Stock Analysis · Bulls vs Bears

Figure Technology Solutions FIGR

🐂 Bulls vs Bears 🐻Report #213 Oct 2026
★ Willem owns this stock · 1.3% of the portfolio
40
moderate risk▼ −12 vs last
🐂 9vs10 🐻
Bears lead
40%
▲ Chance of the biggest tailwind the forecasts miss
25%
▼ Chance of the biggest headwind the forecasts miss
The verdict

The evidence leans bull on the business. Q3 volume was $5.12B (+107% y/y), at the top of guidance. The company is profitable with net cash. At $28.46 the stock trades at ~15x FY27 consensus EPS, after its EV/EBITDA fell from ~59x to ~28x in a year. It leans bear on fragility. Loan-buyer concentration is rising (top 3 went from 38% to 57%, top 5 from 46% to 54%). Take rate sits at the 3.5% floor. Contingent…

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Written by Claude (Anthropic’s AI) from public sources · Willem owns FIGR · AI can make mistakes — numbers in brackets point to the sources · Not financial advice

🐂 Bull arguments 9

  1. 1Volume doubled and beat both quarterly guides it ever gaveStrong
  2. 2The second-lien bond market is deep, growing and still cleanStrong
  3. 3Higher rates push homeowners into HELOCs, not refinancingStrong
  4. 454.6% EBITDA margin and net cash even after KiaviStrong
  5. 5The de-rating already happened: ~15x 2027 consensus EPSMedium
  6. 6Kiavi adds a second ~$7–8B-a-year loan engineMedium
  7. 7489 partners and falling originator concentrationMedium
  8. 8Controls remediated, KPMG audit, monthly volume 8-KsMedium
  9. 9Democratized Prime matched offers grew 50% in a quarterWeak

🐻 Bear arguments 10

  1. 1Loan-buyer concentration is rising, not fallingHigh
  2. 2Take rate fell from 4.4% to 3.6% and sits at the floorMedium
  3. 3Off-balance-sheet credit exposure grew 61% in six monthsMedium
  4. 4Reported cash flow is negative; earnings include fair-value gainsMedium
  5. 5Founders control the vote and the crypto side runs on related partiesMedium
  6. 6Insiders only sell, stock comp rose tenfold, Fidelity trimmedMedium
  7. 7Kiavi: debt-funded fix-and-flip lending as flip profits fallMedium
  8. 8Rocket, UWM and Better are crowding into home equityMedium
  9. 9Short interest at a record 13% of float and risingLow
  10. 10The HELOC legal structure and a 967k-account breach carry tail riskLow

Bull arguments show how well they survive the devil’s advocate (strong / medium / weak); bear arguments show the damage they could do after the counter-argument (high / medium / low).

Bull case

🐂 Bull #1Volume doubled and beat both quarterly guides it ever gave

  • The point: Figure's main metric keeps compounding faster than the market, and management's only numeric guidance has been met or beaten.
  • Evidence:
    • Consumer Loan Marketplace (CLM) volume by quarter: Q3-25 $2,469M, Q4-25 $2,705M, Q1-26 $2,902M, Q2-26 $4,259M, Q3-26 $5,119M (+107% y/y, +20% q/q) [3,4,6,7].
    • September alone was $1,783M (+9% m/m, +104% y/y). Kiavi is excluded [4].
    • The guidance record covers two quarters, the only two it has ever guided:
      • Q2-26: guide $3.8–4.1B, delivered $4.26B, 4% above the top [6,3].
      • Q3-26: guide $4.8–5.2B, delivered $5.12B, "at the high end" [4].
      • No numeric guide was given for Q3-25 to Q1-26.
    • Needham (Buy, $55, 10-07) says the weekly dashboard shows the growth is organic [21].
  • Why it matters: with ~67 bp of operating cost per dollar of volume, extra volume falls mostly to profit [3].
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Two met guides is a short record, and volume is the easiest metric to hit in a booming second-lien market. Industry HELOC securitisation nearly doubled year to date [32].
    • Q4-26 guidance has not been given yet [4].
    • Part of the "Connect" volume goes to Figure's own JV buyer, Fig SIX. Figure owns 5% of Fig SIX and Sixth Street 95%. The third-party share of buyers is still not disclosed [1,2].
    • Q3 volume growth q/q slowed from +47% (Q2) to +20% (Q3).
  • Verdict: Strong The volume is filed and audited. The open question is how much of it is truly third-party demand.

🐂 Bull #2The second-lien bond market is deep, growing and still clean

  • The point: Figure's moat is liquidity, and the market it sells into is still expanding with spotless credit performance.
  • Evidence:
    • BofA forecasts $41B of second-lien and HELOC RMBS in 2026, versus ~$29B in 2025. Issuance was $24B by 07-24, the most at that point of a year since the financial crisis [29].
    • KBRA's HELOC/CES index covers 140 deals and $34.2B (July 2026) [28]:
      • 60+ day delinquency 1.61%, 90+ day 1.26%.
      • 1,318 rating affirmations, 40 upgrades, zero downgrades.
    • Figure keeps placing deals:
      • FIGRE 2026-HE9 ($354.4M, closed 2026-08-25, Class A 32.45% credit enhancement, AAA) [30].
      • FIGRE 2026-FL2 (first-lien HELOCs, $346.1M UPB) [31].
    • AAA second-lien spreads were ~120–130 bp in July (BofA), close to non-QM bonds [29]. Figure cited ~135 bp versus ~255 bp in 2023 [5].
  • Why it matters: each tightening of spreads lifts gain on sale for Figure and its partners. A new partner gets this buyer base on day one.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • HELN reports monthly HELOC issuance fell by more than two-thirds in September, and "issuance sinks" in early October. That lines up with the 10-year topping 5% [32,41].
    • No AAA spread print after the yield spike was found, so widening is neither confirmed nor ruled out.
    • In April 2020, JPMorgan and Wells Fargo stopped taking HELOC applications altogether [49]. The modern second-lien ABS market has never been through a recession.
  • Verdict: Strong in normal markets, and still unproven in stress. The September issuance drop is the first yellow flag.

🐂 Bull #3Higher rates push homeowners into HELOCs, not refinancing

  • The point: the Fed's rate hike hurts most lenders but helps Figure's core product, because borrowers with 3% first mortgages tap equity rather than refinance.
  • Evidence:
    • Freddie Mac 30-year rate: 7.40% on 2026-10-08 [46]. The Fed hiked to 3.75–4.00% on 2026-09-16 [47].
    • In the 2022 rate shock, refinancings fell from 8.3M to 2.2M while HELOC originations rose 33.3% (CFPB, HMDA) [38].
    • The St. Louis Fed reports the share of borrowers using a HELOC rose from 9.18% (Q1-22) to 10.82% (Q1-26) [37].
    • HELOC balances were $459B (Q2-26), the 17th straight quarterly rise [36].
    • 2025 home-equity originations were $311B (HELOCs $271B, +18%) [33].
    • Management on 09-10: "making hay while the sun is shining" [19].
  • Why it matters: demand comes from a structural lock-in that a hiking Fed deepens.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Higher rates also cut loan prices. Management blamed rates for gain-on-sale pressure in Q2 [5].
    • Higher HELOC coupons raise payment stress on a junior lien.
    • The 10-K says a large rate fall would "compress" the market [1]. Rates may not stay high, and the 10-year at 5% could break something first.
  • Verdict: Strong for 2026–27. It flips if a cutting cycle reopens cash-out refinancing.

🐂 Bull #454.6% EBITDA margin and net cash even after Kiavi

  • The point: this is a profitable fintech with a net-cash corporate balance sheet, not a cash burner.
  • Evidence:
    • Adjusted EBITDA by quarter: Q3-25 $86.4M (55.4%), Q4-25 $81.3M (51.6%), Q1-26 $82.7M (49.6%), Q2-26 $119.4M (54.6%). LTM total $369.8M [3,6,7].
    • LTM GAAP net income is $237.3M on $708.9M net revenue (33%) [2,3,6,7].
    • Unrestricted cash was $1,437.5M at 06-30 [2].
    • Kiavi cost ~$590M net, funded by $600M of 8.5% notes due 2031 (first coupon 2027-01-31) [9,10].
    • Pro forma cash: ~$1.44B + $587.5M net note proceeds − ~$590M Kiavi ≈ $1.43B (estimate; ignores Q3 flows).
    • Corporate debt: $600M notes + ~$70M recourse warehouse due 2027. That leaves net cash of ~$0.76B (estimate) [2,10].
    • The indenture allows unlimited restricted payments when total leverage is ≤2.00x, and nets up to $500M of cash [10].
  • Why it matters: it can fund growth and absorb a weak quarter without issuing stock.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Part of the cash backs $506.7M owed to third-party loan owners and $544.7M of certificates and YLDS that are redeemable on demand [2].
    • Q2 revenue included a $29.1M servicing-asset gain (12.9% of revenue) [2].
    • Q2 adjusted EBITDA included a $5.9M gain. Without it the margin is ~52% [5].
    • The EBITDA definition was recast twice in 2026 [2].
    • 60%+ margin is the medium-term target. Actual margins have been 51.6%, 49.6% and 54.6% [3,5].
  • Verdict: Strong Even after removing the demand liabilities, the corporate balance sheet is not the weak point.

🐂 Bull #5The de-rating already happened: ~15x 2027 consensus EPS

  • The point: the stock is down ~61% from its $73.91 close on 2026-01-16, while estimates rose. That makes expectations far less demanding than six months ago.
  • Evidence:
    • Price $28.46 (2026-10-12) [26].
    • FY27 consensus is $1.89 non-GAAP EPS on $1.22B revenue (4 analysts, StockAnalysis), which gives ~15.1x [24]. BofA's lower $1.54 gives 18.5x [20].
    • Yahoo-reported EV/EBITDA has fallen: 58.8x (2025-09-30), 51.8x (YE25), 40.2x (Q1), 30.0x (Q2), ~27.9x now [26].
    • Sell-side targets: Needham $55, Piper $65, Bernstein Outperform (~$67–70), Goldman $41, BofA $44 Neutral, Aletheia $49. Average ~$53 across 8 analysts (7 Buy or Strong Buy, 1 Hold) [20,21,23,24].
  • Why it matters: if volume and margin hold, there is room for the multiple to expand rather than compress.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Targets are falling: Goldman went $48 → $41 on 10-07, BofA $49 → $44 on 10-05, citing a 3.51% take rate and peer de-rating [20,24].
    • The stock trades with yields and crypto, not with earnings. It fell 21% between 09-22 and 09-28 with no company news [26].
    • Consensus figures disagree widely (FY26 EPS ranges $1.18–$1.45), and whether they include Kiavi is not disclosed [24].
  • Verdict: Medium It is cheaper on paper, but the estimates themselves are uncertain and drifting down at BofA.

🐂 Bull #6Kiavi adds a second ~$7–8B-a-year loan engine

  • The point: Kiavi brings investor-property loans (DSCR rental loans and fix-and-flip bridge loans) onto Figure's rails. That adds a product line that does not depend on HELOCs.
  • Evidence:
    • Kiavi claims: 2025 originations ~$7–7.8B, revenue >$250M, EBITDA >$100M. These are company and trade-press figures, unaudited [8,19,52].
    • Management also claims a ~10% market share, ~50 bp lifetime losses since 2013, >50% repeat customers and unlevered payback in under 4 years [19].
    • Sixth Street committed $179M plus a $3B forward-purchase facility through the JV that took Kiavi's balance-sheet assets [52].
    • Figure repaid Kiavi's credit agreement and terminated its Deutsche Bank repo line at closing [9].
    • Needham sees "underappreciated upward bias to estimates" from the deal [22].
  • Why it matters: ~$100M of EBITDA on ~$590M of cash would be a ~17% pre-tax return, and Kiavi's volume is not in the Q3 CLM guide [4].
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Kiavi has filed no audited financials, and no 8-K/A had been filed by 10-13 [56,9].
    • The price does not reconcile: $717M headline, $532.4M to equityholders, ~$590M net cash [8,9].
    • Fix-and-flip economics are weakening: typical flip return 27.6% → 21.5% y/y, and flips fell to 6.2% of sales in Q2 (ATTOM) [40].
  • Verdict: Medium The upside is plausible, but every number is still management's.

🐂 Bull #7489 partners and falling originator concentration

  • The point: supply is getting broader. No single originator or customer carries the company.
  • Evidence:
    • Partners: 307 (Dec-25), 387 (Mar-26), 489 (Jun-26). 102 were added in Q2 [3]. Management said ~500 on 09-10 [19].
    • Top 5 originators: 40.2% of H1-26 origination volume, but only 19.3% of net revenue [2].
    • "No customer accounted for more than 10% of total net revenue" [2].
    • Connect share of volume: 54% (Q4-25), 56% (Q1), 65% (Q2), with a 70% near-term target [2,19].
    • The 2026-HE9 pool shows the multi-originator model: The Loan Store 40.9%, Figure 14.3%, loanDepot 12.4% [30].
  • Why it matters: losing one partner would not break revenue.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • The top 10 partners rose from 52% to 56% of volume in 2025 [1].
    • The largest partners get the lowest fees because of tiered pricing, so concentration in volume understates their bargaining power [5].
    • One originator was ~41% of a recent securitisation pool [30].
  • Verdict: Medium Strong. The partner side is genuinely diversified. The buyer side is not (Bear #1).

🐂 Bull #8Controls remediated, KPMG audit, monthly volume 8-Ks

  • The point: the credibility worries from the IPO year are partly addressed.
  • Evidence:
    • The 10-K says the material weaknesses that existed at YE24 were remediated during 2025. KPMG has been auditor since 2022 [1].
    • Figure files monthly volume 8-Ks and runs a weekly dashboard [4,21].
  • Why it matters: fewer surprises lower the "governance discount".
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Figure is an emerging growth company with no auditor ICFR attestation. The 10-K itself warns that a 404 assessment "may" find more weaknesses [1].
    • Corrections continue:
      • an 8-K/A cut the Q3-25 Democratized Prime matched-offers figure from $38M to $22M [16];
      • the Q2-26 10-Q restated cash-flow classification of retained interests (H1-25 operating cash flow went from $62.2M to $79.3M) [2];
      • the EBITDA definition changed twice [2].
    • The 10-K, filed after the February breach, does not mention it [1,42].
  • Verdict: Medium Better than before, but small corrections keep appearing.

🐂 Bull #9Democratized Prime matched offers grew 50% in a quarter

  • The point: the tokenization side has one growing product.
  • Evidence:
    • Democratized Prime matched offers: $392M (June) → $588M (September) [4].
    • Third-party borrowing was ~$170M on 08-06 [3].
    • On 09-17 the SEC granted a 5-year innovation exemption for tokenized NMS-stock venues [45].
    • Bernstein calls Figure "a blockchain capital markets platform" with "zero crypto beta, full tokenization upside" [23].
  • Why it matters: a fee stream that analysts mostly value at zero.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • YLDS circulation shrank two quarters running: ~$598M (Q1) → $556M → $504M [4].
    • 88% of Democratized Prime YLDS on the balance sheet is related-party: $306.3M of $347.7M. The 10-Q names Hastra as a holder booked as related-party debt [2].
    • The SEC exemption covers stocks, not loans, and gives issuers a veto [45].
    • The CLARITY Act failed in the Senate in September [54].
  • Verdict: Weak The growth is real, but the money is still mostly Figure's own orbit.

Bear case

🐻 Bear #1Loan-buyer concentration is rising, not falling

  • The point: the toll booth depends on a shrinking number of large buyers, and that dependence is growing.
  • Evidence:
    • Top 3 loan purchasers: 38% of loan sale volume in 2024 (15/14/10%), 57% in 2025 (22/18/17%, or $1.3B/$1.0B/$1.0B) [1].
    • Top 5 purchasers: 45.8% of loans sold in H1-25, 54.4% in H1-26 ($4.1B of ~$7.5B). Gain on sale was 27.0% of net revenue [2].
    • One buyer is Figure's own JV, Fig SIX (95% Sixth Street), set up "to purchase HELOC loans… sold through Figure Connect". Figure is owed $23.1M by it [1,2].
    • Purchaser names are not disclosed.
  • Why it matters: if one or two buyers step back, volume, gain on sale and Connect fees fall together, and the fall would be fast.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Figure cites 100+ note buyers and a weekly whole-loan auction [5].
    • Securitisation is an outlet that doesn't depend on any single buyer.
    • Sixth Street's $3B Kiavi forward commitment shows deep-pocketed buyers are adding exposure, not cutting it [52].
  • Severity: High It is the single fastest route to a bad quarter, and the trend points the wrong way.

🐻 Bear #2Take rate fell from 4.4% to 3.6% and sits at the floor

  • The point: revenue per dollar of volume is shrinking by design, and it is now at the bottom of the 3.5–4.0% range.
  • Evidence:
    • Net take rate: Q3-25 4.4%, Q4-25 3.8%, Q1-26 3.8%, Q2-26 3.6% [3,6,7].
    • On the Q2 call, management said the low end was "realistic" for Q3 [5].
    • At the Goldman conference, management called take rate "an output of our strategy", driven by volume tiers [19].
    • BofA models 3.51% [20].
    • Q3 take rate is not in the October 8-K [4]. Management promised "more take-rate clarity" with Q3 results [19].
    • Kiavi and first-lien loans carry lower fees [5].
  • Why it matters: each 10 bp on ~$26B of estimated 2027 CLM volume is ~$26M of almost pure-margin revenue.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Revenue still grew faster than the take rate fell (Q2 net revenue +113%) [3].
    • Management prices on contribution margin, not take rate, so a lower take rate with higher EBITDA can be by design [5].
  • Severity: Medium It is manageable while volume doubles, but a likely break below 3.5% plus a new reporting metric would hurt credibility.

🐻 Bear #3Off-balance-sheet credit exposure grew 61% in six months

  • The point: "capital-light" hides growing credit exposure through repurchase promises and retained bond slices.
  • Evidence:
    • Contingent loan-repurchase commitments (early-payment defaults, 30–90 days): up to $2.9B UPB at 06-30, from $1.8B at YE25. Recorded obligations $19.2M plus a $7.3M reserve [2].
    • Maximum exposure to Figure securitisations: $347.8M → $444.8M. 60+ day delinquency in those deals: 0.8% → 1.1% [2].
    • Loans held for sale: $404.3M → $597.4M (+48%). 90+ day past-due UPB $19.5M. Non-accrual UPB rose from $2.4M to $14.1M [2].
    • The Retained Interest Facility has $317.7M drawn [2].
    • Real US home prices have fallen for 14 months: Case-Shiller national +1.9% y/y vs CPI 3.4% (July). Seattle, Las Vegas and Denver are down nominally [39].
    • The NY Fed mortgage serious-delinquency transition rate rose from 1.29% to 1.52% y/y [36].
  • Why it matters: in a housing downturn, a second lien loses first. Losses would hit Figure through repurchases, fair-value marks and retained interests at the same moment buyers pull back.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Collateral is strong: weighted FICO 756 and CLTV 62.1% (Q2 call) [5].
    • H1 repurchase losses were only $1.6M [2].
    • KBRA reports zero downgrades across the HELOC/CES universe [28].
  • Severity: Medium Losses are tiny today, but the exposure base and non-accruals are growing faster than volume.

🐻 Bear #4Reported cash flow is negative; earnings include fair-value gains

  • The point: GAAP profits are not yet showing up as reported cash.
  • Evidence:
    • Operating cash flow: Q1-26 −$37.8M, Q2-26 −$35.2M (H1 −$73.0M). Less $12.7M of capitalised software, H1 FCF is −$85.6M [2].
    • The gap is mainly loan inventory: HFS rose $193.1M in H1 [2].
    • Fair-value gains in Q2 revenue:
      • gain on servicing asset $29.1M (Q1 $12.9M, Q3-25 $9.3M);
      • gain on sale $57.6M, itself a fair-value mark [2].
    • Q3-25 net income included a $31.5M tax benefit [53].
  • Why it matters: if inventory or servicing marks reverse, both earnings and cash fall together.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Adding back the HFS build gives roughly +$120M of H1 cash generation (estimate). That is lower than H1 adjusted EBITDA of $202M, but positive.
    • FY25 operating cash flow was +$62.6M [1].
    • Loans are held only ~3–4 weeks [5].
  • Severity: Medium Low. This is a lender's normal working-capital pattern, but cash conversion is clearly below 100%.

🐻 Bear #5Founders control the vote and the crypto side runs on related parties

  • The point: minority holders can't change direction, and the newer products depend on entities close to the founders.
  • Evidence:
    • Cagney and Ou hold ~36.0M of 37.9M Class B shares (10 votes each), including 31.5M in a family trust [12]. That is ~71% of voting power per the proxy (2026-04-09) [15].
    • Related-party debt rose from $166.1M (YE25) to $424.6M (06-30), against $120.1M third-party [2].
    • Of the $347.7M of Democratized Prime YLDS, $306.3M is related-party; Hastra's holdings are booked there [2].
    • Hastra pays Figure a 0.50% royalty, which brought in $0.8M in H1 [2].
    • Figure REIT, previously run by Cagney, was merged into VS Evergreen on 2026-03-27. Figure holds 33.3% and 55% interests in the Evergreen fund entities [2].
    • Morpheus (short, 2026-04-16) alleged that:
      • Figure plus one passive investor control ~99% of YLDS;
      • Figure acts as principal buyer on Connect;
      • over 65% of HASH sits with insiders. These are UNCONFIRMED beyond what the filings show [17].
    • Figure's written rebuttal was not found. Only paraphrases exist ("misunderstanding of how blockchain is integrated") [18].
    • At the 2026-06-04 annual meeting, 30.6M votes were withheld from June Ou [57].
  • Why it matters: related-party flows make true third-party demand hard to judge, and control means no outside check on capital allocation.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Everything cited is disclosed in audited filings.
    • The core HELOC engine (volume, securitisations, partners) is rated and audited by third parties.
    • The related-party exposure sits in side products that are ~0% of consensus value [23].
    • The stock barely moved on the Morpheus report (+0.3% that day) [26].
  • Severity: Medium It caps the multiple more than it threatens the HELOC engine.

🐻 Bear #6Insiders only sell, stock comp rose tenfold, Fidelity trimmed

  • The point: the people with the most information are net sellers, and the share count is creeping up.
  • Evidence:
    • No open-market insider purchases from 2026-04-14 to 2026-10-13 [12].
    • 10b5-1 sales:
      • CEO 201k shares ($6.7M);
      • Chief Capital Officer 95k ($3.5M);
      • CFO 49k ($1.6M);
      • Cagney/Ou 103k ($3.7M) [12].
    • Form 144, 2026-09-09: Figure Investments, LLC (shares acquired in a 2018 private placement) noticed 3,000,000 shares (~$114.8M), via Merrill Lynch. No matching Form 4 exists, and the affiliation is not found [13].
    • FMR (Fidelity): 12.81M shares (7.2%) at 03-31 → 9.74M (5.3%) at 06-30 [14].
    • Stock comp: H1-26 $52.0M vs $5.3M in H1-25, ~11.6% of Q2 revenue [2].
    • Unvested awards: 27.5M options + 10.1M RSUs ≈ 37.6M, or 16.8% of 223.6M shares [2].
    • Shares outstanding: 216.38M (YE25) → 224.38M (08-07), +3.7% in ~7 months [2].
    • The $200M buyback (authorised 2026-02-25) was unused at 06-30 [2].
  • Why it matters: supply keeps coming at a time when demand for the stock is weak.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • The officer sales are small against holdings and pre-planned.
    • Most of the 37.6M overhang is $4.82-strike options already counted in the 247.0M diluted shares [2,12].
    • The S-3ASR is a generic shelf with no ATM attached [11].
  • Severity: Medium Low. No dilution shock, but no insider conviction signal either.

🐻 Bear #7Kiavi: debt-funded fix-and-flip lending as flip profits fall

  • The point: Figure took on its first corporate bond to buy a lender in the most cyclical corner of housing credit, just as that corner weakens.
  • Evidence:
    • $600M 8.5% notes cost ~$51M a year in interest. The notes carry a 101% change-of-control put and make-whole protection to 2028-07-31 [10].
    • ATTOM Q2-26: typical flip return 21.5% (27.6% a year earlier), gross profit $60,526 (from ~$71,000), flips 6.2% of sales (8.0% in Q1) [40].
    • Kiavi's revenue, EBITDA and loss figures are unaudited [8,52]. No 8-K/A had been filed by 10-13; one would likely be due ~mid-November if required [9].
    • The stock fell 8.1% on closing day (09-01) [26].
  • Why it matters: if flip volumes and prices fall together, Kiavi's EBITDA could fall short of the ~$100M that justifies the price. The 8.5% coupon stays fixed either way.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Sixth Street took the loan book, so Figure owns mainly a platform with fee income [52].
    • DSCR rental loans are steadier than flips.
    • Kiavi's reported ~50 bp lifetime losses span 2013–2025, including the 2020 shock [19].
  • Severity: Medium The first test is the Q3 results in November.

🐻 Bear #8Rocket, UWM and Better are crowding into home equity

  • The point: the biggest mortgage players are attacking the same product and funding channel.
  • Evidence:
    • Rocket (Q2-26): "nation's #1 home equity lender", with $24B+ accessed since mid-2022. It is preparing its 10th closed-end-second RMBS of 2026 [34,32].
    • UWM offers standalone and piggyback HELOCs up to $350k [55].
    • Better launched a wholesale HELOC/CES platform. Its Q1-26 HELOC volume was $203M, 12% of its volume [35].
    • Freddie Mac's closed-end second pilot is listed as "Active" (cap $2.5B) [44].
    • Figure's claim to be the "No. 1 non-bank HELOC lender" ($8.3B in 2025) is its own. The latest independent HMDA ranking found (2023) put it 6th with 2.4% share, the only non-bank in the top 10 [33,51].
  • Why it matters: competition would show up first in take rate (Bear #2), and in partner defections if Rocket or UWM offer brokers better pricing.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Rocket and UWM mostly sell closed-end seconds through their own channels. Figure sells the platform plus a funded buyer network to other lenders.
    • Fintech HELOC originations grew 140% in 2023–25, versus +7–20% for banks [33].
    • Figure's ~$717 per-loan cost versus the industry's ~$11,109 remains a big gap [1].
  • Severity: Medium It is a margin threat more than a volume threat for now.

🐻 Bear #9Short interest at a record 13% of float and rising

  • The point: more money is betting against the stock than at any time since the IPO.
  • Evidence:
    • Shares short:
      • 11.37M (08-31);
      • 13.77M (09-15);
      • 17.79M on 09-30, 13.1% of float, the highest in the series (+29% in two weeks).
    • Days to cover is 3.4 [25].
    • The September build coincided with a 21% four-day drop (09-22 to 09-28). Peers fell on yields at the same time; no FIGR-specific cause was found [26].
  • Why it matters: the stock is being traded as a rates-and-crypto proxy. That raises volatility around Q3 results.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Days to cover of 3.4 is modest.
    • High short interest into a profitable print can reverse sharply (the stock rose +10%/+4% around Q2).
  • Severity: Low Medium. It is a volatility factor, not a fundamental one.

🐻 Bear #10The HELOC legal structure and a 967k-account breach carry tail risk

  • The point: a few legal interpretations hold up the product, and one cyber event is still open.
  • Evidence:
    • TILA risk: if Figure's HELOCs (including fixed-rate draws) are ruled not "open-end credit", closed-end rules apply (TRID, LO compensation, ability-to-repay). That would risk rescission and refunds across trusts. The 10-K calls this a "material adverse effect" [1].
    • Figure is a non-bank, so it has no federal rate preemption [1].
    • Breach: in February 2026 an employee was social-engineered and files were stolen. Coverage cites ~967k email addresses [42].
      • Law firms (Edelson Lechtzin, 04-09) are "investigating" and claim SSNs may be involved. Figure denies that SSNs were taken [43].
      • No docketed suit was found.
      • The 10-Q says Figure is not party to any material proceeding [2].
  • Why it matters: a single adverse ruling on open-end status would be thesis-threatening. The breach is a cost and reputation item.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • No CFPB action or court case on Figure's HELOC structure was found in 2026.
    • The rating agency treats HE9 as "fully exempt" from ability-to-repay rules [30].
  • Severity: Low (probability) × High (impact). It stays a tail risk.

Tailwinds NOT in the forecasts

Consensus base used below: FY27 revenue ~$1.22B and non-GAAP EPS ~$1.89 (StockAnalysis, 4 analysts; Kiavi inclusion not disclosed) [24]. Diluted shares 247.0M (Q2) [2]. Tax rate 25% (estimate).

  • Volume keeps growing above 50% through 2027 — 40% chance within the FY27 window

    • Impact on revenue: +$98M, about +8% vs consensus FY27.
    • Impact on EPS: +$0.18 per share, about +9.5% vs consensus FY27.
    • How we got the number (estimate):
      • Consensus revenue of $1.22B implies roughly $26–28B of FY27 CLM volume at ~3.5%.
      • 10% more volume ≈ $2.8B × 3.5% ≈ $98M of revenue.
      • At a 60% incremental margin, after 25% tax: $98M × 60% × 0.75 ÷ 247M ≈ +$0.18.
    • Expected value: 40% × $0.18 ≈ +$0.07.
    • What it is: Q3's +107% y/y pace slows only to ~+50–60% in 2027, rather than the ~+35% consensus appears to imply.
    • Why it's not priced in: consensus revenue growth of ~35% for FY27 ($901M → $1.22B) is below the current volume growth rate, even with Kiavi possibly inside it [24].
    • Trigger to watch: the Q4-26 volume guide in November; above ~$5.8B ex-Kiavi would support it.
    • Why this probability: partner adds (+102 in Q2) and rate lock-in support it. The September HELOC-ABS issuance drop and the slowing q/q growth (+47% → +20%) argue against it.

  • Kiavi delivers its full ~$100M EBITDA on top of consensus — 35% chance by FY27

    • Impact on revenue: +$125M, about +10% vs consensus FY27 (estimate: half of Kiavi's >$250M assumed not yet in consensus).
    • Impact on EPS: +$0.15 per share, about +8% vs consensus FY27.
    • How we got the number (estimate): $50M unmodelled EBITDA × 0.75 ÷ 247M ≈ +$0.15. Note coupons are already a known cost.
    • Expected value: 35% × $0.15 ≈ +$0.05.
    • What it is: Kiavi's full contribution plus cross-selling onto Figure's buyer network.
    • Why it's not priced in: consensus jumped (FY26 EPS ~$0.99 → ~$1.45) but no source states Kiavi's inclusion. BofA cut estimates after the deal closed [20,24].
    • Trigger to watch: Q3 results (one month of Kiavi), and an 8-K/A with Kiavi financials (~mid-November, if required).
    • Why this probability: management's figures are unaudited and flip returns are falling, so somewhat below a coin flip.

  • A top-20 US bank adopts Figure's platform or Connect — 25% chance within 36 months

    • Impact on revenue: +$45M, about +3.7% vs consensus FY27 (estimate).
    • Impact on EPS: +$0.08 per share, about +4% vs consensus FY27.
    • How we got the number (estimate): $3B a year of bank volume × ~1.5% fee-only take rate (no gain on sale) ≈ $45M; × 60% margin × 0.75 ÷ 247M ≈ +$0.08.
    • Expected value: 25% × $0.08 ≈ +$0.02.
    • What it is: a large bank outsources HELOC origination to Figure, or sells its HELOCs through Connect.
    • Why it's not priced in: no such partner has been announced. Banks hold ~41% of HELOC balances.
    • Trigger to watch: partner announcements, and the Q3 call.
    • Why this probability: banks are slow tech buyers, but nonbank share gains put pressure on them.

  • Figure starts using its $200M buyback — 20% chance before the authorisation lapses 2027-02-27

    • Impact on revenue: none.
    • Impact on EPS: +$0.03 per share, about +1.6% vs consensus FY27.
    • How we got the number (estimate):
      • $200M ÷ $28.46 ≈ 7.0M shares ≈ 2.8% of diluted shares, which adds ~+$0.05.
      • Lost interest of ~4% on $200M × 0.75 ÷ 247M takes off ~$0.02.
      • Net ≈ +$0.03.
    • Expected value: 20% × $0.03 ≈ +$0.006.
    • What it is: the board uses the authorisation at a price ~11% below the February secondary ($32).
    • Why it's not priced in: $0 was used through 06-30 [2].
    • Trigger to watch: the Q3 10-Q treasury-stock line.
    • Why this probability: the indenture allows it, but cash went to Kiavi and management has never discussed it.

  • A regulatory green light for tokenized loan collateral — 15% chance within 36 months

    • Impact on revenue / EPS: not quantifiable. There is no disclosed fee rate on Democratized Prime or YLDS volume, and no rule text yet.
    • What it is: a CLARITY reset in the new Congress, or SEC/OCC guidance that makes on-chain loans eligible collateral.
    • Why it's not priced in: analysts value these products at ~zero [23].
    • Trigger to watch: a CLARITY reintroduction (January 2027), GENIUS Act final rules (effective by 2027-01-18), and the third-party share of YLDS.
    • Why this probability: CLARITY just failed, and the SEC exemption covers stocks only.

Headwinds NOT in the forecasts

  • Loan buyers and the HELOC bond market pull back for a year — 25% chance within 36 months

    • Impact on revenue: −$225M, about −18% vs consensus FY27 (estimate).
    • Impact on EPS: −$0.41 per share, about −22% vs consensus FY27.
    • How we got the number (estimate): CLM-linked revenue ~$900M × −25% volume ≈ −$225M; × 60% decremental margin × 0.75 ÷ 247M ≈ −$0.41, before fair-value marks.
    • Expected value: 25% × −$0.41 ≈ −$0.10.
    • What it is: a credit or rate shock widens second-lien spreads, and one or two of the top-5 buyers (54% of sales) step back.
    • Why it's not priced in: consensus extrapolates smooth growth. Second-lien ABS has not been through a recession in its modern form.
    • Trigger to watch: AAA HELOC spreads above ~175 bp, HFS above ~$1B, monthly HELOC ABS issuance staying low after September, and a warehouse line not renewed (WH5 was due October 2026; renewal not found).
    • Why this probability: the 10-year above 5%, a hiking Fed and rising buyer concentration push the odds above normal. Buyer breadth (100+ note buyers) and zero downgrades so far argue against a full freeze.

  • Take rate breaks below 3.5% in 2027 — 50% chance in FY27

    • Impact on revenue: −$52M, about −4.3% vs consensus FY27.
    • Impact on EPS: −$0.16 per share, about −8% vs consensus FY27.
    • How we got the number (estimate): 0.2 pt lower (3.3%) × ~$26B CLM volume ≈ −$52M; at ~100% flow-through × 0.75 ÷ 247M ≈ −$0.16.
    • Expected value: 50% × −$0.16 ≈ −$0.08.
    • What it is: Connect heading toward 70% of volume, volume tiers, and first-lien mix push the blended rate below the floor.
    • Why it's not priced in: consensus appears to assume the 3.5% floor holds (BofA uses 3.51%) [20].
    • Trigger to watch: the Q3 take-rate "clarity" and any change to the reported metric after Kiavi.
    • Why this probability: the trend (4.4% → 3.6% in three quarters) points through the floor. Management may redefine the metric instead, which makes this a true coin flip.

  • HELOC credit losses rise through repurchases and retained interests — 20% chance within 36 months

    • Impact on revenue: −$67M one-off in fair-value marks and repurchase losses (estimate), about −5.5% vs consensus FY27.
    • Impact on EPS: −$0.20 per share, about −11% vs consensus FY27.
    • How we got the number (estimate): 15% markdown on $444.8M maximum securitisation exposure ≈ −$67M; × 0.75 ÷ 247M ≈ −$0.20. This excludes the $2.9B repurchase commitments, so it may understate.
    • Expected value: 20% × −$0.20 ≈ −$0.04.
    • What it is: home-price declines spread from Seattle, Las Vegas and Denver, and second-lien delinquencies rise past ~3% 60+.
    • Why it's not priced in: losses have been negligible ($1.6M of H1 repurchase losses) [2].
    • Trigger to watch: securitisation 60+ delinquency above 2%, non-accrual HFS above $30M, and a negative Case-Shiller national print.
    • Why this probability: a 62% CLTV cushion is large, but real prices are already falling and repurchase exposure grew 61% in six months.

  • Kiavi misses: flip and DSCR volume fall 30–40% — 25% chance by FY27

    • Impact on revenue: −$100M, about −8% vs consensus FY27 (estimate).
    • Impact on EPS: −$0.12 per share, about −6% vs consensus FY27.
    • How we got the number (estimate): −40% of ~$100M EBITDA = −$40M; × 0.75 ÷ 247M ≈ −$0.12.
    • Expected value: 25% × −$0.12 ≈ −$0.03.
    • What it is: falling flip margins (21.5% returns) and a 7.4% mortgage rate hit investor-loan demand.
    • Why it's not priced in: management claims payback in under 4 years, and no audited Kiavi numbers exist yet.
    • Trigger to watch: Kiavi volume in the recast Q3 data, and ATTOM Q3 flipping data.
    • Why this probability: ATTOM's falling returns are real, but DSCR loans are steadier and Sixth Street's $3B commitment backs funding.

  • An equity raise off the new S-3ASR shelf — 12% chance within 24 months

    • Impact on revenue: none.
    • Impact on EPS: −$0.13 per share, about −7% vs consensus FY27.
    • How we got the number (estimate): $500M ÷ $28.46 ≈ 17.6M new shares ≈ 7.1% dilution; $1.89 × 7.1% ≈ −$0.13, partly offset by interest on proceeds.
    • Expected value: 12% × −$0.13 ≈ −$0.016.
    • What it is: an issuance to fund an acquisition or bolster capital in a downturn.
    • Why it's not priced in: no offering is pending [11].
    • Trigger to watch: a 424B prospectus supplement, or an ATM agreement.
    • Why this probability: there is net cash today, but a new universal shelf filed one month after a debt-funded deal is a tool kept ready.

  • An adverse TILA or open-end HELOC ruling — 5% chance within 36 months

    • Impact on revenue / EPS: not quantifiable. Rescission and refund exposure across trusts depends on the scope of any ruling, and no claim exists to size it.
    • What it is: a court or the CFPB rules Figure's fixed-rate HELOC draws are closed-end credit.
    • Why it's not priced in: it is a tail risk with no live case.
    • Trigger to watch: borrower class actions, state AG actions, CFPB amicus briefs.
    • Why this probability: the risk is flagged in Figure's own 10-K, but nothing has been filed against it.

  • A governance or credibility event — 15% chance within 36 months

    • Impact on revenue / EPS: not quantifiable. The impact would be on the multiple rather than on earnings.
    • What it is: a restatement, a related-party revelation (YLDS, HASH, Fig SIX), an SEC inquiry, or a new short report backed by filings.
    • Why it's not priced in: the market applies a general discount, not one for a specific event.
    • Trigger to watch: auditor change, related-party debt rising past $500M, the 8-K/A content.
    • Why this probability: several small corrections and the related-party share are real. Controls were remediated, and no inquiry is known.

Investment Risk Score: 40/100 (moderate)

# Factor Weight Measured value Score Why
1 Liquidity & funding runway 15% Pro forma cash ~$1.43B (est.) vs $600M notes + ~$70M recourse warehouse due 2027. Reported H1 OCF −$73.0M (inventory build of $193M). $544.7M demandable certificates/YLDS. WH5 renewal (Oct-26) not found. 28 Net cash and underlying cash generation, but reported FCF is negative and funding depends on warehouse lines and demand liabilities.
2 Leverage 10% Corporate net cash ~$0.76B (est.). Gross notes 1.6x LTM adj EBITDA of $369.8M. Next recourse maturity ~$69.5M in 2027. 18 Net cash.
3 Dilution (last 12 months + overhang) 10% Shares 216.38M (YE25) → 224.38M (08-07), +3.7% in 7 months. Overhang 27.5M options + 10.1M RSUs ≈ 16.8%. SBC ~11.6% of revenue. Buyback $0. New S-3ASR. 45 Mid +3–10% band, with a meaningful but mostly in-the-money overhang.
4 Profitability 10% LTM adj EBITDA margin ~52%. LTM GAAP net margin ~33% ($237.3M / $708.9M). Reported FCF negative on inventory. 25 Strongly profitable; held above the 0–20 band by negative reported FCF and fair-value gains.
5 Revenue quality & concentration 10% No customer >10% of revenue. Top-5 loan buyers 54.4% of H1 sales (from 45.8%). Top-3 57% in 2025 (from 38%). ~98% HELOC. ~47% recurring-type revenue. 55 Transactional revenue that relies on a narrowing buyer group.
6 Execution & track record 10% Volume guide met 2/2. Q4-25 EPS $0.06 (miss). Take rate at the floor. YLDS down 2 quarters. Buyback unused. MWs remediated at YE25. 8-K/A and cash-flow corrections. 45 Mixed record: strong on volume, weak on side products and economics.
7 Competitive position & disruption 10% ~$717/loan vs ~$11,109 industry. 489 partners. Rocket claims #1 in home equity, UWM/Better entering. 2023 HMDA share 2.4%. 38 Strong niche with a cost edge, contested by large lenders.
8 Cyclicality & commodity/macro sensitivity 10% Housing, credit and ABS-market dependent. 10-year >5%. Real home prices −14 months. Sept HELOC ABS issuance −2/3 m/m. Kiavi adds flip exposure. 68 Highly cyclical funding and credit model, partly hedged by rate lock-in demand.
9 Regulatory, legal & geopolitical 5% TILA open-end risk, no preemption, crypto/YLDS classification, breach (~967k accounts) under law-firm investigation, no filed case. 45 Material but contained.
10 Valuation & expectations 10% ~15x FY27 consensus EPS ($1.89), 18.5x on BofA ($1.54). EV/EBITDA ~28x (from 59x). Short interest 13.1% of float, a record, +29% in 2 weeks. 42 Fair to slightly rich, with a growing short base.

Overall: 0.15×28 + 0.10×18 + 0.10×45 + 0.10×25 + 0.10×55 + 0.10×45 + 0.10×38 + 0.10×68 + 0.05×45 + 0.10×42 = 4.2 + 1.8 + 4.5 + 2.5 + 5.5 + 4.5 + 3.8 + 6.8 + 2.25 + 4.2 = 40.1 → 40.

Change vs last: −12 (52 → 40). Most of the change comes from the method:

  • The old score put 70 on "dependency & concentration" with a 15% weight. The 10-factor table instead credits net cash (leverage 18) and profitability (25) explicitly.
  • On the facts, concentration got worse: top-5 buyers 45.8% → 54.4%, and repurchase commitments +61%.
  • Controls got better: material weaknesses remediated at YE25.

Ranking check: At 40, FIGR sits just below VIST and RPAY (41) and above CRDO (37). FIGR is riskier than CRDO because its funding and credit model is far more cyclical. It is safer than PGY (47), because it holds far less retained credit relative to equity and has corporate net cash rather than net debt.

Conclusion

  • What you are really betting on: owning FIGR is a bet on two things. First, that Figure stays the cheapest and most liquid way to originate and sell US home-equity loans. Second, that the handful of large buyers and the second-lien bond market stay open while rates are high and real home prices drift down. The blockchain side is a free option at best.
  • The 2–3 things that will decide the outcome:
    1. Whether buyer demand holds. Watch top-5 buyer share, the after-September ABS issuance and spreads, and HFS inventory.
    2. Whether volume growth outruns take-rate decline once Connect nears 70% and Kiavi mixes in.
    3. Whether Kiavi's ~$100M EBITDA shows up in audited numbers, with flip returns falling.
  • Signposts:
    • Confirms the bull case:
      • a Q4-26 volume guide above ~$5.8B ex-Kiavi;
      • take rate at or above 3.5% on a like-for-like basis;
      • top-5 buyer share falling below 50%;
      • Kiavi 8-K/A EBITDA of at least ~$90M;
      • buyback use or an insider open-market buy.
    • Breaks the bull case:
      • a q/q volume decline;
      • HFS above ~$1B or securitisation 60+ delinquency above 2%;
      • a warehouse line not renewed;
      • a take-rate metric redefined without a like-for-like figure;
      • an equity raise off the S-3ASR.
  • New since the last report:
    • Buyer concentration is worse than the 2025 snapshot showed. Top-5 buyers rose from 45.8% to 54.4% (H1-26 vs H1-25), and top-3 rose from 38% to 57% (2024 → 2025). Contingent repurchase commitments rose from $1.8B to $2.9B.
    • Report #1 overstated control weaknesses: the 10-K says the YE24 material weaknesses were remediated. It also misattributed the related-party YLDS. The 10-Q books Hastra in related-party debt (88% of Democratized Prime YLDS) but gives no Hastra amount.
    • The market turned more bearish while estimates rose:
      • short interest is at a record 17.8M (13.1%);
      • Goldman and BofA cut targets in October;
      • a 3M-share Form 144 from Figure Investments LLC appeared on 09-09;
      • consensus FY27 EPS is ~$1.89, which makes the stock ~15x.

Open questions & data gaps

  • True third-party share of Connect buyers: still not disclosed. Fig SIX volume is not given in the 10-K or 10-Q. This matters a lot for Bull #1 and Bear #1.
  • Q3 take rate and Q4 guide: these come only with Q3 results ("November", date not announced). They matter for Bear #2 and the biggest tailwind.
  • Kiavi audited financials: no 8-K/A yet, and the consideration figures ($717M / $532.4M / ~$590M) don't reconcile. Matters for Bull #6 and Bear #7.
  • Warehouse Facility 5 (due Oct-26) renewal: not found. Low drawn balance ($6.2M), so low impact, but it is a signal.
  • Figure Investments, LLC: affiliation, and whether the 3M-share 144 sale happened. No Form 4 found.
  • AAA HELOC spreads after the September yield spike: not found. This is the key real-time stress indicator.
  • Consensus: only 4 analysts in the StockAnalysis averages, Kiavi inclusion unstated, figures disagree by source (FY26 EPS $1.18–$1.45). All tailwind and headwind sizing is therefore an approximate estimate.
  • Earnings-call text: the Q2 transcript was read only as a summary. No full Q4-25 or Q1-26 transcript was readable. Morpheus was read in part, and Figure's written rebuttal was not found.
  • Market share: no 2025 HMDA or IMF HELOC ranking was readable.
Sources
  1. Figure Technology Solutions Form 10-K FY2025 (Items 1, 1A, 9A, Notes) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-03-16 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000206412426000009/figr-20251231.htm
  2. Figure Form 10-Q Q2 2026 (Notes 5, 6, 7, 10, 11; MD&A) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-08-14 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000162828026057061/figr-20260630.htm
  3. Figure Reports Second Quarter 2026 Results (8-K Ex. 99.1) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-08-13 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000206412426000031/ex991-pressrelease2q26.htm
  4. Preliminary September and Q3 2026 operating data (8-K Ex. 99.1) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-10-06 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000149315226046036/ex99-1.htm
  5. Figure Technologies (FIGR) Q2 2026 Earnings Call Transcript (summary only) — Motley Fool — 2026-08-20 — https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2026/08/20/figure-technologies-figr-q2-2026-earnings-call-transcript/
  6. Figure Reports First Quarter 2026 Results (8-K Ex. 99.1) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-05-11 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000206412426000026/ex991-pressrelease1q26.htm
  7. Figure Q4 2025 results (8-K Ex. 99.1) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-02-26 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000206412426000003/ex991-pressreleaseq425.htm
  8. Form 8-K, Kiavi merger agreement — SEC EDGAR — 2026-06-10 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000149315226028126/form8-k.htm
  9. Form 8-K Item 2.01, completion of Kiavi acquisition — SEC EDGAR — 2026-09-01 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000149315226040931/form8-k.htm
  10. Form 8-K, $600M 8.500% senior notes due 2031, and Indenture Ex. 4.1 — SEC EDGAR — 2026-07-14 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000095010326010619/dp250054_ex0401.htm
  11. Form S-3ASR universal shelf — SEC EDGAR — 2026-10-02 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000095010326015133/dp254272_s3asr.htm
  12. Form 4 filings (Tannenbaum, Stevens, Kgil, Cagney, Ou), 2026-04-14 to 2026-09-15 — SEC EDGAR — https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0002064124&type=4
  13. Form 144, Figure Investments, LLC (3,000,000 shares) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-09-09 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000162828026061202/0001628280-26-061202.txt
  14. Schedule 13G (2026-05-06) and 13G/A (2026-08-06), FMR LLC — SEC EDGAR — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000031506626001994/primary_doc.xml
  15. Figure Proxy Statement DEF 14A — SEC EDGAR — 2026-04-24 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000206412426000020/figr-20260424.htm
  16. Form 8-K/A No. 2 (Q3-25 matched offers correction) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-01-13 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000149315226001929/form8-ka.htm
  17. Figure Technology: Smoke And Mirrors… — Morpheus Research (short seller; partly read) — 2026-04-16 — https://www.morpheus-research.com/figure/
  18. Figure clashes with short seller over blockchain lending claims — The Defiant (summary only) — 2026-04 — https://thedefiant.io/figure-clashes-with-short-seller-over-blockchain-lending-claims
  19. Figure at Goldman Sachs conference: tokenization push deepens — Investing.com (AI-generated summary) — 2026-09-10 — https://www.investing.com/news/transcripts/figure-at-goldman-sachs-conference-tokenization-push-deepens-93CH-4897044
  20. BofA cuts Figure Technology price target on lower loan volumes — Investing.com — 2026-10-05 — https://www.investing.com/news/analyst-ratings/bofa-cuts-figure-technology-stock-price-target-on-lower-loan-volumes-93CH-4931755
  21. Needham reiterates Buy on Figure Technology stock on strong loan growth — Investing.com — 2026-10-07 — https://uk.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/needham-reiterates-buy-on-figure-technology-stock-on-strong-loan-growth-93CH-4898915
  22. Needham reiterates Figure Technology rating on Kiavi deal — Investing.com — 2026-06-30 — https://www.investing.com/news/analyst-ratings/needham-reiterates-figure-technology-stock-rating-on-kiavi-deal-93CH-4767409
  23. Bernstein reiterates $67 Figure target after Q1 — The Block — 2026-05-12 — https://www.theblock.co/post/400906/bernstein-reiterates-67-figure-target-after-q1-loan-volumes-double-sees-72-upside-from-tokenization-thesis
  24. FIGR forecast, statistics and analyst ratings — StockAnalysis (aggregator) — 2026-10-12 — https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/figr/forecast/
  25. FIGR short interest (FINRA data) — MarketBeat — 2026-10-09 — https://www.marketbeat.com/stocks/NASDAQ/FIGR/short-interest/
  26. FIGR key statistics and daily price history — Yahoo Finance — 2026-10-12/13 — https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/FIGR/key-statistics/
  27. Short-Seller Report Weighs on Figure (Granahan Q2 letter) — Yahoo Finance — 2026-09-28 — https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/short-seller-report-weighs-figure-143706085.html
  28. Second Lien Securitizations: HELOC and CES Deals Catch a 2.0 Wind — KBRA — 2026-09-08 — https://www.kbra.com/publications/NvPkXxcx/kbra-releases-research-second-lien-securitizations-heloc-and-ces-deals-catch-a-2-0-wind?format=web
  29. Second-lien issuance expected to reach $41 billion this year — National Mortgage News — 2026-07-27 — https://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/second-lien-issuance-expected-to-reach-41-billion-this-year
  30. Figure Lending raises another $354.4M from HELOCs (FIGRE 2026-HE9) — National Mortgage News — 2026-08 — https://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/figure-lending-raises-another-354-4-million-from-helocs
  31. Morningstar DBRS assigns provisional ratings to FIGRE Trust 2026-FL2 — Morningstar DBRS — 2026 — https://dbrs.morningstar.com/research/482755/morningstar-dbrs-assigns-provisional-credit-ratings-to-figre-trust-2026-fl2
  32. Capital-markets headlines (HELOC/CES issuance, Rocket 10th CES deal) — HELN News (teasers) — 2026-09-30 to 2026-10-09 — https://www.hel.news/category/mbs/
  33. Study: HELOC lending share up as limits top $1T (Cotality data) — HELN News — 2026-04-07 — https://www.hel.news/articles/bank-home-equity-news/study-originations-040726/
  34. Rocket Companies Q2 2026 earnings release — Rocket Companies — 2026-08 — https://s205.q4cdn.com/636124780/files/doc_financials/2026/q2/RKT-Earnings-Release-06-30-2026.pdf
  35. Better Home & Finance first quarter 2026 results — Business Wire — 2026-05-07 — https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20260507437038/en/Better-Home-Finance-Holding-Company-Announces-First-Quarter-2026-Results
  36. Household Debt and Credit Report Q2 2026 — Federal Reserve Bank of New York — 2026-08-11 — https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2026Q2.pdf
  37. Tracking the shift from mortgage refinancings to HELOCs — Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis — 2026-06 — https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2026/jun/tracking-shift-mortgage-refinancings-helocs
  38. Data Point: Mortgage market activity and trends — CFPB — 2023-09 — https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_data-point-mortgage-market-activity-trends_report_2023-09.pdf
  39. S&P Cotality Case-Shiller Index, July 2026 — S&P Dow Jones Indices — 2026-09-29 — https://press.spglobal.com/2026-09-29-S-P-Cotality-Case-Shiller-Index-Reports-Annual-Gain-in-July-2026
  40. Q2 2026 U.S. Home Flipping Report — ATTOM — 2026-10-01 — https://www.attomdata.com/news/market-trends/flipping/home-flipping-profits-continue-gradual-two-year-decline/
  41. Mortgage rates rise as Treasury yields top 5% — NAHB Eye on Housing — 2026-10 — https://eyeonhousing.org/2026/10/mortgage-rates-rise-as-treasury-yields-top-5/
  42. Fintech lending giant Figure confirms data breach — TechCrunch — 2026-02-13 — https://techcrunch.com/2026/02/13/fintech-lending-giant-figure-confirms-data-breach
  43. Edelson Lechtzin LLP investigates Figure Lending data breach — Cision — 2026-04-09 — https://digital-release.wowktv.com/business/press-releases/cision/20260409PH31385/data-breach-alert-edelson-lechtzin-llp-investigates-figure-lending-corp-data-breach-affecting-nearly-1-million-users
  44. Pilots (closed-end second mortgage pilot) — Freddie Mac — accessed 2026-10-13 — https://freddiemac.com/about/pilots
  45. SEC opens up five-year sandbox for tokenized trading of NMS stocks — Gibson Dunn — 2026-09 — https://www.gibsondunn.com/sec-opens-up-five-year-sandbox-for-tokenized-trading-of-nms-stocks/
  46. Primary Mortgage Market Survey — Freddie Mac — 2026-10-08 — https://www.freddiemac.com/pmms
  47. FOMC statement — Federal Reserve Board — 2026-09-16 — https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm
  48. Figure's take rate is shrinking by design — Trefis — 2026-08-19 — https://www.trefis.com/stock/figr/articles/611912/figures-take-rate-is-shrinking-by-design/2026-08-19
  49. Wells Fargo stops accepting home equity credit line applications — American Banker — 2020-04 — https://www.americanbanker.com/articles/wells-fargo-stops-accepting-home-equity-credit-line-applications
  50. Figure (FIGR): The Hypoport of America — investresearch Substack (author holds FIGR) — 2026-09-17 — https://investresearch.substack.com/p/figure-technology-figr-the-hypoport
  51. Largest HELOC lenders (HMDA 2023) — The Truth About Mortgage — 2025 — https://www.thetruthaboutmortgage.com/top-heloc-lenders/
  52. Kiavi acquired by Figure Technology, Sixth Street partnership — National Mortgage News — 2026-06-10 — https://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/kiavi-acquired-by-figure-technology-sixth-street-partnership
  53. Figure Form 10-Q Q3 2025 (income statement, cash flow) — SEC EDGAR — 2025-11-13 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000206412425000032/R6.htm
  54. Senate blocks CLARITY Act 49-50 — The Defiant — 2026-09 — https://thedefiant.io/news/regulation/senate-blocks-clarity-act-49-50-with-no-democratic-votes-to-proceed
  55. HELOC product page — UWM — undated, accessed 2026-10-13 — https://www.uwm.com/price-a-loan/exclusives/products/heloc
  56. FIGR filing index (no 8-K/A or Form 4 after 2026-09-15 found) — SEC EDGAR — accessed 2026-10-13 — https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0002064124
  57. Form 8-K Item 5.07, annual meeting results — SEC EDGAR — 2026-06-10 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000149315226028100/form8-k.htm
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Disclaimer. AI-generated research and podcast (Claude by Anthropic, voices by Google Gemini) for educational purposes — not financial advice and not a recommendation to buy or sell. Willem (MR.INVEST) owns this stock. Check the company’s own filings before making any decision.
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