25. There have been no restatements, and the 2024 SEC comment-letter review closed without changes [1,21].
  • Why it matters: About 74% of guided 2026 EBITDA falls in H2: Q3 about $85M, implied Q4 about $128M (my arithmetic from [3]). A management team that has never missed a guide makes that back-loading less risky.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • The record is on revenue and adjusted EBITDA, not cash.
    • The FY25 cash promise was to "increase annual cash flow". Operating cash flow rose, but FCF after capex fell from about $17.6M to about $7.6M (calc from [7,8]).
    • The implied Q4 margin of about 34.6% is a step up the CFO would not confirm on the call. He said only that "margin usually increases through the year" [14].
  • Verdict: Strong on the P&L, Medium on cash. Q3 (~Nov 3–4, unconfirmed) is the next test.

🐂 Bull #3Contracted minimums and a backlog that jumped $99.6M in one quarter

  • The point: Much of the revenue is guaranteed before the season starts, and the guaranteed book is growing.
  • Evidence:
    • About 60% of FY25 revenue came from contractual minimum guarantees [1].
    • RPO was $584.4M at Q3-25, $515.7M at Q4-25, $535.1M at Q1-26 and $634.7M at Q2-26. About 55% of it falls due within 12 months [2,4,7,9].
    • Variable revenue share was $26.7M in Q2-26 vs $12.4M in Q2-25 [2].
    • Locke: "Volatility in handle or hold does not translate to earnings volatility for Genius" [13].
    • In 2020, when sports stopped for months, revenue still grew 31% to $149.7M, with only about $6M of one-off customer discounts [22].
  • Why it matters: Fixed revenue against largely fixed rights costs is the base of the margin plan. It also cushions Genius when customers' handle (total amount wagered) is weak (Bear #6).
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • RPO is lumpy. It fell $68.7M in Q4-25 before jumping in Q2-26.
    • The cause of the Q2 jump is not disclosed. It could be Legend contracts consolidated from 1 May rather than core price increases. The Kalshi and Polymarket deals came after quarter end, so they are not in it [2].
    • RPO excludes variable fees and contracts of one year or less.
  • Verdict: Medium Strong (was Strong). The guarantee structure is real, but the headline backlog growth is not yet attributable.

🐂 Bull #4Incremental revenue drops through at near-100% to EBITDA

  • The point: Rights fees are fixed per contract, so revenue above plan falls almost entirely to EBITDA.
  • Evidence:
    • The Q2 beat was $11M of revenue, which turned into $8M of extra EBITDA. The August raise of $15M in revenue lifted EBITDA guidance by $15M, which the CFO described as about 100% flow-through [3,14].
    • Gross margin was 32.6% in Q2-26, vs 23.1% in Q1-26 and 24.8% in Q3-25 (calc from [3,4,9]).
    • Adjusted EBITDA margin: 20.4% (Q3-25), 26.9% (Q2-26), about 32.7% guided for Q3 [3].
    • Data and streaming rights costs did rise sharply, to $44.4M from $25.4M in Q2-25 [2].
    • The 2028 target is about 35% margin and at least 60% unlevered FCF conversion [6].
  • Why it matters: On $1.6bn of 2028 revenue, a 35% margin and 60% conversion would be about $336M of unlevered FCF. That compares with today's EV of about $2.55bn (calc; management target, not a forecast).
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Gross margin swings from 23% to 33% quarter to quarter with the NFL calendar.
    • The Q2 jump includes the first two months of Legend, which is a higher-margin business, so part of it is mix rather than operating leverage.
    • The GAAP operating margin was −28.4% in Q2 [3].
  • Verdict: Medium The flow-through is real in adjusted terms. The proof is the Q4 margin.

🐂 Bull #5Valuation now below the pre-Legend multiple on a bigger EBITDA base

  • The point: The market is paying less per dollar of EBITDA than it did before Genius bought Legend, though EBITDA has roughly doubled.
  • Evidence:
    • Price $6.65 (2026-10-09). The 52-week range is $3.83–12.39, and the 2-year closing high was $13.55 (2025-09-04) [23].
    • EV is about $2.55bn: 282M shares including vested NFL warrants, plus about $670M of net debt (calc). That is about 8.8x the FY26 EBITDA guide midpoint of $290M, or about 9.5x if the $214M earn-out liability is counted.
    • Before the deal (2026-02-04, $8.54) it was about 10–11.5x standalone FY26 EBITDA. At year-end 2025 it was about 19x FY25 EBITDA (calc from [23,7]).
    • Sportradar trades at roughly 8x its FY26 EBITDA guide, with net cash (calc from [20,26]).
    • Consensus target is about $10.83–11.25, from about 20 analysts [26,27].
    • JPMorgan initiated Overweight at $8 on 2026-09-25 [28].
  • Why it matters: A low multiple means the bar is low: delivering the guide plus 2027 conversion could re-rate the stock without heroic assumptions.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • The multiple is low for reasons. The business is now levered, GAAP loss-making and carries an affiliate business.
    • Truist says Legend was bought at about 8.6x while listed affiliates trade at 3.5–5x (secondary) [29].
    • A blended "fair" multiple may simply be lower than standalone Genius used to get.
  • Verdict: Medium The stock is cheap, but cheap for an identifiable reason.

🐂 Bull #6Legend's first earn-out tranche is booked at 89% of maximum

  • The point: Legend is beating the targets set when the deal was signed. This is the best hard evidence yet that Genius did not overpay for a fading affiliate.
  • Evidence:
    • Contingent consideration on the 30 Jun balance sheet: $134.2M current plus $79.9M non-current. After a legacy $3.6M balance, tranche 1 is booked at about $134M (89% of its $150M cap) and tranche 2 at about $76M (51%) [2].
    • Q2 had an $8.0M remeasurement loss, meaning the expected payout went up [2].
    • CFO: organic growth "solidly above 20% for both Genius and Legend Media" [14].
    • Q1 call: guidance "does not yet include the 4 revenue synergies we identified" [13].
    • Implied Legend run-rate is about $280–290M revenue and $130–150M EBITDA: the Feb pro forma minus the standalone guide (calc from [6]).
  • Why it matters: Legend is about half of Media and carries most of the uplift to the 2028 target. If it holds 20% growth, the EBITDA base for 2027 is solid.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Legend standalone numbers remain undisclosed. "We don't break out Legend separate from Genius" [14].
    • Every dollar of earn-out success is a dollar paid out, in cash or shares (Bear #3).
    • The thresholds sit in the share purchase agreement, which nobody has summarised.
  • Verdict: Medium Strong (was Medium). The balance-sheet number is hard evidence, even if it is indirect.

🐂 Bull #7Paid on every route a bet takes, including prediction markets

  • The point: Whether a bet goes through a sportsbook, a prediction market or a market maker, Genius can sell data, settlement, integrity monitoring or customer acquisition (through Legend).
  • Evidence:
    • Polymarket deal (2026-08-04): data, settlement, integrity, US streaming and Legend acquisition [30].
    • Kalshi deal (2026-08-05): official football data and integrity [31].
    • The deals carry "fixed minimums and upside" (Locke) [14].
    • "In the second quarter, we generated meaningful revenue from the category", but the figure was not given [14].
    • JPMorgan puts prediction-market EBITDA at maturity at $30–35M, and says that is not in its estimates [28].
    • Better Collective's publishing CPA revenue rose 45% in Q2, driven by prediction-market partners. That supports Legend's acquisition angle [32].
  • Why it matters: Prediction markets pay no state betting tax and take 8–11% of sportsbook handle in competitive states [33]. Being paid on them hedges the leak from Genius's core customers.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate: Sportradar matched every deal and has more league inventory for this channel (Bear #7). The NFL is Genius's best asset and is fighting prediction markets in court.
  • Verdict: Medium The deals are real, but how big they are is unknown.

🐂 Bull #8Litigation overhang shrank: Sportscastr patent case settled before trial

  • The point: The suit that combined patent and antitrust attacks on official-data distribution has mostly been settled.
  • Evidence:
    • Sportscastr (Panda) v. Genius, E.D. Tex. 2:23-cv-00471 (lead case 00472), Judge Gilstrap. Jury selection was reset to 2026-09-11.
    • A notice of settlement was filed on 2026-09-09, followed by a 30-day stay for dismissal papers. This comes from CourtListener docket entries as read by the helper. A Law360 headline reads "Genius Settles With Panda Ahead Of Sports Tech Patent Trial" (paywalled) [34,35].
    • Sportradar settled its parallel Panda case in Feb–Apr 2026 [34].
    • "Legal provisions" fell from $4.8M at YE25 to zero at 30 Jun 2026, with no explanation [2].
    • The 2021 dMY SPAC class action settled; the court approved it on 2026-02-23 (about $14.8M, per plaintiff counsel) [36].
  • Why it matters: An antitrust verdict against exclusive official-data distribution in front of a Texas jury was the tail risk to the whole model. That route now looks closed.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Settlement terms are not disclosed.
    • It is not confirmed whether the severed antitrust case (2:25-cv-01251) is covered.
    • Genius's own suits against Sportscastr in New York (SDNY, filed 2026-05-11) and Delaware (filed 2026-06-10) may also still be open [34].
    • Altenar is pursuing Sherman Act claims against Sportradar's exclusives, and the same theory could be aimed at Genius [37].
  • Verdict: Medium This is new and positive, but it is based on docket entries and a headline, not a company statement. The Q3 6-K should confirm it.

🐂 Bull #9League technology embeds Genius in the long tail of rights

  • The point: Many smaller leagues give Genius their data rights in exchange for its software, tracking and offside systems, with little or no cash changing hands. Their rights are cheap to hold and hard for a rival to dislodge.
  • Evidence:
    • The 20-F describes the "contra" model [1].
    • Semi-automated offside is used in the Premier League and by Brazil's CBF, and the CBF work continues despite the ban [16].
  • Why it matters: A long tail of near-free inventory spreads the cost of rights and fills the betting product.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Sports Technology is the smallest, slowest line.
    • None of this protects the two cash-paid Tier-1 contracts.
    • FIFA chose Stats Perform as its worldwide betting-data distributor (2026-01-12) [38].
  • Verdict: Weak Medium.

(Dropped since #2: none. Re-ranked: the beat-and-raise record moved up to #2. The valuation reset and the Sportscastr settlement are new. Bull #3 was downgraded because the backlog jump is not yet attributable.)

Bear case

🐻 Bear #1Rights costs rise to $397M in 2028, then both big contracts expire

  • The point: The scarce assets are leased, the lease bill is rising, and the two biggest leases end together.
  • Evidence:
    • The 20-F lists minimum data-rights commitments of $1,512.7M at YE25: 2026 $331.1M, 2027 $366.2M, 2028 $397.1M, 2029 $325.7M, then 2030 $90.4M [1].
      • The drop to $90M in 2030 is the NFL and FDC contracts running out.
    • Data and streaming rights cost of revenue was $44.4M in Q2-26, +75% year on year [2].
    • Investor Day had rights fees at about 35% of 2028 revenue [11].
    • NFL and FDC cash fees are not disclosed. Press estimated the 2021 NFL deal at about $100–120M a year, half in equity [39].
    • A £92M letter of credit goes to one supplier, probably FDC (unconfirmed) [2].
  • Why it matters:
    • Rights commitments grow about 10% a year from 2026 to 2028 (calc).
    • Revenue has to outgrow that just to hold margin.
    • The post-2029 price is set within our 36-month window, with leagues that now have direct prediction-market buyers.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Commitments of +20% over two years compare with guided revenue growth of about +50% in 2026 alone. Consensus has +28% in 2027 [26].
    • Genius renewed both contracts early in the last cycle.
    • The NFL's warrants align it with the share price.
  • Severity: High It is the biggest long-term variable, and no one outside the room can model it.

🐻 Bear #2Free cash flow is still negative, and the cash yardstick keeps changing

  • The point: EBITDA has grown for years, but FCF has not followed. Management has also moved the goalposts on how it measures cash.
  • Evidence:
    • Quarterly FCF, defined as operating cash flow minus capex and capitalised software (calc from [2,4,7,9]):
      • Q3-25 +$4.1M
      • Q4-25 +$70.5M
      • Q1-26 −$84.0M
      • Q2-26 −$104.0M
      • LTM about −$113M, against LTM adjusted EBITDA of $158.9M.
    • FY25 FCF was about +$7.6M on $136.2M of adjusted EBITDA [7].
    • Q1 call: H2 "approximately $100 million of total cash flow, including all interest expenses and debt repayment … 50% to 55% conversion" [13].
    • Q2 call: "approximately $145 million of unlevered free cash flow … 70% … Less roughly $30 million of interest and $10 million of debt repayment gets you to 50% levered" [14].
    • Q2 call: "underlying operating cash flow would have been roughly break even" excluding one-offs, against a reported −$80.8M. No bridge was given [14].
    • UBS cut its target to $6 in February because cash-flow growth lagged EBITDA [40].
  • Why it matters:
    • Year-end cash of about $260M means H2 must bring in about $105M.
    • Missing that would push out deleveraging, make a cash-settled earn-out harder, and test the "2x" leverage claim.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • H1 is always the cash low: NFL and FDC fees are prepaid and deferred revenue unwinds.
    • H1-26 also carried $36.4M of deal costs and $14.5M of Legend LTIP [2].
    • Q4-25 alone produced +$70.5M.
    • The Q2 cash guide was beaten.
  • Severity: High until Q4-26. If year-end cash is at least $250M, it drops to Medium.

🐻 Bear #3Share count +12% a year, with an earn-out payable in shares

  • The point: Shareholders are diluted every year, and the biggest single tranche is still to come.
  • Evidence:
    • Ordinary shares rose from 238.44M (30 Jun 25) to 267.63M (30 Jun 26), +12.2%. That includes 10.09M to Legend's sellers and about 11.9M RSU/PSU vestings [2].
    • Overhang:
      • 14.5M vested and 5.0M unvested NFL warrants at $0.01;
      • 6.62M RSUs;
      • 17.77M PSUs, which can pay out at 0–200%;
      • fully diluted before the earn-out is about 311M (calc from [2]).
    • Earn-out tranche 1 (12 months to 2027-04-30) and tranche 2 (to 2028-04-30) can be settled in cash or shares at the 30-day VWAP [1,5].
    • At $6.65, a $150M tranche is 22.6M shares and both are 45.1M: 8.4% / 16.9% of 267.6M (calc).
    • Tranche 1 is booked at about $134M and classed as current [2].
    • The $100M buyback bought nothing in H1. Locke: "Our focus right now is the delever" [13].
  • Why it matters: Per-share value grows more slowly than the business. A share-settled earn-out at today's price would hand Legend's sellers about 8% of the company for one year of results.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • The choice is Genius's.
    • GAAP SBC halved from $97.7M in H1-25 to $42.3M in H1-26.
    • If H2 cash lands, a cash or mixed settlement in mid-2027 is affordable from the revolver ($220M, undrawn).
  • Severity: Medium High.

🐻 Bear #4Leverage is 4.2x on trailing EBITDA, not the "2x" headline

  • The point: Leverage looks moderate only on forward, pro-forma EBITDA. On reported numbers it is high, and the covenant thresholds are not public.
  • Evidence:
    • $825M term loan with an 8.2% effective rate, SOFR + 3.50% stepping down to 2.75%, maturing 2031-04-30 [2,5].
    • Net debt was about $670M at 30 Jun. On LTM adjusted EBITDA of $158.9M that is 4.2x net (calc).
    • Adding the $214M earn-out liability gives about $884M of debt-like claims.
    • Management: "approximately two times net leverage" at YE26, with no denominator given [14].
    • The covenant levels (maximum net leverage, minimum interest cover) won't be filed until the FY26 20-F [5].
    • Amortisation is 1.25% a quarter from Q4-26, about $72M over the next 24 months [2].
  • Why it matters: Cash interest runs at about $60–65M a year [14,41]. The covenant headroom can't be checked from outside.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Using the FY26 guide, net debt is about 2.3x, or about 1.9x at a $555M year-end net debt (calc).
    • There are no maturities before 2031 and the revolver is undrawn.
    • Genius was in compliance at 30 Jun [2].
  • Severity: Medium

🐻 Bear #5Legend is an expensive affiliate whose sellers can sell from late October

  • The point: Genius paid a full price for an SEO-exposed affiliate. The sellers' shares become free to trade within weeks.
  • Evidence:
    • Consideration was $844.4M at fair value: $607.4M cash, $44.0M of stock and the $202.5M earn-out [2].
    • Goodwill from Legend is $436.7M [2].
    • Truist (secondary): Legend was bought at about 8.6x while affiliates trade at 3.5–5x [29].
    • Peers:
      • Gambling.com cut its guidance and about 25% of staff, citing "changes to search engine mechanisms" [42].
      • Catena's Q2 revenue was −1% on "persistent headwinds in traditional SEO-based affiliation" [43].
    • Lock-up: 10,088,781 completion shares are locked for 180 days from 2026-04-30, so until about 2026-10-27. After that, up to 411,416 shares a day may be sold, which clears the whole block in about 25 trading days (calc from [5]).
      • Those shares were priced at about $9.91 at signing and booked at $4.36. At $6.65 they are worth about $67M.
  • Why it matters:
    • Supply of about 4% of the float hits a stock with 18.5% short interest, starting days before Q3.
    • If AI search erodes Legend, both the earn-out logic and the $436.7M of goodwill are exposed.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Two-thirds of Legend visitors return directly [44].
    • Better Collective's North America grew +35% in Q2 [32].
    • The earn-out marking (Bull #6) says Legend is beating plan.
    • Sellers who think the earn-out will pay may prefer to hold.
  • Severity: Medium

🐻 Bear #6The US sportsbook market has stalled while taxes rise

  • The point: Genius's core customers are squeezed from two sides: flat handle and higher taxes.
  • Evidence:
    • H2 Gambling Capital (2026-09-09): total sportsbook handle in reporting states is "flat" in 2026. It projects NFL-season handle down 0.8%, the first decline. Prediction markets take about 4% of sportsbook handle overall and 8–11% in competitive states [33].
    • Sportradar's US revenue grew 16% in Q2, but its release cites "moderating U.S. market growth" and its CFO said the US "flatlined" vs Q1 [20,45].
    • DraftKings' Q2 revenue was −5% [46].
    • UK: remote gaming duty rose from 21% to 40% on 2026-04-01, and remote betting duty goes from 15% to 25% on 2027-04-01 [47].
    • Illinois moved to a 20–40% progressive tax plus a per-bet fee [48].
    • Brazil's ban takes effect with licences ending 2026-10-25 [49].
    • Genius's 13% customer was 13% of Q2-26 revenue (10% for H1-26) [2].
  • Why it matters: The variable revenue share (23% of Q2 Betting revenue) falls with customers' gaming revenue. Squeezed customers also push back on price increases at renewal.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • About 60% of revenue is minimums.
    • Genius sizes Brazil as "minimal" [16].
    • Betting revenue still grew 28% in Q2 [3].
    • Pressure on books pushes them toward in-play and value-added products, where Genius earns more.
  • Severity: Medium

🐻 Bear #7Prediction markets are shared with Sportradar and the NFL is hostile

  • The point: Genius's share of the new channel is non-exclusive and lacks its crown jewel.
  • Evidence:
    • Sportradar has a multi-year global Kalshi deal and the Polymarket/ATP streaming deal [20].
    • MLB gave Polymarket exclusivity, and the NHL and MLS license prediction markets directly. The NBA was in talks as of September [50].
    • NFL amicus brief (2026-10-08, Flaherty v. KalshiEX, No. 26-299): sports event contracts are gambling for states to regulate [51].
    • Locke: "we do not expect the NFL to green-light prediction markets in the near future" [14].
    • There is a circuit split (Third Circuit for Kalshi; Ninth and Sixth for the states). Kalshi's response to the cert petition is due 2026-11-09 [51,52].
  • Why it matters:
    • If prediction markets win without the NFL, NFL betting volume can migrate to venues that don't buy official NFL data from Genius.
    • The NFL said about $2bn of $3.3bn in prediction-market volume on the season's first Sunday was NFL-related [51].
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • The NFL told the CFTC that sports markets need official settlement data [14]. The CFTC's June proposal also favours verified data [53].
    • If the states win, volume returns to licensed sportsbooks, which are Genius's core customers.
  • Severity: Medium

🐻 Bear #8Adjusted EBITDA flatters: SBC exceeded it in FY25, and litigation add-backs recur

  • The point: The headline profit measure leaves out costs that recur.
  • Evidence:
    • FY25 SBC add-back was $160.5M, against adjusted EBITDA of $136.2M (that includes the $85M NFL warrant charge in Q2-25) [7].
    • The "litigation and related costs" add-back was $36.8M in FY25 (FY24 $7.6M) and $8.4M in H1-26 [3,7].
    • The SEC questioned the rationale for this add-back in 2024 [21].
    • GAAP net loss was $132.2M in H1-26; Q2 EPS was −$0.28 [3].
    • Consensus FY26 GAAP EPS is about −$0.35 [27].
  • Why it matters: Valuing the company on 8.8x adjusted EBITDA overstates the earnings that belong to shareholders, if SBC and legal costs keep coming.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Quarterly SBC is down to about $25–31M.
    • The big legal matters (dMY, Sportscastr) are now settled, so the add-back should shrink.
    • Management guides to sustained positive GAAP net income in 2027 [13].
  • Severity: Medium

🐻 Bear #9Insiders sell, nobody buys, and short interest has risen 2.6x since March

  • The point: The people closest to the company are taking money off the table, and more investors are betting against it.
  • Evidence:
    • CEO Locke sold 800,000 shares at about $6.54–6.58 (2026-09-15/17). He collared 4.4M shares (put $5.00, call $10.20, expiring 2028-09-06) and keeps 19.38M shares [54].
    • The CLO sold 50,000 at $6.51 [54].
    • There have been no open-market insider purchases since the Feb-2026 cluster of about 1.4M shares [55].
    • Short interest went from 14.6M (7.1% of float, 31 Mar) to 37.98M (18.5%, 30 Sep). Days to cover is 4.05 [56].
    • On 09-18 the stock fell 13% on the heaviest volume of the leg, while peers fell only 2–3% [23].
    • New holders: Glenview 5.2% (May) and BlackRock 5.3% (Jun). Voss and Wellington exited [57].
  • Why it matters: A founder capping his upside at $10.20 says something about his two-year view. Pledged shares can also become forced sales.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • The sales were about 4% of Locke's stake.
    • The collar may simply be loan liquidity.
    • With 4 days to cover and the stock up about 17% from its 10-01 low, heavy short interest also sets up a squeeze on good Q3 news.
  • Severity: Low Medium.

🐻 Bear #10Addiction litigation names Genius's NFL data as the enabler

  • The point: A new kind of suit says official in-game data is what makes micro-betting addictive.
  • Evidence:
    • Sage & Thompson (Philadelphia Common Pleas, filed 2026-03-24) names DraftKings, FanDuel, the NFL and Genius. The plaintiffs claim losses of about $1.9M and over $170k [2,58].
    • Preliminary objections were filed in July; no ruling has been found [58].
  • Why it matters: If the theory survives, copycat suits could make leagues and books cautious about the in-play micro-markets Genius earns most from.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • The damages are small.
    • Genius is a data supplier, not the operator.
    • No ruling has gone against any defendant.
  • Severity: Low

(Dropped since #2: "Customer concentration" as a standalone bear. The 13% figure is Q2 only; H1-26 was 10%. It is folded into Bear #6. New: Bear #8, earnings quality, and the Legend lock-up in Bear #5.)

Tailwinds NOT in the forecasts

Base for sizing: FY27 consensus revenue is about $1.30bn [26]. FY27 consensus adjusted EBITDA is about $398M (an aggregator figure, unverified) [59]. GAAP EPS is negative and the "non-GAAP EPS" basis is unclear, so impacts are given as EBITDA per share. The base is about $398M ÷ 282M shares ≈ $1.41.

  • Prediction-market minimums scale beyond the "prudent" amount in guidance — 35% chance by end-2027

    • Impact on revenue: +$40M, +3.1% vs consensus FY27

    • Impact on EPS: +$0.11 EBITDA per share, +7.5% vs FY27 base (EBITDA per share)

    • How we got the number (estimate): $40M × 75% incremental margin (data resale, rights already paid) ≈ $30M ÷ 282M shares ≈ +$0.11. This is in line with JPMorgan's $30–35M EBITDA at maturity [28].

    • Expected value: 35% × $0.11 ≈ +$0.037

    • What it is: Kalshi and Polymarket minimums step up at renewal, more venues sign (Robinhood, DraftKings Predictions, Crypto.com), and Legend earns CPA (cost-per-acquisition) fees from prediction-market sign-ups.

    • Why it's not priced in: Guidance includes only a "prudent" undisclosed amount. JPMorgan explicitly leaves it out of its estimates [14,28].

    • Trigger to watch: a disclosed prediction-market revenue line or a named new venue in the Q3 (~Nov 3–4) or Q4 results.

    • Why this probability: The deals exist with minimums and "meaningful revenue" in Q2. But Sportradar competes for every deal and the Supreme Court question hangs over the category, so this is below even odds.

  • Legend revenue synergies land in 2027 (not in guidance) — 45% chance by end-2027

    • Impact on revenue: +$30M, +2.3% vs consensus FY27

    • Impact on EPS: +$0.05 EBITDA per share, +3.8% (EBITDA per share)

    • How we got the number (estimate): $30M × 50% margin (affiliate/media mix) ≈ $15M ÷ 282M ≈ +$0.05

    • Expected value: 45% × $0.05 ≈ +$0.024

    • What it is: The four revenue synergies identified at the deal: BetVision and data on Legend sites, prediction-market acquisition, and media cross-sell.

    • Why it's not priced in: The CFO said guidance "does not yet include the 4 revenue synergies" [13]. The FY27 street number (+28%) roughly annualises Legend [26].

    • Trigger to watch: a synergy figure in the FY27 outlook (March 2027), or a further earn-out remeasurement loss.

    • Why this probability: Synergies are "building faster than expected" (Q2 call), but are not quantified. Cross-selling between affiliates and B2B tends to disappoint, so this is just under even.

  • NFL licenses prediction markets with Genius as data and settlement partner — 14% chance within 36 months

    • Impact on revenue: +$30M, +2.3% vs consensus FY27 (first full year would likely be FY28; FY27 base used as a proxy)

    • Impact on EPS: +$0.085 EBITDA per share, +6.0% (EBITDA per share)

    • How we got the number (estimate): $30M distribution and settlement fees × 80% margin ≈ $24M ÷ 282M ≈ +$0.085. For scale, the reported MLB–Polymarket deal is up to $300M over 4 years to the league (secondary) [50].

    • Expected value: 14% × $0.085 ≈ +$0.012

    • What it is: The NFL follows MLB and the NHL, and routes official settlement data through its exclusive distributor.

    • Why it's not priced in: Management excludes it from guidance and says not to expect it soon [14].

    • Trigger to watch: a Supreme Court cert decision after 2026-11-09, the CFTC final rule, or an NFL statement before the 2027 season.

    • Why this probability: Lowered from 20%. The NFL is in court arguing that these contracts are gambling for states to regulate, which is the opposite of preparing to license them.

  • Term-loan margin steps down as leverage falls — 55% chance by end-2027

    • Impact on revenue: none

    • Impact on EPS: +$0.015 GAAP EPS (pre-tax interest saving; EBITDA unaffected)

    • How we got the number (estimate): two 25bp step-downs × $825M ≈ $4.1M ÷ 282M ≈ +$0.015

    • Expected value: 55% × $0.015 ≈ +$0.008

    • What it is: The SOFR margin grid falls from 3.50% to 2.75% in three steps as net leverage drops [5].

    • Why it's not priced in: Consensus interest lines most likely use the current rate, though this is not verified.

    • Trigger to watch: year-end net leverage at or below about 2x.

    • Why this probability: It depends on Q4 cash, which management has guided to, though a track record of hitting cash guidance is still short.

(Dropped: "Texas legalises mobile betting". Expansion needs a two-thirds legislative vote plus a constitutional amendment, and the Lt. Governor is opposed, so the earliest realistic date is 2028 [60]. Chance within the window is below 5%.)

Headwinds NOT in the forecasts

  • Earn-out settled largely in shares at a depressed price — 40% chance by mid-2028

    • Impact on revenue: none

    • Impact on EPS: −$0.25 EBITDA per share, −13.8% vs FY28 (EBITDA per share)

    • How we got the number (estimate): FY28 EBITDA about $514M (unverified aggregator figure [59]) ÷ 282M = $1.82. With 45.1M new shares ($300M ÷ $6.65), it is ÷ 327M = $1.57, i.e. −$0.25. Paying in cash instead costs about $25M a year of interest at 8.2% (−$0.09 per share, pre-tax).

    • Expected value: 40% × −$0.25 ≈ −$0.10

    • What it is: Genius chooses shares for one or both tranches, at a 30-day VWAP near today's price.

    • Why it's not priced in:

      • Per-share consensus uses today's share count.
      • EV-based valuations typically ignore the earn-out liability.
      • The settlement method has not been announced.

    • Trigger to watch: the tranche-1 determination (around May 2027), year-end net leverage, and the AGM agenda on 2026-12-08.

    • Why this probability: Genius wants to delever and has called share settlement an option. Paying in cash needs H2 cash to land and revolver use, so this is a bit below even.

  • NFL and/or FDC renewal on materially worse terms — 30% chance that terms are set within 36 months

    • Impact on revenue: not directly. It is a cost hit, with the first affected year FY2030.

    • Impact on EPS: −$0.21 EBITDA per share, −15% against the FY27 base used as a proxy (no FY30 consensus exists) (EBITDA per share)

    • How we got the number (estimate): NFL+FDC are a "majority" of 2029 commitments of $325.7M; I assume about $200M. +30% cost ≈ $60M ÷ 282M ≈ −$0.21.

    • Expected value: 30% × −$0.21 ≈ −$0.064

    • What it is: A sharp fee rise, split exclusivity, or the NFL taking prediction-market rights in-house.

    • Why it's not priced in: Consensus and the 2028 targets stop before the renewal year.

    • Trigger to watch: an FDC tender notice, any Sportradar comment on the NFL, or a change in the £92M letter of credit.

    • Why this probability: Genius renewed both early last time and the NFL is a shareholder. But leagues now have more ways to make money directly.

  • US betting growth slows below plan as handle stalls and taxes bite — 27% chance in FY27

    • Impact on revenue: −$45M, −3.5% vs consensus FY27

    • Impact on EPS: −$0.11 EBITDA per share, −7.8% (EBITDA per share)

    • How we got the number (estimate): FY27 Betting revenue of about $560M (estimate from H1-26 $263.6M plus seasonality) growing about 12% instead of about 20% ≈ −$45M × 70% decremental margin ≈ −$31M ÷ 282M ≈ −$0.11.

    • Expected value: 27% × −$0.11 ≈ −$0.030

    • What it is: Handle is flat in 2026 [33], the UK duty rises in April 2027, US states raise taxes, and prediction markets take share. Together these slow the variable fee and renewal price increases.

    • Why it's not priced in: Consensus has FY27 revenue at +28% [26], and Investor Day assumed a 22% CAGR [11].

    • Trigger to watch: Betting growth in Q3/Q4-26 below about 20%, or US operator renewals done at flat prices.

    • Why this probability: Minimums and exclusive content cushion Genius, but the handle data are already flat, so the odds are not trivial.

  • Legend traffic declines from Google/AI-search changes — 28% chance in FY27

    • Impact on revenue: −$43M, −3.3% vs consensus FY27

    • Impact on EPS: −$0.09 EBITDA per share, −6.5% (EBITDA per share)

    • How we got the number (estimate): Legend at about $285M revenue (calc) × −15% ≈ −$43M × 60% decremental ≈ −$26M ÷ 282M ≈ −$0.09.

    • Expected value: 28% × −$0.09 ≈ −$0.025

    • What it is: Organic search clicks fall faster than direct and returning traffic can replace them.

    • Why it's not priced in: The earn-out marking and management's ">20% organic" claim set expectations of growth.

    • Trigger to watch: an earn-out remeasurement gain (which would mean a lower expected payout), a goodwill impairment flag, or Better Collective's Q3 (2026-11-18).

    • Why this probability: Peers that rely on SEO are shrinking, but Legend's returning-visitor share and current outperformance are real buffers.

  • Prediction markets curbed by the Supreme Court or states — 24% chance within 36 months

    • Impact on revenue: −$15M, −1.2% vs consensus FY27 (estimate of prediction-market revenue embedded in forecasts)

    • Impact on EPS: −$0.04 EBITDA per share, −2.8% (EBITDA per share)

    • How we got the number (estimate): $15M × 75% ≈ $11M ÷ 282M ≈ −$0.04

    • Expected value: 24% × −$0.04 ≈ −$0.010

    • What it is: The Court grants cert and sides with the states, or the CFTC restricts sports contracts.

    • Why it's not priced in: JPMorgan and Citizens cite prediction-market upside as a reason to own the stock.

    • Trigger to watch: the cert decision after 2026-11-09, and the CFTC final rule.

    • Why this probability: The NFL brief raises the odds of a cert grant. A full curb still needs a merits ruling against the CFTC within the window. Partial offset: volume returns to sportsbooks.

Investment Risk Score: 48/100 (elevated)

# Factor Weight Measured value Score Why
1 Liquidity & funding runway 15% Cash $155.1M + $220M revolver undrawn; LTM FCF ≈ −$113M; H2 guide +$105M; no maturity before 2031 (amortisation ~$41M/yr); no going-concern language 48 Runway is well over 36 months even at LTM burn, but FCF is negative on a trailing basis and the year-end cash target is still a promise.
2 Leverage 10% Net debt ≈ $670M = 4.2x LTM adj EBITDA, ~2.3x FY26 guide; +$214M earn-out liability; 8.2% cost; covenant levels undisclosed 55 Mid-band on forward EBITDA, worse on trailing numbers, and the covenant headroom can't be checked.
3 Dilution (last 12 months + overhang) 10% Shares +12.2% y/y (238.4M→267.6M); overhang ≈ 43.9M (NFL 19.5M, PSUs 17.8M, RSUs 6.6M) + earn-out up to 45M at $6.65 72 Inside the +10–25% band, with the largest single block (the earn-out) still ahead.
4 Profitability 10% LTM FCF margin ≈ −14%; Q2 GAAP operating margin −28.4%; adj EBITDA margin 26.9% (Q2); FY25 FCF ≈ +1% 64 Clearly loss-making on GAAP and FCF, improving on adjusted measures; 2027 GAAP profit promised, not delivered.
5 Revenue quality & concentration 10% ~60% contractual minimums; RPO $634.7M; top customer 13% (Q2-26), 10% (H1-26) 36 Mostly contracted, and the top customer sits in the 10–20% band.
6 Execution & track record 10% Revenue/EBITDA guide met or beaten in every period checked; ICFR effective; but FY25 FCF fell vs "increase cash flow" and the cash definition changed between Q1 and Q2 calls 38 Mostly hits on the P&L, small misses on cash.
7 Competitive position & disruption 10% Duopoly with Sportradar; NFL/FDC/NCAA exclusives to 2029–32; prediction markets non-exclusive; FIFA to Stats Perform 40 A strong niche, but the core is rented and renews within 3 years.
8 Cyclicality & commodity/macro sensitivity 10% 2020 revenue +31% through the sports shutdown; minimums ~60%; Media/Legend ad- and affiliate-exposed; US handle flat 2026 35 Mild: the guarantees protect Betting, and the cyclical part is Media.
9 Regulatory, legal & geopolitical 5% Prediction-market cert pending; UK duty 25% Apr-27; Brazil ban; US state taxes; Sage & Thompson; Sportscastr settled 55 Material but contained; the largest legal tail (antitrust jury) appears settled.
10 Valuation & expectations 10% EV ≈ $2.55bn ≈ 8.8x FY26 EBITDA (9.5x incl. earn-out) vs ~10–11.5x pre-deal; SRAD ~8x; short interest 18.5% of float, 4.05 days 45 Fair on multiples, but heavy short interest and a supply overhang from late October.

Overall: weighted average = 0.15×48 + 0.10×55 + 0.10×72 + 0.10×64 + 0.10×36 + 0.10×38 + 0.10×40 + 0.10×35 + 0.05×55 + 0.10×45 = 48.45 → 48.

Change vs last: −7, mostly method. The old six-area score of 55 put "dependency & concentration" at 66. The v3 method scores customer concentration separately (36), and the H1 figure is 10%, not 13%. Liquidity and the competitive position also score lower here because the minimums and the 2031 maturity are explicit. Risk that rose on the facts: dilution (+12.2% y/y confirmed, and the earn-out booked near its maximum), and trailing leverage at 4.2x. Risk that fell on the facts: the Sportscastr trial is settled.

Ranking check: At 48, GENI sits just below REAX and FTAI (both 50). It shares REAX's leverage profile and FTAI's cash-conversion questions. Its 60% contracted minimums and nothing due before 2031 make it slightly safer than both. It is clearly riskier than AVGO (34), which has net-cash-like leverage and positive FCF.

Conclusion

  • What you are really betting on when you own this stock:
    • That the price sportsbooks and prediction markets pay for NFL and UK-football data keeps rising faster than the rights bill ($331M → $397M by 2028).
    • That adjusted EBITDA finally turns into cash, so the Legend earn-out gets paid without another 8–17% of new shares.
    • That the 2029-30 renewals do not reset the spread.
  • The 2–3 things that will decide the outcome:
    1. Q4-26 cash: about $260M at year-end, and a believable path to 60% conversion in 2027.
    2. How the earn-out is settled (tranche 1 around mid-2027): cash, shares, or a mix.
    3. NFL and FDC renewal terms for the 2030s.
  • Signposts:
    • Confirm the bull case:
      • Q3 revenue at least $260M and adjusted EBITDA at least $85M, with prediction-market revenue disclosed.
      • Year-end 2026 cash at least $250M and net leverage at or below about 2x.
      • Earn-out tranche 1 announced as cash or mostly cash.
      • An early NFL or FDC renewal with a modest step-up.
    • Break the bull case:
      • Year-end cash below about $220M, or a revolver draw.
      • Q3 or Q4 Betting growth below about 15–20%, or US renewals at flat prices.
      • An earn-out remeasurement gain or a goodwill impairment, either of which would mean Legend is missing.
      • Split or lost NFL/FDC exclusivity, or NFL prediction-market rights sold around Genius.
  • New since the last report:
    • Cash and dilution, measured from filings rather than estimated.
      • LTM FCF is about −$113M.
      • Shares are +12.2% y/y.
      • Earn-out tranche 1 is booked at 89% of its cap and payable at a 30-day VWAP.
      • The Legend sellers' 10.09M shares unlock around 2026-10-27, after which up to 411k shares a day may be sold.
    • Rights-cost schedule found.
      • Contracted rights rise from $331M (2026) to $397M (2028), then fall to $90M in 2030, which is the visible cliff.
    • Two corrections and one resolved risk.
      • The 13% customer applies to Q2-26 only; H1-26 was 10%.
      • JPMorgan initiated on 2026-09-25 at $8, not ~10-02.
      • The Sportscastr patent case appears settled before trial (notice 2026-09-09).

Open questions & data gaps

  • Covenant levels and covenant EBITDA definition: not public until the FY26 20-F (around March 2027). Matters: High for the leverage score.
  • Bridge from H2 adjusted EBITDA to FCF: $145M of unlevered FCF vs about $213M of EBITDA. Also the "underlying break-even" Q2 operating cash flow. No itemisation given. Matters: High.
  • Driver of the +$99.6M Q2 RPO jump: not disclosed. Matters: Medium.
  • Sportscastr settlement terms and scope: the docket notice and Law360 headline are the only evidence; amount and whether the antitrust case 2:25-cv-01251 is covered are not found. The CourtListener API was throttled. Matters: Medium.
  • Prediction-market revenue: "meaningful" in Q2 but no number. Matters: Medium.
  • FY27/FY28 consensus EBITDA: only an aggregator figure was found (about $398M / $514M, unverified). All EBITDA-per-share impacts above inherit this uncertainty. Matters: Medium.
  • Earn-out thresholds: sit in SPA Exhibit 4.1 (2026-05-01 6-K), not read. Matters: Medium.
  • Cause of the September sell-off (−13% on 09-18, −7% on 09-30): only the insider sales line up in time. Matters: Low.
  • Q3-26 date: not announced. Calendars show 2026-11-03/04. Locke hinted the call might be later in the month for personal reasons. Matters: Low.
Sources
  1. Genius Sports Form 20-F FY2025 — SEC EDGAR — 2026-03-17 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312526110749/geni-20251231.htm
  2. Genius Sports Q2-26 interim report (6-K Ex 99.1) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-08-06 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312526336663/geni-ex99_1.htm
  3. Genius Sports Q2-26 press release (6-K Ex 99.2) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-08-06 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312526336663/geni-ex99_2.htm
  4. Genius Sports Q1-26 interim report and press release (6-K Ex 99.1/99.2) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-05-07 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312526210270/geni-ex99_2.htm
  5. Genius Sports 6-K: Legend closing, credit agreement summary, lock-up agreement (Ex 4.2) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-05-01 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312526199000/d262500d6k.htm
  6. Genius Sports to acquire Legend, incl. 2028 pro-forma targets (6-K Ex 99.1) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-02-05 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312526038384/d58400dex991.htm
  7. Genius Sports Q4/FY25 results (6-K Ex 99.1) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-03-04 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312526089847/geni-ex99_1.htm
  8. Genius Sports Q4/FY24 results (6-K Ex 99.1) — SEC EDGAR — 2025-03-04 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000095017025031313/geni-ex99_1.htm
  9. Genius Sports Q3-25 results (6-K Ex 99.2) — SEC EDGAR — 2025-11-04 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312525263521/geni-ex99_2.htm
  10. Genius Sports Q2-25 results (6-K Ex 99.2) — SEC EDGAR — 2025-08-06 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000095017025103525/geni-ex99_2.htm
  11. Genius Sports to Detail … 2028 Financial Targets at its Investor Day — Business Wire — 2025-12-03 — https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20251203629786/en/
  12. Genius Sports newsroom listing (Aug–Sep 2026) — Genius Sports — retrieved 2026-10-12 — https://www.geniussports.com/newsroom/
  13. Genius Sports Q1 2026 earnings call transcript — Motley Fool — 2026-05-08 — https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2026/05/08/genius-sports-geni-q1-2026-earnings-transcript/
  14. Genius Sports Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (verbatim incl. Q&A) — MarketBeat / Investing.com — 2026-08-06/07 — https://www.marketbeat.com/earnings/reports/2026-8-7-genius-sports-limited-stock/ ; https://www.investing.com/news/transcripts/earnings-call-transcript-genius-sports-beats-revenue-in-q2-2026-raises-outlook-93CH-4842486
  15. Genius Sports Q2 earnings call highlights (auto-generated summary) — MarketBeat via Yahoo Finance — 2026-08-08 — https://finance.yahoo.com/media-advertising/articles/genius-sports-q2-earnings-call-090343196.html
  16. Genius Sports Notes Limited Impact from Brazil's New Betting Regulations and Reaffirms 2026 Guidance — Business Wire (via Finviz) — 2026-09-28 — https://finviz.com/news/396154/genius-sports-notes-limited-impact-from-brazils-new-betting-regulations-and-reaffirms-2026-guidance
  17. Notice of 2025 AGM (6-K Ex 99.1) — SEC EDGAR — 2025-11-07 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312525271038/d89643dex991.htm
  18. Genius Sports Schedules 2026 AGM on December 8, 2026 — Business Wire (headline only) — 2026-09-23 — https://secure.businesswire.com/news/home/20260923856005/en/
  19. Genius Sports 6-K AGM 2025 results — SEC EDGAR — 2025-12-10 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312525314062/d31813d6k.htm
  20. Sportradar Q2 2026 results (6-K Ex 99.1) and Atrium divestiture (6-K) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-08-03 / 2026-10-07 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1836470/000110465926089457/tm2621599d1_ex99-1.htm ; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1836470/000110465926114201/tm2626951d1_ex99-1.htm
  21. SEC staff comment letters on FY2023 20-F — SEC EDGAR — 2024-07-17 / 2024-12-10 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000000000024008135/filename1.pdf
  22. Genius Sports Form 20-F FY2021 (2020 vs 2019) — SEC EDGAR — 2022-03 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312522079500/d238687d20f.htm
  23. GENI / SRAD daily price data — Yahoo Finance chart API — pulled 2026-10-12 — https://query1.finance.yahoo.com/v8/finance/chart/GENI?range=2y&interval=1d
  24. Genius Sports Chosen as Successful Bidder for Exclusive Football DataCo Betting Rights Through 2029 — Business Wire — 2024-03-12 — https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240312874031/en/
  25. NCAA and Genius Sports expand partnership through 2032 — Business Wire via FinancialContent — 2025-04-25 — https://www.financialcontent.com/article/bizwire-2025-4-25-ncaa-and-genius-sports-expand-partnership-through-2032
  26. GENI forecast and statistics (consensus revenue/EPS, 20 analysts; SRAD EV) — Stockanalysis — retrieved 2026-10-12 — https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/geni/forecast/
  27. GENI analyst forecast table — MarketBeat — 2026-10-11 — https://www.marketbeat.com/stocks/NYSE/GENI/forecast/
  28. JPMorgan initiates Genius Sports at Overweight, $8 (as reported) — StockTwits / MarketBeat — 2026-09-25 / 2026-10 — https://stocktwits.com/news-articles/markets/equity/geni-stock-jpmorgan-8-price-target-prediction-markets/cZMO4KcRBas ; https://www.marketbeat.com/articles/jpmorgan-bets-on-genius-sports-as-the-market-loses-patience/
  29. Truist on Legend multiple vs listed affiliates (as reported) — iGB Affiliate (secondary, via helper) — 2026 — not directly read
  30. Polymarket deal boosts Genius Sports stock — SBC News — 2026-08-05 — https://sbcnews.co.uk/sportsbook/2026/08/05/polymarket-deal-boosts-genius-sports-stock/
  31. Kalshi, Genius Sports announce partnership — Covers — 2026-08-05 — https://www.covers.com/industry/kalshi-genius-sports-prediction-market-partnership-data-integrity-august-2026
  32. Better Collective Q2 2026 interim report — Better Collective — 2026-08-21 — https://bettercollective.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Q2-2026-Report-Better-Collective-1.pdf
  33. H2 Projects 1st NFL Betting Handle Decline as Prediction Markets Gain Ground — Covers — 2026-09-09 — https://www.covers.com/industry/h2-projects-1st-nfl-betting-handle-decline-as-prediction-markets-gain-ground-sept-9-2026
  34. CourtListener dockets: Sportscastr v. Genius 2:23-cv-00471/00472, 2:25-cv-01250/01251; Genius v. SportsCastr SDNY 1:26-cv-03900 — CourtListener (search output, read by helper) — read 2026-10-12 — https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67857345/sportscastr-inc-v-sportradar-group-ag/
  35. Genius Settles With Panda Ahead Of Sports Tech Patent Trial — Law360 (paywalled headline) — 2026-09 — https://www.law360.com/sports-and-betting/articles/2523441
  36. Genius Sports (f/k/a dMY Technology Group II) shareholder action — Kessler Topaz — 2026 — https://www.ktmc.com/new-cases/genius-sports-ltd-f-k-a-dmy-technology-group-inc-ii-2023/
  37. Sportradar sued by Altenar over data monopoly — SBC Americas — 2026-04-02 — https://sbcamericas.com/2026/04/02/sportradar-sued-altenar-data-monopoly/
  38. FIFA names Stats Perform official worldwide betting data distributor — FIFA — 2026-01-12 — https://inside.fifa.com/en/news/stats-perform-official-worldwide-betting-data-streaming-rights-distributor-world-cup
  39. Genius Sports wins NFL data rights (~$100M/yr reported) — Legal Sports Report — 2021 — https://www.legalsportsreport.com/50077/genius-sports-wins-nfl-data-rights/
  40. Analysts remain mixed on Genius Sports amid uncertainty tied to future cash flows (UBS) — Finviz / Insider Monkey — 2026-02-25 — https://finviz.com/news/322613/analysts-remain-mixed-on-genius-sports-limited-geni-amid-uncertainty-tied-to-future-cash-flows
  41. GENI Deep Dive — Mungbeans — 2026-06-25 (corrected 07-04) — https://mungbeans.io/deep-dives/geni/
  42. Gambling.com Group lowers 2026 projections — Sigma — 2026 — https://sigma.world/news/gambling-com-group-lowers-2026-projections/
  43. Catena Media Q2 2026 summary — Quartr — 2026-08 — https://quartr.com/events/catena-media-ctm-q2-2026_3gz2UPeS
  44. Genius Sports Q2 2026 call — Locke on Legend owned audience (118M users, two-thirds returning) — Investing.com — 2026-08-06 — https://www.investing.com/news/transcripts/earnings-call-transcript-genius-sports-beats-revenue-in-q2-2026-raises-outlook-93CH-4842486
  45. Sportradar Q2 2026 earnings call transcript — Motley Fool via Webull — 2026-08-03 — https://www.webull.com/news/15381684690052096
  46. DraftKings Q2 results dinged by Knicks, World Cup — Casino.org — 2026-08-06 — https://casino.org/news/draftkings-q2-results-dinged-by-knicks-world-cup-prediction-market-momentum-building
  47. Gambling duty changes — GOV.UK / HMRC — 2025-11-26 — https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/changes-to-gambling-duties/gambling-duty-changes
  48. Sports betting taxes: lawmakers discuss 2026 hikes — iGaming Business — 2026 — https://igamingbusiness.com/sports-betting/nclgs-lawmakers-sports-betting-taxes-discussion/
  49. Brazil betting ban: what the provisional measure actually says — Yogonet — 2026-09-28 — https://www.yogonet.com/international/news/2026/09/28/126587-brazil-betting-ban-what-the-provisional-measure-actually-says
  50. NBA is in talks with Kalshi and Polymarket — Front Office Sports — 2026-09-03 — https://frontofficesports.com/article/nba-is-in-talks-with-kalshi-and-polymarket/
  51. NFL tells Supreme Court prediction market sports contracts are gambling — The Block — 2026-10-08 — https://www.theblock.co/news/regulation/2026-10-08-nfl-amicus-brief-supreme-court-kalshi-new-jersey-prediction-markets-418064
  52. Third Circuit affirms Kalshi's preliminary injunction — Skadden — 2026-04 — https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2026/04/third-circuit-affirms-kalshis-preliminary-injunction
  53. CFTC proposes new framework for regulating prediction markets — Akin — 2026-06 — https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/cftc-proposes-new-framework-for-regulating-prediction-markets
  54. Form 4s: Mark Locke (2026-09-17), Thomas Russell (2026-09-18), Bryan Castellani (2026-10-05) — SEC EDGAR — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312526394762/ownership.xml
  55. 6-K: management and board share purchases — SEC EDGAR — 2026-02-13 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1834489/000119312526049812/d79198d6k.htm
  56. GENI short interest (FINRA, settlement 2026-09-30) — MarketBeat — 2026-10 — https://www.marketbeat.com/stocks/NYSE/GENI/short-interest
  57. Schedule 13G filings: BlackRock (2026-07-28), Glenview (2026-05-21), Voss 13G/A (2026-07-14), Wellington 13G/A (2026-05-15) — SEC EDGAR — https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001834489&type=SC+13
  58. Lawsuit alleges microbetting by DraftKings, FanDuel, NFL leads to addiction — Insurance Journal — 2026-03-27 — https://amp.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2026/03/27/863775.htm
  59. GENI EBITDA consensus 2027–28 (aggregator, unverified, page blocked) — aktien.guide via search snippet — retrieved 2026-10-12 — not directly read
  60. Texas sports betting standoff — D Magazine — 2026-06-10 — https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-ceo/2026/the-power-of-play/texas-sports-betting-standoff/
All GENI Bulls vs Bears reports
Disclaimer. AI-generated research and podcast (Claude by Anthropic, voices by Google Gemini) for educational purposes — not financial advice and not a recommendation to buy or sell. Willem (MR.INVEST) owns this stock. Check the company’s own filings before making any decision.
← All Bulls vs Bears reports
GENI Bulls vs Bears — Stock Analysis — MR.INVEST