Stock Analysis · Bulls vs Bears

Borr Drilling Ltd BORR

🐂 Bulls vs Bears 🐻Report #213 Oct 2026
★ Willem owns this stock · 1.1% of the portfolio
57
elevated risk▼ −6 vs last
🐂 9vs10 🐻
Bears lead
25%
▲ Chance of the biggest tailwind the forecasts miss
55%
▼ Chance of the biggest headwind the forecasts miss
The verdict

Near-term evidence leans to the bears: Contracted dayrates are still drifting down. 2026 awards so far average about $123k/day, and the 2027 book fell from $142k to about $138k. The first big Gulf tender of the war went to a Saudi champion. Net debt is about 6x trough EBITDA. The bull case is not broken. Nothing matures before 2028, Q3 should rebound as Q2's one-offs fall away, and Tor Olav Trøim has bought about…

🎙️ Bulls vs Bears podcast — Borr Drilling Ltd
Alex and Sam debate every bull and bear argument · 13:51
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Written by Claude (Anthropic’s AI) from public sources · Willem owns BORR · AI can make mistakes — numbers in brackets point to the sources · Not financial advice

🐂 Bull arguments 9

  1. 1Youngest big jack-up fleet, and almost no new supply comingStrong
  2. 2Refinancing pushed every real maturity out to 2032–2034Strong
  3. 3The founder bought about $37M of stock in eight weeksMedium
  4. 4Q2 was depressed by one-offs that fall away in Q3Medium
  5. 5The oil shock should lift drilling demand in 2027–28Medium
  6. 6The 2027 contract book keeps fillingMedium
  7. 7Rigs bought at a fraction of newbuild costMedium
  8. 8Mexico restructured into long bareboat contracts with no cash callsWeak
  9. 9A Middle East tender wave could absorb Borr's idle rigsWeak

🐻 Bear arguments 10

  1. 1Net debt is about 6x trough EBITDA, and debt service rises in 2027High
  2. 2Dayrates are still falling, not risingHigh
  3. 3State-backed Gulf champions are winning the tenders Borr needsMedium
  4. 4FY2026 consensus EBITDA looks too high for the H2 run-rateMedium
  5. 5Customer credit losses keep recurringMedium
  6. 6Mexico exposure grew while Pemex's budget shrinksMedium
  7. 7The Gulf war still idles rigs and raises costsMedium
  8. 8Repeated execution slips, and no numeric 2026 guidanceMedium
  9. 9The valuation already prices a recovery, and shorts doubledMedium
  10. 10Dilution history, with a convert and option overhangMedium

Bull arguments show how well they survive the devil’s advocate (strong / medium / weak); bear arguments show the damage they could do after the counter-argument (high / medium / low).

Bull case

🐂 Bull #1Youngest big jack-up fleet, and almost no new supply coming

  • The point: Supply of modern jack-ups can't grow for years. When demand turns, the youngest rigs get hired and repriced first, and Borr owns the largest pure modern fleet.
  • Evidence:
    • 11 jack-up newbuilds are under construction, 2.5% of the marketed fleet [3].
    • Global marketed utilisation was 87.4% at 30 June, and modern-fleet utilisation was 90.1%, rising to 91.7% by the Q2 report date [3].
    • Borr's average fleet age is 9.4–9.8 years, against 17–29 years at the main peers [1,7].
    • Borr says ~30% of the world fleet is past its 30-year design life. That figure is the company's own and is not independently confirmed [7].
    • Esgian says premium jack-up values stabilised at end-2025 and have "recovered gradually into 2026" [33].
  • Why it matters: With a fixed fleet, each extra rig of demand goes first into utilisation and then into dayrates. Each +$10k/day across ~24 working rigs is about $88M of annual EBITDA (24 × $10k × 365, estimate).
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • "No new supply" has been true since 2022, yet jack-up dayrates fell 20.6% in 2025 [34].
    • Valaris's benign-water jack-up fleet was only 41% utilised in Q2 on a total-fleet basis, and 76% counting active rigs only [31]. Idle, reasonably modern capacity exists.
    • Second-hand rigs are changing hands cheaply: Noble sold to Borr at $72M each, and the Fontis rigs went at about $57M each [3,4]. When supply can be bought that cheaply, it is not scarce.
  • Verdict: Strong as a structural point, unchanged from #1. It sets the ceiling, not the timing.

🐂 Bull #2Refinancing pushed every real maturity out to 2032–2034

  • The point: The 2028/2030 maturity wall is gone, so Borr can wait for the cycle without a forced restructuring.
  • Evidence:
    • $1,100M of 8.75% notes due 2032 and $935M of 9.00% notes due 2034 were priced on 2026-05-27 [12].
    • The old 2028 and 2030 notes were retired by 29 June, at a $176.3M extinguishment charge [2].
    • The only bullet before 2032 is the $44.2M of 2028 convertibles due 8 Feb 2028 [4].
    • The $250M super-senior revolver is undrawn. It matures on the earlier of 2031-06-11 or six months before the 2032 notes [3].
    • Liquidity was $473.6M at 30 June [3]. The interim accounts are on a going-concern basis with no doubt language [4].
    • CEO Bruno Morand on the Q2 call: "I don't see an immediate need or a near-term need for any kind of balance sheet transactions" [13].
  • Why it matters: Time is the scarce asset in a cyclical trough, and Borr bought about five years of it.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • The cost of that time is high. The coupon run-rate is about $193M a year: $96.3M + $84.2M + $10.5M + $2.2M, plus the undisclosed Noble seller-credit rate (arithmetic on [4]).
    • The notes amortise 5% a year (about $101.75M) from July 2027 [3].
    • Debt service from H2 2027 is therefore about $295M a year, against FY2025 operating cash flow of $251.9M, which was a much better year [6].
    • Maintenance covenants exist on the revolver: net leverage, liquidity, equity ratio, collateral and interest cover [1]. The post-June 2026 thresholds were not found.
  • Verdict: Strong Medium. The maturity risk is gone, but a cash-flow squeeze from mid-2027 has replaced it if rates don't rise.

🐂 Bull #3The founder bought about $37M of stock in eight weeks

  • The point: The person who knows the fleet and the pipeline best is buying aggressively, and buying faster as the price falls.
  • Evidence:

    • Drew Holdings (Trøim's close associate) bought in the open market [16,17]:

      Date Shares Price
      08-17 500k $4.39
      08-25 200k $4.37
      09-17 1.0M $4.30
      09-18 150k $4.38
      10-06 1.5M $4.13
      10-07 1.5M $4.24
      10-08 1.25M $4.31
      10-12 2.5M $4.74

    • That totals about 8.6M shares and about $37M (arithmetic on [16,17]).

    • Earlier in 2026: Drew bought 500k at $5.20 on 03-25, and director Jeffrey Currie bought 250k at $5.31, explicitly on the open market [18].

    • CEO Morand bought 45,500 at about $4.40 on 09-21 [17].

    • Drew held 25.1M shares (8.2%) per a February 2026 13G/A. The current stake is not disclosed. About 34M (~11%) after the 2026 purchases is an estimate [17].

    • Value funds also hold large stakes: Cobas 31.3M shares (10.2%, 13G event 2026-08-13) [21] and Azvalor 28.6M (10.0%) [22].

  • Why it matters: Insiders rarely buy $37M ahead of a dilutive raise. Interpretation: this is the strongest available signal that management sees no equity raise coming and expects better 2027 pricing.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Granular Capital cut from 18.8% to 13.1% on 2026-06-10 and gave no reason [20]. A smart holder was a large seller.
    • Trøim also bought heavily in 2019–21 before Borr had to defer debt and raise equity in the downturn.
    • The holdings-after figures on the forms were not visible. Whether Drew is absorbing a seller's block is unknown.
  • Verdict: Medium Strong. This is new and much larger than in report #1, and it materially lowers the near-term equity-raise probability. It does not change dayrates.

🐂 Bull #4Q2 was depressed by one-offs that fall away in Q3

  • The point: Q2 adjusted EBITDA of $43.8M was not the run-rate. Q3 guidance and the start of Odin point to a sharp rebound.
  • Evidence:
    • Q2 one-offs [2]:
      • Odin costs $22.5M.
      • A credit loss of $10.8M on a former West African customer.
      • Middle East insurance ($2.2M) and fuel ($5.1M).
    • Together that is about $40.6M. Q2 EBITDA excluding them would be about $84M (arithmetic).
    • Odin started earning dayrate offshore Texas on 2026-09-11 [9].
    • Management guides about 23 active rigs in Q3, against 21.2 in Q2, and says EBITDA should "improve significantly" [2].
    • On the call Morand added "a quite substantial increase on sequential results in Q3" [13].
  • Why it matters: One or two clean quarters back at about $100M+ EBITDA would take leverage from about 6.2x LTM toward about 5x and calm the credit story.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Q3 still carries $6–9M of Odin preparation cost [13].
    • Morand called Q4 "a bit of steady state", not further growth [13].
    • Credit losses are not one-off: $8.4M in Q1 and $10.8M in Q2 [5,2].
    • Q2's adjusted EBITDA margin on reported revenue was 18.9%, against 48.9% in Q3-2025 [2]. Even a full rebound only reaches the 2025 level, not a new high.
  • Verdict: Medium The Q3 rebound is very likely. It is a recovery to the 2025 trend, not proof of an upcycle.

🐂 Bull #5The oil shock should lift drilling demand in 2027–28

  • The point: The Gulf war drained inventories. Higher oil should push national and international oil companies to drill shallow-water barrels, which have low breakevens, with dayrates lagging oil by 6–12 months.
  • Evidence:
    • Brent averaged $114 in September 2026 and hit $131 on 09-15 [30].
    • EIA forecasts Brent at $105 in Q4 2026, $96 for 2026 and $84 for 2027, with Middle East shut-ins averaging 4.5 mb/d in Q4 2026 [30].
    • Management in May: "improved activity and dayrates will lag the oil price development by 6 to 12 months", and it is "increasingly confident" about 2027 and 2028 [5].
    • On the Q2 call, management said low global inventories "will require sustained drilling" [2].
    • Shallow-water jack-up projects break even at about $10–31/bbl (company deck) [7].
  • Why it matters: A 2027 rate reset on about 64% of open days is the single biggest lever on Borr's equity (see Tailwinds).
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • EIA's own path has Brent back at $74 by Q4 2027 [30]. Customers that see the spike as temporary won't sign multi-year contracts at peak rates.
    • Borr says the war cut near-term visibility and delayed tenders and contract starts [2].
    • S&P Global data cited on the Q2 call show H1 2026 jack-up backlog additions at their lowest in more than 25 years [13].
    • Seven months into the shock, Borr's own 2027 book is pricing lower, not higher (see Bear #2).
  • Verdict: Medium The trigger is real and stronger than in report #1 (EIA raised Q4 2026 by $14). The transmission into Borr's contracts hasn't started.

🐂 Bull #6The 2027 contract book keeps filling

  • The point: Borr keeps adding firm work into 2027, which reduces the downside even if rates don't jump.
  • Evidence:
    • 2026 to date: 21 commitments, about 4,350 days and $541M [3].
    • Backlog: $962.9M at YE2025 [1], $1.04B at 30 June and $1.13B at 11 August [3].
    • 2027 coverage was 29% at $142k/day in the May deck [7]. The August slides show about 36% at $138k/day; that figure comes from a secondary summary, because the chart is an image [14].
    • September awards:
      • Bestla: Eni exercised a 9-month option to September 2027 [9].
      • Idun: a 3-well Vietnam job of about 130 days from Q4 [9].
      • Norve: 3 firm wells, about 245 days from mid-December to August 2027, plus about 175 days of options [11].
      • Natt: Shell exercised a 1-well option into August 2027 [11].
    • Odin has firm work to mid-2027, with options to 2029 [13].
  • Why it matters: Each firm rig-year at about $130k with about $75k opex is about $20M of EBITDA (estimate) that does not depend on the cycle.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • The work is short: wells and months, not years.
    • Most September awards have undisclosed rates.
    • The 2026 awards average about $123k/day ($541M ÷ 4,350 days) [3], below the $134k book. Borr is filling the calendar by giving up price.
  • Verdict: Medium Volume is improving and price is not.

🐂 Bull #7Rigs bought at a fraction of newbuild cost

  • The point: Borr has grown its fleet at prices far below replacement cost. If the cycle turns, the return on that capital is very high.
  • Evidence:
    • January 2026: 5 rigs from Noble for $360M, about $72M each [3].
    • July 2026: 5 Fontis rigs through BC Ventures for $287M, about $57M each. That deal was funded by a $237M non-recourse seller credit and $25M of Borr cash [4].
    • Westwood (2023) put a 400ft newbuild at $250–300M and said it needed $200–230k/day for a 15% return [43].
    • The latest current replacement cost found is not newer than 2023.
  • Why it matters: No rational owner orders new rigs until dayrates clear about $200k, which caps supply and protects asset values.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Cheap transaction prices are the market telling you rigs are plentiful.
    • Esgian's rig value for Borr's fleet is $86.8M per rig. The market-implied value was $133M per rig in May 2026 [33].
    • Interpretation: at today's enterprise value of about $3.78B [24], the stock already prices Borr's rigs above independent appraisal, not below.
  • Verdict: Medium Weak. Buying was smart, but the equity market already gives credit for it.

🐂 Bull #8Mexico restructured into long bareboat contracts with no cash calls

  • The point: Borr exits its 51% operating JVs but keeps the rigs on long bareboat charters, so the payment risk and cash calls sit with the local partner.
  • Evidence:
    • Borr is selling its 51% of Perfomex to its "long-standing local partner" at net book value as of 2026-07-31, which is undisclosed [10].
    • Perfomex was carried at only $10.3M on 30 June [4].
    • Galar and Gersemi are contracted to May 2030 and Njord to April 2028, with "economics largely unchanged" [10].
    • The Q2 deck says Pemex is "calling previously suspended rigs back to work" [8].
  • Why it matters: Long contracts on three owned rigs, with no 51% cash-call duty, cut the main Mexico tail risk flagged in report #1.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • Total Mexico exposure still went up: 3 owned rigs on bareboat, 5 JV rigs and Ran.
    • The JV needed about $15M of shareholder-loan working capital in Q3 [13].
    • The JV carries a $237M seller credit due January 2029 [4].
    • Closing of the Perfomex sale was not confirmed by 10-13.
    • Bareboat income still ultimately depends on Pemex paying the partner.
  • Verdict: Weak Medium. The structure is better and the exposure is bigger.

🐂 Bull #9A Middle East tender wave could absorb Borr's idle rigs

  • The point: Gulf national oil companies have more than a dozen jack-up tenders out, and Borr has idle modern rigs (5 of 29 uncommitted at Q2) [3].
  • Evidence:
    • Borr's May deck cited Clarksons estimates of opportunities for up to about 17 rigs, including Aramco about 9 rigs and KOC/KJO about 4 [7].
    • Westwood counted about 56 rig-years tendered in late 2025 and early 2026 [34].
  • Why it matters: Two multi-year awards would lift utilisation and remove the Var activation question.
  • 😈 Devil's advocate:
    • The first award went elsewhere. KJO's 4-rig, about SAR 2B, 4-year contract went to Arabian Drilling on 2026-09-28 [35].
    • No Aramco award was found by 10-13.
    • ADES now has 88 units after buying Shelf, Saipem's 5 Saudi jack-ups and 4 Noble rigs [36,37].
    • Aramco's share of Borr revenue fell from 14% in 2023 to 6% in 2025 [1].
  • Verdict: Weak It was Weak-to-Medium in report #1, and the KJO outcome cut it further.

Bear case

🐻 Bear #1Net debt is about 6x trough EBITDA, and debt service rises in 2027

  • The point: Borr carries investment-grade-sized debt on a trough-sized, cyclical EBITDA. From July 2027 it must also start repaying principal.
  • Evidence:
    • Principal was $2,529.2M and cash $223.6M at 30 June, so net debt is about $2,305.6M [3].
    • LTM adjusted EBITDA (Q3-25 to Q2-26) is $135.6M + $105.2M + $88.5M + $43.8M = $373.1M. That gives net debt of about 6.2x LTM, or about 8.7x on H1 annualised (arithmetic on [2,5,6]).
    • Q2 operating cash flow was −$21.8M [2].
    • Run-rate coupons are about $193M, plus amortisation of about $101.75M a year from July 2027 [3,4].
    • S&P rates Borr 'B' after cutting it in December 2025 [45]. No post-refinancing rating action was found.
  • Why it matters: Every dollar of EBITDA goes first to bondholders. If 2027 dayrates stay at about $130k, free cash flow after interest and amortisation is roughly zero or negative, and equity holders own the leftover.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • There are no maturities to 2028/2032, and the revolver is undrawn [3].
    • On FY2025-level EBITDA ($470.1M) leverage would be about 4.9x [6].
    • The bonds are senior secured on a young fleet that Esgian values at about $2.5B for 29 rigs (29 × $86.8M, estimate) [33].
  • Severity: High This is the single biggest reason the equity is fragile.

🐻 Bear #2Dayrates are still falling, not rising

  • The point: Borr's own contract pricing has not turned, despite the oil spike and management saying the bottom had passed.
  • Evidence:
    • Average 2026 booked dayrate: about $147k for 2025, then $137k (Q1) and $134k (Q2) [3,5].
    • 2027 booked rate: $142k (May) [7], then about $138k (August, secondary) [14].
    • 2026 awards to date average about $123k/day ($541M ÷ 4,350 days) [3].
    • Valaris's jack-ups averaged $134k/day in Q2 [31]. Westwood measured 2025 dayrates at −20.6% vs 2024 [34].
    • Management said in February 2026 that "the jack-up market bottom is now behind us" [6].
    • On the Q2 call Morand said "it only takes probably about a dozen of new contracts before you start pushing into a place where pricing power returns" [13]. Interpretation: that is an admission that pricing power has not returned yet.
  • Why it matters: About 64% of 2027 days are still open (estimate from 36% coverage). Each $10k/day on those days is about $61M of revenue (6,100 days × $10k).
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • West Africa leading-edge fixtures were "approaching $170k/day" in May [7].
    • Harsh-environment North Sea work is far higher; Noble has $320k/day from bp UK [49].
    • Modern utilisation above 90% is the classic precondition for a rate jump.
  • Severity: High Without a visible rate inflection in the next two quarters, the leverage math doesn't work.

🐻 Bear #3State-backed Gulf champions are winning the tenders Borr needs

  • The point: The Arabian Gulf is about 36% of global jack-up supply [34], and it is consolidating into national champions with local-content advantages.
  • Evidence:
    • Arabian Drilling won KJO's 4-rig, about SAR 2B, 4-year contract (2026-09-28) [35].
    • ADES bought Shelf Drilling (2025), Saipem's Saudi jack-up business for $285M (closed about 09-18), and 4 Aramco-contracted Noble rigs for $292M [36,37].
    • ADES runs at 97.6% utilisation with a SAR 34.67B backlog of about 4.5 years [36].
    • Transocean–Valaris (Valaris owns 50% of ARO with Aramco) is due to close in Q4 2026 [31,44].
    • Borr has 4 Gulf rigs [3], and Aramco fell to 6% of Borr revenue in 2025 [1].
  • Why it matters: If the Gulf recovery is captured by local players, Borr's idle rigs must compete in Southeast Asia and West Africa. Southeast Asia already has a "slight overhang" [13].
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Borr is the most geographically diversified premium jack-up owner, so it doesn't need the Gulf.
    • The Aramco tender (~9 rigs) is still open.
    • Every rig the champions absorb at home is one less competing with Borr elsewhere.
  • Severity: Medium High. This is new in report #2 and reinforced by the KJO loss.

🐻 Bear #4FY2026 consensus EBITDA looks too high for the H2 run-rate

  • The point: The only consensus figure found implies H2 EBITDA of about $287M, about $143M a quarter, which is above Borr's best recent quarter.
  • Evidence:
    • FY2026 adjusted EBITDA consensus is $419M (10 analysts, range $376–457M) [27]. The source is undated and may be stale.
    • H1 was $132.3M [2], so H2 needs about $287M.
    • Q3-2025, before the rate reset, was $135.6M [6].
    • My own run-rate estimate:
      • Q3: 23 rigs × 92 days × ($134k − $75k) ≈ $125M, less ~$15M G&A and ~$7.5M Odin cost, ≈ $102M.
      • Q4: ≈ $110M.
      • H2 ≈ $212M, so FY ≈ $344M (estimate).
    • Revenue consensus of $996.5M (7 analysts) looks reachable [23]. The gap is cost and credit losses, not revenue.
  • Why it matters: A visible miss in November or February would hit sentiment just as short interest is near its high and the 2027 rate story is unproven.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • The $419M may simply be stale and pre-Q2. Post-Q2 revenue consensus already fell [23].
    • Management guided "significant" improvement and refused to give a number [13], so it is not on record against consensus.
  • Severity: Medium It is a sentiment event, not a solvency event.

🐻 Bear #5Customer credit losses keep recurring

  • The point: Borr has repeatedly lost money on weak customers, which suggests it is chasing marginal work to keep rigs busy.
  • Evidence:
    • Credit losses of $8.4M (Q1) and $10.8M (Q2) on a "former West African customer", now fully provided [5,2]. The H1 provision for customer credit deterioration was $19.9M, and the allowance was $18.2M at 30 June [4].
    • Lime Petroleum (Benin, rig Gerd) discontinued Benin operations and stopped funding on 2026-05-29 [40]. The link to Borr's loss is my inference; Borr does not name the customer.
    • Two sanctions-related terminations (Odin and Hild) took effect in October 2025 [1].
    • Mexican receivables were about $90–100M at YE2025, per a secondary summary of the Q4 call. No 2026 figure is disclosed [6].
  • Why it matters: About $19M in H1 equals about 14% of H1 EBITDA, lost to customers that can't pay.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Gerd now works for Foxtrot in Ivory Coast [3].
    • The bad customer is gone and has no net receivable left [2].
    • The large customers (Eni 18%, PTTEP 11%) are investment-grade [1].
  • Severity: Medium Low.

🐻 Bear #6Mexico exposure grew while Pemex's budget shrinks

  • The point: Borr now has 8–9 rigs tied to Pemex activity, owned or through the JV, while Mexico is cutting Pemex's budget and support.
  • Evidence:
    • The 2027 budget proposal (2026-09-08) cuts Pemex spending 1.3% in real terms to MX$527.1B. Treasury support falls from MX$263.5B to MX$81.1B [38].
    • Small suppliers said in July 2026 that MX$27.24B of 2024 invoices were still unpaid (secondary).
    • Pemex deferred about $29B of 2025 supplier payments for up to eight years, to 2033 [39]. This is a single source and not re-confirmed by helpers.
    • The JV's $237M seller credit is due in January 2029. A third party says it carries 10% interest for the first 12 months, rising after that (unverified).
  • Why it matters: A Pemex suspension round, like 2024–25, would idle several rigs at once and freeze receivables.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • Galar and Gersemi are on contract to 2030 under "improved commercial and payment terms" [10].
    • The JV debt is non-recourse to Borr [4].
    • Pemex is currently recalling suspended rigs, not suspending them [8].
  • Severity: Medium

🐻 Bear #7The Gulf war still idles rigs and raises costs

  • The point: Borr is directly exposed to an unresolved war in its second-largest demand region.
  • Evidence:
    • Arabia III was shut down and evacuated on 2026-03-07 after an incident on a customer platform [15]. Its current status is not disclosed in any document read.
    • Q2 cost $2.2M of extra insurance and $5.1M of extra fuel [2].
    • Valaris lost about $30M of Q2 EBITDA to the war [31].
    • Westwood saw Gulf working utilisation fall from about 83% to about 69% between February and April [34].
    • As of 10-12 there is no ceasefire: the US rejected Iran's offer and there were vessel strikes [41].
    • Forseti's Noble bareboat ends December 2026, and its follow-on work is not found [3].
  • Why it matters: Lost days and higher costs fall in Borr's thinnest years.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • All four Gulf rigs stayed under contract and insured [15].
    • Suspended rigs are "gradually resuming" [13].
    • Valaris expects the impact to "moderate" in H2 [31].
  • Severity: Medium

🐻 Bear #8Repeated execution slips, and no numeric 2026 guidance

  • The point: Management's timing promises slip, and it has stopped giving a full-year number.
  • Evidence:
    • Odin was due to start in February. It slipped to June, then to approvals in mid-July, and finally earned dayrate on 2026-09-11 [5,9]. It cost $22.5M in Q2 plus $6–9M in Q3 [13].
    • Q2 revenue was $232.3M against about $246–249M consensus [48]. The stock fell about 4–10% depending on source and measure [42,13].
    • 2024 EBITDA landed at $505.4M after a $500–550M guide narrowed to the low end [1].
    • 2026 has no numeric EBITDA guidance in the Q4, Q1 or Q2 releases [6,5,2].
  • Why it matters: Without a guide, investors have no anchor, and the next miss is judged against a consensus management never endorsed.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • FY2025 adjusted EBITDA of $470.1M hit the top of its $455–470M range [6].
    • PwC gives clean opinions, and there are no material weaknesses or restatements [1].
    • Odin's delay was US permitting, outside Borr's control.
  • Severity: Medium Low. Controls are clean, and the slips are about timing, not integrity.

🐻 Bear #9The valuation already prices a recovery, and shorts doubled

  • The point: At $4.92 the stock is not trough-priced on trough earnings.
  • Evidence:
    • Enterprise value is about $3.78B, about 10.1x LTM EBITDA, against about 7.9x in March 2026 (FactSet via multiples.vc) [24,28].
    • The market-implied value per Borr rig was $133M in May, against Esgian's $86.8M [33].
    • The average target is $4.97 (4 Buy / 3 Hold), essentially the share price [25].
    • SEB downgraded to Hold in March because "the recovery is already reflected in the share price" [29].
    • Short interest went from 13.7M (late February) to 32.9M (14 August) and then 34.5M, which is 14.5% of shares and 5.85 days to cover [24,26].
  • Why it matters: The equity needs the upcycle just to justify today's price. Shorts are positioned for another disappointment.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • On a recovered EBITDA, for example the $543M FY2027 consensus (undated) [27], EV/EBITDA is about 7x.
    • High short interest plus heavy insider buying can produce sharp squeezes on good news.
  • Severity: Medium

🐻 Bear #10Dilution history, with a convert and option overhang

  • The point: Borr has repeatedly issued equity at low prices. A further overhang exists, and authorised headroom is tight.
  • Evidence:
    • Shares outstanding went from 244.9M (YE2024) [47] to 307.2M (YE2025) and 308.5M (30 June 2026) [1,4], about +26% in 18 months.
    • 2025 raises: 50M shares at $2.05 and 21M at $4.00 [1].
    • Overhang:
      • $300M of 2033 converts at $8.00, which would be 37.5M shares (12%) [4].
      • 11.9M options at a $4.45 average strike [1].
      • 2.87M RSUs/PSUs granted on 2026-08-25 [19].
    • Authorised headroom is about 49.6M shares (365M authorised vs 315.4M issued) [4].
    • An F-3ASR shelf is on file [1].
  • Why it matters: If 2027 repricing is late, equity is the release valve.
  • 🛡️ Counter-argument:
    • The converts are about 63% out of the money.
    • No maturity forces a raise.
    • About $37M of founder buying argues against an imminent raise.
  • Severity: Medium Low (Medium in report #1). The founder buying and the maturity push lowered it.

Tailwinds NOT in the forecasts

Consensus base (aggregator data, S&P Global via StockAnalysis [23]): FY2027 revenue $1.22B and EPS $0.08, from 308.5M shares. FY2027 EPS is near zero, so % EPS changes are huge and are shown for completeness only.

  • Dayrate upcycle lifts 2027 open days to about $155k+ — 25% chance by end-2027

    • Impact on revenue: +$91M, +7.5% vs consensus FY2027 $1.22B.

    • Impact on EPS: +$0.25 per share (about 3x the $0.08 FY2027 consensus).

    • How we got the number (estimate): ~6,100 open 2027 days × +$15k average uplift (back-end weighted) ≈ $91M × 85% incremental margin after revenue taxes ÷ 308.5M ≈ +$0.25.

    • Expected value: 0.25 × $0.25 ≈ +$0.06 per share.

    • What it is: Leading-edge rates move from about $123–138k toward $155–170k as inventories rebuild and the Aramco and Southeast Asia tenders clear.

    • Why it's not priced in: Consensus FY2027 EPS of $0.08 implies roughly flat rates. The 2027 book is at about $138k, falling.

    • Trigger to watch: Q3 release 2027 coverage and rate. A disclosed fixture above $150k outside West Africa.

    • Why this probability: It was 33% in report #1. It is lower because Borr's 2027 book rate fell $4k since May and the KJO tender went elsewhere, though EIA's higher Q4 oil keeps it alive.

  • Two idle rigs (e.g. Var, Hild) win multi-month work in 2027 — 30% chance by mid-2027

    • Impact on revenue: +$78M, +6.4% vs consensus FY2027.

    • Impact on EPS: +$0.11 per share.

    • How we got the number (estimate): 2 rigs × 300 days × $130k = $78M; × ($130k − $75k)/$130k ≈ 42% margin ≈ $33M ÷ 308.5M ≈ +$0.11. This excludes Var's ~$56M activation capex.

    • Expected value: 0.30 × $0.11 ≈ +$0.03.

    • What it is: 5 of 29 owned rigs were uncommitted at Q2 [3].

    • Why it's not priced in: Consensus revenue growth of ~22% in FY2027 probably already includes the full-year Noble rigs and Odin. Var and Hild have no announced work.

    • Trigger to watch: An Aramco ~9-rig award, Mexico IOC procurement "in coming months" [13], a Var contract.

    • Why this probability: Modern utilisation above 90% means idle modern rigs do find work, but Var is the least marketable and has been idle since delivery.

  • BC Ventures fourth rig restarts with Pemex — 45% chance by mid-2027

    • Impact on revenue: not consolidated (50/50 JV, equity-method assumed).

    • Impact on EPS: +$0.02 per share.

    • How we got the number (estimate): 300 days × ($110k − $65k) ≈ $13.5M × 50% ÷ 308.5M ≈ +$0.02. The rate and opex are assumptions, because Fontis-rig rates are not disclosed.

    • Expected value: 0.45 × $0.02 ≈ +$0.01.

    • What it is: Management said a fourth JV rig may restart in late 2026 or early 2027 [13].

    • Why it's not priced in: The JV is new (closed 07-29), and analysts' JV modelling is not disclosed.

    • Trigger to watch: A Pemex contract announcement for Oberon, Titania, Courageous, Defender or Intrepid.

    • Why this probability: Pemex is recalling suspended rigs, but its budget is shrinking, so this is close to a coin flip.

  • Asset value crystallised (takeover of Borr, or rig sales above book) — 8% chance within 36 months

    • Impact on revenue / EPS: not quantifiable. It is a valuation event, not an earnings change.

    • Expected value: not quantifiable.

    • What it is: The sector is consolidating (Transocean–Valaris, ADES–Shelf/Saipem/Noble rigs).

    • Why it's not priced in: No bidder is visible.

    • Trigger to watch: Drew Holdings buying past 15–20%, or a strategic review.

    • Why this probability: It was 12% in report #1. It is lower because Trøim is buying, not selling, and the bonds have change-of-control puts that make a bid expensive.

Headwinds NOT in the forecasts

  • FY2026 EBITDA lands about $75M below the ~$419M consensus — 55% chance by the Q4 report (February 2027)

    • Impact on revenue: about 0 vs consensus FY2026 $996.5M. The gap is costs and credit losses.

    • Impact on EPS: EBITDA per share −$0.24, −18% vs $1.36 consensus EBITDA per share. FY2026 EPS is distorted by the $176.3M extinguishment charge, so EBITDA per share is used.

    • How we got the number (estimate): H2 ≈ Q3 ~$102M + Q4 ~$110M = $212M; FY ≈ $132M + $212M ≈ $344M vs $419M ⇒ −$75M ÷ 308.5M ≈ −$0.24.

    • Expected value: 0.55 × −$0.24 ≈ −$0.13 per share (EBITDA).

    • What it is: H1 run-rate + 23 rigs at about $134k cannot reach about $143M a quarter.

    • Why it's not priced in: The aggregator consensus (if current) still shows $419M.

    • Trigger to watch: Q3 adjusted EBITDA below about $110M in November.

    • Why this probability: My run-rate math says a miss is more likely than not. It isn't higher because the $419M may already be stale and revised down.

  • 2027 open days get priced at about $125k instead of about $140k — 35% chance by end-2027

    • Impact on revenue: −$91M, −7.5% vs consensus FY2027 $1.22B.

    • Impact on EPS: −$0.25 per share, which would turn the $0.08 FY2027 EPS into a loss of about −$0.17.

    • How we got the number (estimate): ~6,100 open days × −$15k ≈ −$91M × 85% ÷ 308.5M ≈ −$0.25.

    • Expected value: 0.35 × −$0.25 ≈ −$0.09.

    • What it is: 2026 awards to date (about $123k/day) set the price for 2027.

    • Why it's not priced in: Consensus assumes stable rates. The 2026 award average is not widely quoted.

    • Trigger to watch: Q3 2027 coverage disclosed at a rate below $135k.

    • Why this probability: The current trend points this way, but the oil shock and >90% modern utilisation make outright further decline less likely than stagnation.

  • Pemex suspends or slows payment on two Borr-linked rigs for six months in 2027 — 20% chance in 2027

    • Impact on revenue: −$43M, −3.5% vs consensus FY2027.

    • Impact on EPS: −$0.10 per share.

    • How we got the number (estimate): 2 rigs × 180 days × $120k ≈ $43M; less ~$12M opex saved on stacked rigs ≈ −$31M ÷ 308.5M ≈ −$0.10.

    • Expected value: 0.20 × −$0.10 ≈ −$0.02.

    • What it is: The 2027 budget cuts Pemex real spending and support [38].

    • Why it's not priced in: Contracts to 2028/2030 look safe on paper.

    • Trigger to watch: Congress's final Pemex budget, Pemex rig-suspension letters, the Borr receivables note in the 20-F.

    • Why this probability: Pemex did this in 2024–25, but it is currently recalling rigs.

  • Gulf war drags into 2027: one Gulf rig idle six months plus continued war costs — 25% chance in 2027

    • Impact on revenue: −$23M, −1.9% vs consensus FY2027.

    • Impact on EPS: −$0.08 per share.

    • How we got the number (estimate): 180 days × $130k ≈ $23M revenue; EBITDA lost ≈ $15M (opex continues on standby) + ~$10M insurance and fuel ≈ $25M ÷ 308.5M ≈ −$0.08.

    • Expected value: 0.25 × −$0.08 ≈ −$0.02.

    • What it is: No ceasefire as of 10-12 [41]. Forseti is due to roll off in December 2026.

    • Why it's not priced in: EIA and most forecasters assume Gulf production normalises by end-Q2 2027 [30].

    • Trigger to watch: Arabia III status, the Forseti follow-on contract, Gulf war-risk insurance premia.

    • Why this probability: The war has outlasted two ceasefires, but every Borr Gulf rig is still under contract.

  • Another customer credit loss of about $10M — 30% chance within 12 months

    • Impact on revenue: 0.

    • Impact on EPS: −$0.03 per share.

    • How we got the number (estimate): $10M ÷ 308.5M ≈ −$0.03.

    • Expected value: 0.30 × −$0.03 ≈ −$0.01.

    • What it is: Credit losses have repeated in Q1 and Q2 2026, and there were sanction terminations in 2025.

    • Why it's not priced in: Analysts treat credit losses as one-offs.

    • Trigger to watch: The allowance line in Q3; any West African or Mexican customer distress.

    • Why this probability: Two losses in two quarters, but the known bad customer is fully provided.

  • Equity raise or dilutive financing before end-2027 — 20% chance by end-2027

    • Impact on revenue: 0.

    • Impact on EPS: −$0.01 per share (−10% vs $0.08 consensus FY2027).

    • How we got the number (estimate): $150M at $4.50 ≈ 33M new shares (+10.7%); $0.08 × 308.5/341.5 ≈ $0.072.

    • Expected value: 0.20 × −$0.01 ≈ −$0.002. Interpretation: the EPS effect is small only because EPS is near zero. The ownership dilution of about 10% is the real cost.

    • What it is: Debt service rises to about $295M a year from H2 2027.

    • Why it's not priced in: Management says it has no need.

    • Trigger to watch: Revolver drawn; a new F-3 or ATM; Drew buying stops.

    • Why this probability: It was 31% in report #1. It is cut because there are no maturities, the revolver is undrawn and the founder has bought $37M since August.

Investment Risk Score: 57/100 (elevated)

# Factor Weight Measured value Score Why
1 Liquidity & funding runway 15% Liquidity $473.6M ($223.6M cash + $250M undrawn revolver); H1-26 operating cash flow +$26.3M, ≈ +$10.5M after maintenance capex excl. Noble deposit; Q2 ≈ −$30M; no maturity before Feb-2028 ($44.2M) 48 Runway is well above 36 months and there is no going-concern doubt. FCF is around break-even, and debt service rises by ~$102M a year from July 2027.
2 Leverage 10% Net debt $2,305.6M ≈ 6.2x LTM adj EBITDA ($373.1M); ≈ 8.7x on H1 annualised; coupons ≈ $193M a year at 8.75–9.00% 84 Above 5x on a cyclical EBITDA, with a B rating.
3 Dilution (last 12 months + overhang) 10% ≈ +7.8% in 12 months (~286M → 308.5M incl. the Dec-25 21M raise); +26% in 18 months; overhang ≈ 52M (37.5M convert shares at $8 + 11.9M options at $4.45 + 2.9M RSUs/PSUs) ≈ 17% 55 Within the +3–10% band, pushed up by the overhang and tight authorised headroom.
4 Profitability 10% Q2 adj EBITDA margin 18.9%, operating cash flow −$21.8M; H1 FCF margin ≈ +2% excl. acquisitions; FY25 FCF ≈ $164M (16%); GAAP net loss Q2 −$241.4M (incl. $176.3M extinguishment) 55 Around break-even in 2026, after a solid 2025.
5 Revenue quality & concentration 10% Top customer Eni 18%, top 4 = 45% (2025); backlog $1.13B ≈ 1.1 years of revenue; contracts 45 days to 4 years 40 Top customer is in the 10–20% band. Revenue is contractual but short-dated.
6 Execution & track record 10% FY25 guide hit (top of range); FY24 at the low end; Odin 7 months late; Q2 revenue miss; no 2026 numeric guide; PwC clean, no material weakness 55 Mixed record with project delays. Controls are clean.
7 Competitive position & disruption 10% Youngest fleet, modern utilisation 91.7%; but KJO 4-rig award lost to Arabian Drilling; ADES now 88 units; awards priced ~$123k 52 Contested commodity market. Fleet quality wins volume, not price.
8 Cyclicality & commodity/macro sensitivity 10% 2025 dayrates −20.6%; 2015–17 utilisation fell to ~50%; 2020–22 debt deferrals; ±$10k/day ≈ ±$88M EBITDA 72 Highly cyclical and tied to oil-company capex.
9 Regulatory, legal & geopolitical 5% 4 rigs in a war zone (no ceasefire 10-12); 8–9 rigs Pemex-linked; sanctions terminations 2025; CEMAC FX rules; no litigation disclosed 65 Large geopolitical exposure, but no China/sanction risk to Borr itself.
10 Valuation & expectations 10% EV ≈ $3.78B ≈ 10.1x LTM EBITDA (7.9x in March); implied $133M per rig vs Esgian $86.8M; short interest 14.5% of shares, 5.85 days; price ≈ average target 55 Rich on trough earnings, fair on recovered earnings. Elevated short interest.

Overall: weighted average = 7.2 + 8.4 + 5.5 + 5.5 + 4.0 + 5.5 + 5.2 + 7.2 + 3.25 + 5.5 = 57.25 → 57.

Change vs last: −6 vs 63, which was scored under the old 6-area method, so the change is mostly methodological.

  • Higher than before: the old "Financial health" score of 78 is now split into Leverage (84) and Liquidity (48). The refinancing lowers liquidity risk, but leverage got worse as LTM EBITDA fell.
  • Lower than before: dilution risk is lower after the founder buying. Revenue concentration (40) is lower than the old 62, because Eni at 18% is the top customer and Mexico now sits on long bareboats.
  • New: valuation (55) is scored explicitly. Under the old method the sentiment area was 40.

Ranking check: BORR (57) sits between TOYO (56) and EROC (58). Unlike both, it has clean controls and about $1B of revenue. But neither of their ledger entries is driven by leverage, and leverage is BORR's biggest factor at 6.2x on a cyclical dayrate business. It also scores above VG/EQPT (54): similar leverage, but VG has 20-year offtake contracts and BORR's contracts are measured in wells and months.

Conclusion

  • What you are really betting on: that 2027 jack-up dayrates reprice upward by at least $10–20k/day before July 2027, when debt amortisation starts and pushes annual debt service to about $295M. The oil shock is the trigger, the young fleet is the means, and Trøim's buying is the signal. None of it is yet visible in Borr's contract prices.

  • The 2–3 things that will decide the outcome:

    1. The rate and coverage on 2027 days disclosed at Q3 (November) and Q4 (February).
    2. Whether Q3/Q4 EBITDA gets back to $100–135M a quarter without new credit losses.
    3. Gulf normalisation, plus Borr winning any of the Aramco ~9-rig scope.

  • Signposts:

    • Bull confirmed:
      • 2027 coverage >50% at a rate above $142k.
      • Q3 adjusted EBITDA >$110M.
      • A multi-year Aramco or Gulf award, or a Var contract.
      • Drew keeps buying above $5.
    • Bull broken:
      • 2027 booked rate below $135k.
      • Revolver drawn, or an equity raise.
      • Another credit loss of $10M+, or rising Mexican receivables.
      • Pemex suspension letters after the 2027 budget.

  • New since the last report:

    • Trøim's Drew Holdings bought about 8.6M shares (about $37M) between 08-17 and 10-12, including 6.75M in the week of 10-06. Cobas (10.2%) and Azvalor (10.0%) have filed 13Gs.
    • The KJO 4-rig award went to Arabian Drilling (09-28). The 2027 book rate slipped from $142k to about $138k, and 2026 awards average about $123k/day.
    • Corrections and confirmations:
      • The 2027 coverage of 29% at $142k is confirmed in the May deck.
      • There is no numeric 2026 EBITDA guidance at all.
      • The Perfomex partner is unnamed in the release (report #1 said "CME", which is not in the 6-K).
      • The Q2 stock drop was 4–10% depending on the source.
      • The Fearnley $6.80 and SEB $3.55 targets could not be verified. The verifiable actions are Fearnley Hold $5.60 (02-11), SEB Hold $5.45 (03-11), Citi Hold $5.50 (09-08) and Capital One Overweight $6 (about 07-01) [25].

Open questions & data gaps

  • Covenant thresholds on the amended $250M revolver (June 2026) were not found. The only figures are July-2025 proposals: minimum liquidity $30M, springing net leverage 6.00x, equity 25%, interest cover 1.50x [1]. This matters a lot: at about 6.2x LTM, a springing 6.0x test would bind if triggered.
  • The Noble seller-credit rate, and the BC Ventures seller-credit rate (reportedly 10%, rising) were not found in primary documents.
  • Mexican receivables in 2026, and Perfomex closing and price were not disclosed. This matters for Bear #6.
  • Arabia III and Forseti status after December 2026 are unknown.
  • Q2 deck 2027 coverage of about 36% at $138k comes from a secondary summary only, because the chart is an image.
  • FY2026–28 consensus EBITDA comes from an undated aggregator. FY2028 consensus was not found. This weakens the sizing of the tailwinds and headwinds.
  • Q3 2026 results date is not announced. Last year it was 11-05.
  • Drew Holdings' total stake after the October purchases is not visible on the notices.
  • The Pemex "$29B deferred to 2033" claim rests on one source (El CEO).
  • Full Q1 2026 call Q&A was not read (paywalled). The Q2 transcript is AI-generated and garbled in places.
Sources
  1. Borr Drilling Form 20-F FY2025 — SEC EDGAR — 2026-03-26 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1715497/000162828026021450/borr-20251231.htm
  2. Q2 2026 results press release (6-K ex99-1) — Borr Drilling / SEC — 2026-08-11 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001715497/000114036126032598/ef20080031_ex99-1.htm
  3. Q2 2026 report (6-K ex99-2) — Borr Drilling / SEC — 2026-08-11 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001715497/000114036126032598/ef20080031_ex99-2.htm
  4. H1 2026 interim financial statements (6-K) — Borr Drilling / SEC — 2026-08-12 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001715497/000162828026055957/borr-20260630.htm
  5. Q1 2026 results (6-K ex99-2) — Borr Drilling / SEC — 2026-05-20 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001715497/000114036126022412/ef20074577_ex99-2.htm
  6. Q4 2025 results (6-K ex99-1/ex99-2) — Borr Drilling / SEC — 2026-02-18 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1715497/000114036126006137/ef20066099_ex99-1.htm
  7. Investor Presentation May 2026 — Borr Drilling — 2026-05-26 — https://api.borrdrilling.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Investor-Presentation-May-2026.pdf
  8. Q2 2026 presentation (6-K ex99-2) — Borr Drilling / SEC — 2026-08-12 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1715497/000114036126032660/ef20080142_ex99-2.htm
  9. Fleet and contracting update (6-K) — Borr Drilling / SEC — 2026-09-15 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1715497/000114036126036705/ef20082084_ex99-1.htm
  10. Divestment of Mexican joint ventures (6-K) — Borr Drilling / SEC — 2026-09-15 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001715497/000114036126036608/ef20082025_ex99-1.htm
  11. Contracting updates (6-K) — Borr Drilling / SEC — 2026-09-30 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001715497/000114036126038129/ef20083023_ex99-1.htm
  12. Pricing of $2.035B senior secured notes (6-K) — Borr Drilling / SEC — 2026-05-27 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001715497/000114036126023042/ef20075065_ex99-1.htm
  13. Earnings call transcript: Borr Drilling Q2 2026 (AI-generated) — Investing.com — 2026-08-12 — https://www.investing.com/news/transcripts/earnings-call-transcript-borr-drilling-q2-2026-miss-sparks-10-stock-drop-93CH-4855392
  14. Borr Drilling Q2 2026 slides summary (2027 coverage 36% @ $138k; secondary) — Investing.com — 2026-08-12 — https://www.investing.com/news/company-news/borr-drilling-q2-2026-slides-refinancing-complete-amid-transition-costs-93CH-4855430
  15. Borr Drilling provides operational update on Arabian Gulf operations — Borr Drilling via MFN — 2026-03-09 — https://mfn.se/cis/a/borr-drilling/borr-drilling-limited-borr-drilling-provides-operational-update-on-arabian-gulf-operations-f6abe32c
  16. Notification of PDMR transaction (Drew Holdings, 2.5M sh @ $4.7374) — Borr Drilling via Inderes — 2026-10-12 — https://www.inderes.dk/releases/borr-drilling-limited-notification-of-pdmr-transaction-18
  17. Notifications of PDMR transactions (Drew Holdings 08-17 to 10-08; CEO Morand 09-21) — Borr Drilling via Inderes — 2026-08-17 to 2026-10-08 — https://www.inderes.dk/releases/borr-drilling-limited-notification-of-pdmr-transaction-17 (and -9, -10, -12 to -16)
  18. Notification of PDMR transaction (Drew 500k, Currie 250k) — Borr Drilling via Inderes — 2026-03-25 — https://www.inderes.dk/releases/borr-drilling-limited-notification-of-pdmr-transaction-5
  19. Notification of PDMR transaction (RSU/PSU grant) — Borr Drilling via Inderes — 2026-08-25 — https://www.inderes.dk/releases/borr-drilling-limited-notification-of-pdmr-transaction-11
  20. Borr — major shareholding notification (Granular Capital) — MFN — 2026-06-10 — https://mfn.se/ob/a/borr-drilling/borr-major-shareholding-notification-147ba85f
  21. Schedule 13G, Cobas Asset Management — SEC EDGAR — 2026-08 (event 2026-08-13) — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001715497/000170593126000001/primary_doc.xml
  22. Schedule 13G, Azvalor — Stock Titan / SEC — 2025-11-25 — https://www.stocktitan.net/sec-filings/BORR/schedule-13g-borr-drilling-ltd-sec-filing-3055495aeacf.html
  23. BORR forecast (S&P Global data) — StockAnalysis — accessed 2026-10-13 — https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/borr/forecast/
  24. BORR statistics (EV, short interest) — StockAnalysis — accessed 2026-10-13 — https://www.stockanalysis.com/stocks/borr/statistics/
  25. Borr Drilling consensus estimates and ratings — Investing.com — accessed 2026-10-13 — https://www.investing.com/equities/borr-drilling-consensus-estimates
  26. BORR short interest (FINRA) — Curvedtrading — 2026-08-14 — https://curvedtrading.com/stocks/borr/short-interest/
  27. Borr Drilling EBITDA forecast (undated, possibly stale) — StocksGuide — accessed 2026-10-13 — https://stocksguide.com/en/forecast/Borr-Drilling-Ltd-BMG1466R2078
  28. Borr Drilling valuation multiples (FactSet) — multiples.vc — 2026-03 — https://multiples.vc/public-comps/borr-drilling-valuation-multiples
  29. Borr Drilling to acquire five rigs; SEB downgrade — Yahoo Finance — 2026-03 — https://finance.yahoo.com/sectors/energy/articles/borr-drilling-borr-acquire-five-192529207.html
  30. Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026 — global oil — U.S. EIA — 2026-10-06 — https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.php
  31. Valaris Q2 2026 results (8-K ex99.1) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-08-05 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000314808/000031480826000138/a06302026ex991pressrelease.htm
  32. Valaris fleet status report (8-K ex99.1) — SEC EDGAR — 2026-08-05 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000314808/000031480826000139/fsrex99_1august2026.htm
  33. From fixtures to values: where the jackup recovery is already being priced — Esgian / Offshore Engineer — 2026-07-08 — https://www.oedigital.com/news/541040-from-fixtures-to-values-where-the-jackup-recovery-is-already-being-priced
  34. Westwood Insight: Middle East conflict reverberates through jackup market — Westwood Global Energy — 2026-05-13 — https://www.westwoodenergy.com/news/westwood-insight/westwood-insight-middle-east-conflict-reverberates-through-jackup-market
  35. Arabian Drilling wins four-jackup offshore contract from KJO — Drilling Contractor — 2026-09-29 — https://drillingcontractor.org/arabian-drilling-wins-four-jackup-offshore-contract-from-kjo-80162
  36. ADES Holding reports revenue growth, profit decline in H1 2026 — Baird Maritime — 2026-08 — https://www.bairdmaritime.com/offshore/vessels-rigs/ades-holding-reports-revenue-growth-profit-decline-in-h1-2026 (summary only)
  37. Saipem sells Saudi jack-up drilling business to ADES for $285m — MEED — 2026-06-26 — https://www.meed.com/saipem-sells-saudi-jack-up-drilling-business-to-ades-for-285m (summary only)
  38. México alista recorte al presupuesto de Pemex y CFE — Bloomberg Línea — 2026-09-09 — https://www.bloomberglinea.com/latinoamerica/mexico/mexico-alista-recorte-al-presupuesto-de-pemex-y-cfe-pero-las-compensara-con-transferencias/
  39. Pemex difiere 29,235 mdd en pagos a proveedores hasta 2033 — El CEO — 2026-01-07 — https://elceo.com/negocios/pemex-difiere-29235-mdd-en-pagos-a-proveedores-hasta-2033/
  40. Lime Petroleum Holding update on strategic review and restructuring — Euronext Oslo — 2026-06-08 — https://live.euronext.com/sites/default/files/company_press_releases/attachments_oslo/2026/06/08/675573_2026-06-08%20LPH%20-%20Press%20Release%20%20Lime%20Petroleum%20Holding%20AS%20update%20on%20strategic%20review%20and%20restructuring%20process.pdf
  41. US-Iran war live updates — CBS News — 2026-10-12 — https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/us-iran-war-deal-strait-of-hormuz/ (summary only)
  42. Why Borr Drilling stock withered Wednesday — Motley Fool via Nasdaq — 2026-08-12 — https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/why-borr-drilling-stock-withered-wednesday (summary only)
  43. Westwood Insight: rig dayrates and new orders — Hellenic Shipping News — 2023-09-04 — https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/1001334-2/ (summary only)
  44. Transocean and Valaris to combine in $5.8bn all-share deal — Marine Log — 2026-02-09 — https://www.marinelog.com/offshore/transocean-and-valaris-to-combine-in-5-8bn-all-share-deal/
  45. Borr Drilling completes $84M offering; S&P downgrades to 'B' — Yahoo Finance — 2025-12 — https://finance.yahoo.com/news/borr-drilling-borr-completes-84m-164156865.html (summary only)
  46. Borr Q2 2026 call machine transcript — Gloom — 2026-08-12 — https://gloom.sh/stocks/borr/transcripts/q2-2026
  47. Borr Drilling Form 20-F FY2024 — SEC EDGAR — 2025-03-25 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1715497/000162828025014602/borr-20241231.htm
  48. Borr Drilling posts earnings results (Q2 consensus, price) — MarketBeat — 2026-08-12 (price updated 2026-10-12) — https://www.marketbeat.com/instant-alerts/borr-drilling-nyseborr-posts-earnings-results-2026-08-12/
  49. Noble Corporation announces second quarter 2026 results — Noble — 2026-07-27 — https://noblecorp.com/press-release/noble-corporation-plc-announces-second-quarter-2026-results/ (summary only)
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Disclaimer. AI-generated research and podcast (Claude by Anthropic, voices by Google Gemini) for educational purposes — not financial advice and not a recommendation to buy or sell. Willem (MR.INVEST) owns this stock. Check the company’s own filings before making any decision.
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